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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 



DOCTRINE 



OF 



THE WILL 

i 

BY REV. A. MAHAN, 

PRESIDENT OF THE OBERLIN COLLEGIATE INSTITUTE. 



" Not man alone, all rationals Heaven arms 
With an illustrious, but tremendous power, 
To counteract its own most gracious ends ; 
And this, of strict necessity, not choice ; 
That power denied, men, angels, were no more 
But passive engines void of praise or blame. 
A nature rational implies the power 
Of being blest, or wretched, as we please. 
* * * * * * 

Man falls by man, if finally he falls ; 
And fall he must, who learns from death alone, 
The dreadful secret— That he lives for ever." 

Young. 





NEW YORK: 
MARK H. NEWMAN, 199 BROADWAY. ~ 
OBERLIN, OHIO. R.E.GILLET. 



t Pn/lfce s6£*6, &fa^ 






Entered according'to an Act of Congress, in the year 1844* by 

ASA MAHAN, 

In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States, for the 
Southern District of New York* 



S 



S. W. BENEDICT & CO., STER. & PRINT, j 
16 Spruce street. 






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CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER I. Page 

Introductory Observations. — Importance of the Subject — True 
and false Methods of Inquiry — Common Fault — Proper Method of 
Reasoning from Revelation to the System of Mental Philosophy 
therein pre-supposed — Errors of Method, 8 

CHAPTER II. 

Classification of the Mental Faculties. — Classification veri- 
fied, 22 

CHAPTER III. 

Liberty and Necessity. — Terms defined — Characteristics of the 
above Definitions — Motive defined— Liberty as opposed to Necessity 
the Characteristic of the Will — Objections to Doctrine of Neces- 
sity — Doctrine of Liberty, direct Argument — Objection to an Appeal 
to Consciousness — Doctrine of Liberty argued from the existence of 
the idea of Liberty in all Minds — The Doctrine of Liberty, the Doc- 
trine of the Bible — Necessity as held by Necessitarians — The term 
Certainty, as used by them — Doctrine of Ability, according to the 
Necessitarian Scheme— Sinful Inclinations — Necessitarian Doc- 
trine of Liberty — Ground which Necessitarians are bound to take in 
respect to the Doctrine of Ability — Doctrine of Necessity, as regarded 
by Necessitarians of different Schools, 29 

CHAPTER IV. 

Extent and Limits of the Liberty of the Will. — Strongest 
Motive — Reasoning in a Circle, 84 

CHAPTER V. 

Greatest apparent Good. — Phrase defined — Its meaning according 
to Edwards — The Will not always as the Dictates of the Intelli- 
gence — Not always as the strongest desire — Nor as the Intelligence 
and Sensibility combined — Necessitarian Argument — Motives cause 
acts of the Will, in what sense — Particular Volitions, how account- 
ed for— Facts wrongly accounted for — Choosing between Objects 
known to be equal, how treated by Necessitarians — Palpable Mis- 
take, 91 

CHAPTER VI. 

Doctrine of Liberty and the Divine Prescience. — Dangers to 
be avoided — Mistake respecting Divine Prescience — Inconsistency 
of Necessitarians — Necessitarian Objection, 110 

CHAPTER VII. 

Doctrine of Liberty and the Divine Purposes and Agency. — 
God's Purposes consistent with the Liberty of Creatures — Senses in 
which God purposed moral Good and Evil — Death of the Incorrigi- 
ble preordained, but not willed — God not responsible for their 
Death — Sin a Mystery— Conclusion from the above, 118 

CHAPTER VIII. 

Obligation predicable only of the Will. — Men not responsible 
for the Sin of their progenitors — Constitutional Ill-desert— Present 
Impossibilities riot required, . 124 



VI CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER IX. Page 

Standard of Moral Character. — Sincerity, and not Intensity, the 
true Standard, 137 

CHAPTER X. 

Moral acts never of a mixed Character. — Acts of Will result- 
ing from a variety of Motives — Loving with a greater Intensity at 
one time than another — Momentary Revolutions of Character, 144 

CHAPTER XL 

Relations of the Will to the Intelligence and Sensibility, 
in states morally right, or wrong. — Those who are and are 
not virtuous, how distinguished — Selfishness and Benevolence — 
Common Mistake— Defective forms of Virtue — Test of Conformity 
to Moral Principle — Common Mistake — Love as required by the 
Moral Law — Identity of Character among all Beings morally Vir- 
tuous, 156 

CHAPTER XII. 

Element of the Will in complex Phenomena. — Natural Propen- 
sities — Sensation, Emotion, Desire, and Wish defined — Anger, Pride, 
Ambition, &c. — Religious Affections — Repentance— Love — Faith — 
Convictions, Feelings and external Actions, why required or pro- 
hibited — Our Responsibility in respect to such Phenomena — Feel- 
ings how controlled by the Will — Relation of Faith to other Exer- 
cises morally right, 169 

CHAPTER XIII. 

Influence of the Will in Intellectual Judgments. — Men often 
voluntary in their Opinions — Error not from the Intelligence, but 
Will — Primary Faculties cannot err — So of the secondary Faculties 
— Assumptions — Pre-judgments — Intellect not deceived in Pre-judg- 
ments — Mind, how influenced by them— Influences which induce 
false Assumptions — Cases in which we are apparently, though not 
really, misled by the Intelligence, 183 

CHAPTER XIV. 

Liberty and Servitude. — Liberty as opposed to moral Servitude — 
Mistake of German Metaphysicians — Moral Servitude of the race, 194 

CHAPTER XV. 

Liberty and Dependence.— Common Impression — Spirit of De- 
pendence — Doctrine of Necessity tends not to induce this Spirit — 
Doctrine of Liberty does — God controls all Influences under which 
Creatures act — Dependence on account of moral Servitude, 198 

CHAPTER XVI. 

Formation of Character.— Commonly how accounted for— The 
voluntary element to be taken into the account — Example in Illus- 
tration — Diversities of Character, 205 

CHAPTER XVII. 

Concluding Reflections. — Objection, The Will has its Laws — Ob- 
jection, God dethroned from his Supremacy if the Doctrine of Lib- 
erty is true — Great and good Men have held the doctrine of Neces- 
sity—Last Resort— Willing and aiming to perform impossibilities— 
Thought at Parting, 210 



DEDICATORY PREFACE. 



To one whose aim is, to " serve his generation ac- 
cording to the Will of God," but two reasons would 
seem to justify an individual in claiming the atten- 
tion of the public in the capacity of an author — the 
existence in the public mind of a want which needs 
to be met, and the full belief, that the Work which 
he has produced is adapted to meet that want. Un- 
der the influence of these two considerations, the fol- 
lowing Treatise is presented to the public. Whether 
the author has judged rightly or not, it is not for him 
to decide. The decision of that question is left with 
the public, to whom the Work is now presented. It 
is doubtful, whether any work, prepared with much 
thought and pains-taking, was ever published with 
the conviction, on the part of the author, that it was 
unworthy of public regard. The community, how- 
ever, may differ from him entirely on the subject ; 
and, as a consequence, a work which he regards as 
so imperiously demanded by the public interest, falls 



Vlll DEDICATORY PREFACE. 

dead from the press. Many an author, thus disap- 
pointed, has had occasion to be reminded of the ad- 
monition, " Ye have need of patience." Whether 
the following Treatise shall succeed in gaining the 
public ear, or not, one consolation will remain with 
the writer, the publication of the work has satis- 
fied his sense of duty. To his respected Associates 
in the Institution over which he presides, Associates 
with whose approbation and counsel the work was 
prepared, the Author would take this occasion pub- 
licly to express his grateful acknowledgments for 
the many important suggestions which he received 
from them, during the progress of its preparation. 

Having said thus much, he would simply add, 
that, To the Lovers of Truth, the Work is now 

RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED, WITH THE KIND REGARDS 

OF 

THE AUTHOR. 



CHAPTER I. 
INTRODUCTORY OBSERVATIONS. 

IMPORTANCE OF THE SUBJECT. 

The doctrine of the Will is a cardinal doctrine of 
theology, as well as of mental philosophy. This 
doctrine, to say the least, is one of the great central 
points, from which the various different and conflict- 
ing systems of theological, mental, and moral science, 
take their departure. To determine a man's senti- 
ments in respect to the Will, is to determine his po- 
sition, in most important respects, as a theologian, 
and mental and moral philosopher. If we turn our 
thoughts inward, for the purpose of knowing what we 
are, what we ought to do, and to be, and what we 
shall become, as the result of being and doing what 
we ought or ought not, this doctrine presents itself 
at once, as one of the great pivots on which the 
resolution of all these questions turns. 

If, on the other hand, we turn our thoughts from 

ourselves, to a study of the character of God, and 

of the nature and character of the government which 

He exercises over rational beings, all our apprehen- 

2 



10 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

sions here, all our notions in respect to the nature 
and desert of sin and holiness, will, in many funda- 
mental particulars, be determined by our notions in 
respect to the Will. In other words, our apprehen- 
sions of the nature and character of the Divine gov- 
ernment, must be determined, in most important re- 
spects, by our conceptions of the nature and powers 
of the subjects of that government. I have no wish 
to conceal from the reader the true bearing of our 
present inquiries. I wish him distinctly to under- 
stand, that in fixing his notions in respect to the doc- 
trine of the Will, he is determining a point of obser- 
vation from which, and a medium through which, he 
shall contemplate his own character and deserts as a 
moral agent, and the nature and character of that 
Divine government, under which he must ever " live, 
and move, and have his being." 

TRUE AND FALSE METHODS OF INQUIRY. 

Such being the bearing of our present inquiries, 
an important question arises, to wit : What should 
be the influence of such considerations upon our in- 
vestigations in this department of mental science i 
It should not surely induce us, as appears to be true 
in the case of many divines and philosophers even, 
first to form our system of theology, and then, in the 
light of that, to determine our theory of the Will. 
The true science of the Will, as well as that of all 
other departments of mental philosophy, " does not 



INTRODUCTORY OBSERVATIONS. 11 

come by observation," but by internal reflection. 
Because our doctrine of the Will, whether true or 
false, will have a controlling influence in determin- 
ing the character of our theology, and the meaning 
which we shall attach to large portions of the Bible, 
that doctrine does not, for that reason, lose its exclu- 
sively psychological character. Every legitimate 
question pertaining to it, still remains purely and 
exclusively a psychological question. The mind has 
but one eye by which it can see itself, and that is the 
eye of consciousness. This, then, is the organ of 
vision to be exclusively employed in all our inquiries 
in every department of mental science, and in none 
more exclusively than in that of the Will. We know 
very well, for example, that the science of optics has 
a fundamental bearing upon that of Astronomy. 
What if a philosopher, for that reason, should form 
his theory of optics by looking at the stars ? This 
would be perfectly analogous to the conduct of a di- 
vine or philosopher who should determine his theory 
of the Will, not by psychological reflection, but by a 
system of theology formed without such reflection. 
Suppose again, that the science of Geometry had the 
same influence in theology, that that of the Will now 
has. This fact would not change at all the nature of 
that science, nor the mode proper in conducting our 
investigations in respect to it. It would still remain 
a science of demonstration, with all its principles and 
rules of investigation unchanged. So with the doc- 



12 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

trine of the Will. Whatever its bearings upon other 
sciences may be, it still remains no less exclusively 
a psychological science. It has its own principles 
and laws of investigation, principles and laws as in- 
dependent of systems of theology, as the principles 
and laws of the science of optics are of those of As- 
tr6nomy. In pursuing our investigations in all other 
departments of mental science, we, for the time being, 
cease to be theologians. We become mental philo- 
sophers. Why should the study of the Will be an 
exception ? 

The question now returns — what should be the 
bearing of the fact, that our theory of the Will, 
whether right or wrong, will have an important influ- 
ence in determining our system of theology ? This 
surely should be its influence. It should induce in 
us great care and caution in our investigations in this 
department of mental science. We are laying the 
foundation of the most important edifice of which it 
ever entered into the heart of man to conceive — an 
edifice, all the parts, dimensions, and proportions of 
which, we are required most sedulously to conform 
to the "pattern shown us in the mount." Under 
such circumstances, w T ho should not be admonished, 
that he should " dig deep, and lay his foundation 
upon a rock ?" I will therefore, in view of what has 
been said above, earnestly bespeak four things of the 
reader of the following treatise. 



INTRODUCTORY OBSERVATIONS. 13 

1. That he read it as an honest, earnest inquirer 
after truth. 

2. That he give that degree of attention to the 
work, that is requisite to an understanding of it. 

3. That when he dissents from any of its funda- 
mental principles, he will distinctly state to his own 
mind the reason and ground of that dissent, and care- 
fully investigate its validity. If these principles are 
wrong, such an investigation will render the truth 
more conspicuous to the mind, confirm the mind in 
the truth, and furnish it with means to overturn the 
opposite error. 

4. That he pursue his investigations with implicit 
confidence in the distinct affirmations of his own 
consciousness in respect to this subject. Such a sug- 
gestion would appear truly singular, if made in re- 
spect to any other department of mental science but 
that of the WilL Here it is imperiously called for ; 
so long have philosophers and divines been accus- 
tomed to look without, to determine the characteris- 
tics of phenomena which appear exclusively within, 
and which are revealed to the eye of consciousness 
only. Having been so long under the influence of 
this pernicious habit, it will require somewhat of an 
effort for the mind to turn its organ of self-vision in 
upon itself, for the purpose of correctly reporting to 
itself, what is really passing in that inner sanctuary. 
Especially will it require an effort to do this, with a 
fixed determination to abandon all theories formed 

2* 



14 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

from external observation, and to follow implicitly 
the results of observations made internally. This 
method we must adopt, however, or there is at once 
an end of all real science, not only in respect to the 
Will, but to all other departments of the mind. Sup- 
pose an individual to commence a treatise on colors, 
for example, with a denial of the validity of all affir- 
mations of the Intelligence through the eye, in re- 
spect to the phenomena about which he is to treat. 
What would be thought of such a treatise ? The 
moment we deny the validity of the affirmations of 
any of our faculties, in respect to the appropriate 
objects of those faculties, all reasoning about those 
objects becomes the height of absurdity. So in re- 
spect to the mind. If we doubt or deny the validity 
of the affirmations of consciousness in respect to the 
nature and characteristics of all mental operations, 
mental philosophy becomes impossible, and all reason- 
ing in respect to the mind perfectly absurd. Im- 
plicit confidence in the distinct affirmations of con- 
sciousness, is a fundamental law of all correct philo- 
sophizing in every department of mental science. 
Permit me most earnestly to bespeak this confidence, 
as we pursue our investigations in respect to the WilL 

COMMON FAULT. 

It may be important here to notice a common fault 
in the method frequently adopted by philosophers in 
their investigations in this department of mental sci- 



INTRODUCTORY OBSERVATIONS. 15 

ence. In the most celebrated treatise that has ever 
appeared upon this subject, the writer does not recol- 
lect to have met with a single appeal to consciousness , 
the only adequate witness in the case. The whole 
treatise, almost, consists of a series of syllogisms, 
linked together with apparent perfectness, syllogisms 
pertaining to an abstract something called Will. 
Throughout the whole, the facts of consciousness are 
never appealed to. In fact, in instances not a few, 
among writers of the same school, the right to make 
such an appeal, on the ground of the total inadequacy 
of consciousness to give testimony in the case, has 
been formally denied. Would it be at all strange, if it 
should turn out that all the fundamental results of 
investigations conducted after such a method, should 
be wholly inapplicable to the Will, the phenomena 
of which lie under the eye of consciousness, or to 
stand in plain contradiction to the phenomena thus 
affirmed 1 What, from the method adopted , we see 
is very likely to take place, we find, from experience, 
to be actually true of the treatise above referred to. 
This is noticed by the distinguished author of The 
Natural History of Enthusiasm, in an Essay introduc- 
tory to Edwards on the Will. " Even the reader," he 
says, " who is scarcely at all familiar with abstruse 
science, will, if he follow our author attentively, be 
perpetually conscious of a vague dissatisfaction, or 
latent suspicion, that some fallacy has passed into the 
train of propositions, although the linking of syllogisms 



16 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

seems perfect. This suspicion will increase in 
strength as he proceeds, and will at length condense 
itself into the form of a protest against certain con- 
clusions, notwithstanding their apparently necessary 
connection with the premises." What should we 
expect from a treatise on mental science, from which 
the affirmations of consciousness should be formally 
excluded, as grounds of any important conclusions ? 
Just what we find to be true, in fact, of the above 
named treatise on the Will ; to wit : all its funda- 
mental conclusions positively contradicted by such 
affirmations. What if the decisions of our courts of 
justice were based upon data from which the testi- 
mony of all material witnesses has been formally ex:- 
cluded ? Who would look to such decisions as the 
exponents of truth and justice ? Yet all the elements 
in those decisions may be the necessary logical con- 
sequents of the data actually assumed. Such deci- 
sions may be all wrong, however, from the fact that 
the data which ought to be assumed in the case, were 
excluded. The same will, almost of necessity, be 
true of all treatises, in every department of mental 
science, which are not based upon the facts of con- 
sciousness. 

PROPER METHOD OF REASONING FROM REVELATION TO 
THE SYSTEM OF MENTAL PHILOSOPHY THEREIN 
PRE-SUPPOSED. 

By what has been said, the reader will not under- 
stand me as denying the propriety of comparing our 



"introductory observations. 17 

conclusions in mental science with the Bible. 
Though no system of mental philosophy is directly 
revealed in the Bible, some one system is therein 
pre-supposed, and assuming, as we do, that the Scrip- 
tures are a revelation from God, we must suppose 
that the system of mental science assumed in the sa- 
cred writings, is the true system. If we could find 
the system pre-supposed in the Bible, we should 
have an infallible standard by which to test the valid- 
ity of any conclusions to which we have arrived, as 
the results of psychological investigation. It is 
therefore a very legitimate, interesting, and profitable 
inquiry — what is the system of mental science as- 
sumed as true in the Bible ? We may very properly 
turn our attention to the solution of such a question. 
In doing this, however, two things should be kept 
distinctly in mind. 

1. In such inquiries, we leave the domain of men- 
tal philosophy entirely, and enter that of theology. 
In the latter we are to be guided by principles entire- 
ly distinct from those demanded in the former. 

2. In reasoning from the Bible to the system of 
mental philosophy pre-supposed in the Scriptures, 
we are in danger of assuming wrong data as the 
basis of our conclusions ; that is, we are in danger 
of drawing our inferences from those truths of Scrip- 
ture which have no legitimate bearing upon the 
subject, and of overlooking those which do have 
such a bearing. While there are truths of inspira- 



18 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

tion from which we may properly reason to the the- 
ory of the Will, pre-supposed in the Bible, there are 
other truths from which we cannot legitimately thus 
reason. Now suppose that we have drawn our con- 
clusions from truths of inspiration which have no le- 
gitimate bearing upon the subject, truths which, if we 
do reason from them in the case, will lead us to wrong 
conclusions ; suppose that in the light of such conclu- 
sions we have explained the facts of consciousness, 
assuming that such must be their true character, else 
we deny the Bible. Shall we not then have almost 
inextricably lost ourselves in the labyrinth of error? 
The following principles may be laid down as uni- 
versally binding, if we would reason correctly, as 
philosophers and theologians, on the subject under 
consideration. 

1. In the domain of philosophy, we must confine 
ourselves strictly and exclusively to the laws of 
psychological investigation, without reference to any 
system of theology. 

2. In the domain of theology, when we would 
reason from the truths of inspiration to the theory of 
the Will pre-supposed in the Bible, we should be 
exceedingly careful to reason from those truths only 
which have a direct and decisive bearing upon the 
subject, and not from those which have no such 
bearing. 

3. We should carefully compare the conclusions 
to which we have arrived in each of these domains, 



INTRODUCTORY OBSERVATIONS. 19 

assuming that if they do not harmonize, we have 
erred either as philosophers or theologians. 

4. In case of disagreement, we should renew our 
independent investigations in each domain, for the 
purpose of detecting the error into which we have 
fallen. 

In conducting an investigation upon such princi- 
ples, we shall, with almost absolute certainty, find 
ourselves in each domain, following rays of light, 
which will converge together in the true theory of 
the Will. 

ERRORS OF METHOD. 

Two errors into which philosophers and divines of 
a certain class have fallen in their method of treating 
the department of our subject now under considera- 
tion, here demand a passing notice. 

1. The two methods above referred to, the psy- 
chological and theological, which should at all times 
be kept entirely distinct and separate, have unhappi- 
ly been mingled together. Thus the subject has 
failed to receive a proper investigation in the domain, 
either of theology or of philosophy. 

2. In reasoning from the Scriptures to the theory 
of the Will pre-supposed in the same, the wrong truth 
has been adduced as the basis of such reasoning, to 
wit : the fact of the Divine foreknowledge. As all 
events yet future are foreknown to God, they are in 
themselves, it is said, alike certain. This certainty 
necessitates the adoption of a particular theory of 



20 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL 

the Will. Now before we can draw any such con- 
clusion from the truth before us, the following things 
pertaining to it we need to know with absolute cer- 
tainty, things which God has not revealed, and 
which we never can know, until He has revealed 
them, to wit : the mode, the nature, and the degree of 
the Divine foreknowledge. Suppose that God should 
impart to us apprehensions perfectly full and distinct, 
of the mode, nature and degree of His fore- 
knowledge of human conduct. How do we know but 
that we should then see with the most perfect clear- 
ness, that this foreknowledge is just as consistent 
with the theory of the Will, denied by the philoso- 
phers and divines under consideration, as with that 
which they suppose necessarily to result from the 
Divine foreknowledge ? This, then, is not the truth 
from which we should reason to the theory of the 
Will pre-supposed in the Bible. 

There are truths of inspiration, however, which 
appear to me to have a direct and decisive bearing 
upon this subject, and upon which we may therefore 
safely base our conclusions. In the Scriptures, man 
is addressed as a moral agent, the subject of com- 
mands and prohibitions, of obligation, of merit and 
demerit, and consequently of reward and punish- 
ment. Now when we have determined the powers 
which an agent must possess, to render him a proper 
subject of command and prohibition, of obligation, of 
merit and demerit, and consequently of reward and 



INTRODUCTORY OBSERVATIONS. 21 

punishment, we have determined the philosophy of 
the Will, really pre-supposed in the Scriptures. 
Beneath these truths, therefore, and not beneath that 
of the divine foreknowledge, that philosophy is to be 
sought for. This I argue — 

1. Because the former has a direct , while the lat- 
ter has only an indirect bearing upon the subject. 

2. Of the former our ideas are perfectly clear and 
distinct, while of the mode, the degree, and the na- 
ture of the Divine foreknowledge we are profoundly 
ignorant. To all eternity, our ideas of the nature of 
commands and prohibitions, of obligations, of merit 
and demerit, and of reward and punishment grounded 
on moral desert, can never be more clear and distinct 
than they now are. From such truths, then, and not 
from those that we do not understand, and which at 
the utmost have only an indirect bearing upon the 
subject, we ought to reason, if we reason at all, to 
the philosophy of the Will pre-supposed in the Scrip- 
tures. The reader is now put in possession of the 
method that will be pursued in the following treatise, 
and is consequently prepared to enter upon the inves- 
tigation of the subject before us. 



CHAPTER II. 

CLASSIFICATION OF THE MENTAL FACULTIES, 

Every individual who has reflected with any degree 
of interest upon the operations of his own mind, can- 
not have failed to notice three classes of men- 
tal phenomena, each of which is entirely distinct 
from either of the others. These phenomena, which 
comprehend the entire operations of the mind, and 
which may be expressed by the terms thinking, feel- 
ing , and willing, clearly indicate in the mind three 
faculties equally distinct from one another. These 
faculties are denominated the Intellect, the Sensibil- 
ity or Sensitivity, and the Will. To the first, all in- 
tellectual operations, such as perceiving, thinking, 
judging, knowing, &c, are referred. To the second, 
we refer all sensitive states, all feelings, such as sen- 
sations, emotions, desires, &c. To the Will, or the 
active voluntary faculty, are referred all mental de- 
terminations, such as purposes, intentions, resolu- 
tions, choices and volitions. 

CLASSIFICATION VERIFIED. 

1. The classes of phenomena, by which this 
tri-unity of the mental powers is indicated, differ 
from one another, not in degree, but in kind. 
Thought, whether clear or obscure, in all de- 



CLASSIFICATION OF MENTAL FACULTIES. 23 

grees, remains equally distinct, in its nature, from feel- 
ings and determinations of every class. So of feel- 
ings. Sensations, emotions, desires, all the phenome- 
na of the Sensibility, in all degrees and modifications, 
remain, in their nature and essential characteristics, 
equally distinct from thought on the one hand, and 
the action of the Will on the other. The same 
holds true of the phenomena of the Will. A reso- 
lution, for example, in one degree, is not a thought ; 
in another, a sensation, emotion, or desire ; and in 
another a choice, purpose, intention, or volition. In 
all degrees and modifications, the phenomena of the 
Will, in their nature and essential characteristics, re- 
main equally distinct from the operations of the 
Intelligence on the one hand, and of the Sensibility 
on the other. 

2. This distinction is recognized by universal con- 
sciousness. When, for example, one speaks of 
thinking of any particular object, then of desiring it, 
and subsequently of determining to obtain the object, 
for the purpose of gratifying that desire, all mankind 
most clearly recognize his meaning in each of the 
above-named affirmations, and understand him as 
speaking of three entirely distinct classes of mental 
operations. No person, under such circumstances, 
ever confounds one of these states with either of the 
others. So clearly marked and distinguished is the 
three-fold classification of mental phenomena under 
consideration, in the spontaneous affirmations of uni- 
versal consciousness. 



24 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

3. In all languages, also, there are distinct terms 
appropriated to the expression of these three classes 
of phenomena, and of the mental power indicated by 
the same. In the English language, for example, 
we have the terms thinking, feeling, and willing, each 
of which is applied to one particular class of these 
mental phenomena, and never to either of the others. 
We have also the terms Intellect, Sensibility, and 
Will, appropriated, in a similar manner, to designate 
the mental powers indicated by these phenomena. 
In all other languages, especially among nations of 
any considerable advancement in mental culture, we 
find terms of precisely similar designation. What 
do such facts indicate ? They clearly show, that in 
the development of the universal Intelligence, the 
different classes of phenomena under consideration 
have been distinctly marked, and distinguished from 
one another, together with the three-fold division of 
the mental powers indicated by the same phenomena. 

4. The clearness and particularity with which the 
universal intelligence has marked the distinction un- 
der consideration, is strikingly indicated by the fact, 
that there are qualifying terms in common use which 
are applied to each of these classes of phenomena, 
and never to either of the others. It is true that 
there are such terms which are promiscuously applied 
to all classes of mental phenomena. There are 
terms, however, which are never applied to but 
one class. Thus we speak of clear thoughts, but 



CLASSIFICATION OF MENTAL FACULTIES. 25 

never of clear feelings or determinations. We speak 
of irrepressible feelings and desires, but never of irre- 
pressible thoughts or resolutions. We also speak of 
inflexible determinations, but never of inflexible feel- 
ings or conceptions. With what perfect distinctness, 
then, must universal consciousness have marked 
thoughts, feelings, and determinations of the Will, 
as phenomena entirely distinct from one another — 
phenomena differing not in degree, but in kind, and as 
most clearly indicating the threefold division of the 
mental powers under consideration. 

5. So familiar are mankind with this distinction, 
so distinctly marked is it in their minds, that in fa- 
miliar intercourse, when no particular theory of the 
mental powers is in contemplation, they are accus- 
tomed to speak of the Intellect, Sensibility, and Will, 
and of their respective phenomena, as entirely dis- 
tinct from one another. Take a single example from 
Scripture. u What I shall choose, I wot not — having 
a desire to depart." Here the Apostle evidently speaks 
of desire and choice as phenomena differing in kind, 
and not in degree. " If you engage his heart" [his 
feelings], says Lord Chesterfield, speaking of a for- 
eign minister, " you have a fair chance of imposing 
upon his understanding, and determining his Will." 
u His Will" says another writer, speaking of the 
insane, u is no longer restrained by his Judgment, but 
driven madly on by his passions." 
3* 



26 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

" When wit is overruled by Witt, 
And Will is led by fond Desire, 
Then Reason may as well be still, 
As speaking, kindle greater fire ."# 

In all the above extracts the tri-unity of the mental 
powers, as consisting of the Intellect, Sensibility, and 
Will, is distinctly recognized. Yet the writers had, 
at the time, no particular theory of mental philoso- 
phy in contemplation. They speak of a distinc- 
tion of the mental faculties which all understand 
and recognize as real, as soon as suggested to their 
minds. 

The above considerations are abundantly sufficient 
to verify the threefold distinction above made, of 
mental phenomena and powers. Two suggestions 
arise here which demand special attention. 

1 . To confound either of these distinct powers of 
the mind with either of the others, as has been done 
by several philosophers of eminence, in respect to 
the Will and Sensibility, is a capital error in mental 
science. If one faculty is confounded with another, 
the fundamental characteristics of the former will 
of course be confounded with the same characteris- 
tics of the latter. Thus the worst forms of error 
will be introduced not only into philosophy, but 
theology, too, as far as the latter science is influenced 
by the former. What would be thought of a treatise 
on mental science, in which the Will should be con- 

* See Upham on the Will, pp. 32—35. 



CLASSIFICATION OF MENTAL FACULTIES. 27 

founded with the Intelligence, and in which thinking 
and willing would be consequently represented as 
phenomena identical in kind ? This would be an error 
no more capital, no more glaring, no more distinctly 
contradicted by fundamental phenomena, than the 
confounding of the Will with the Sensibility. 

2. We are now prepared to contemplate one of the 
great errors of Edwards in his immortal work on the 
Will — an error which we meet with in the com- 
mencement of that work, and which lays a broad 
foundation for the false conclusions subsequently 
found in it. He has confounded the Will with the 
Sensibility. Of course, we should expect to find 
that he has subsequently confounded the fundamental 
characteristics of the phenomena of the former 
faculty, with the same characteristics of the latter. 

" God has endowed the soul," he says, " with two 
faculties : One is that by which it is capable of per- 
ception and speculation, or by which it discerns, and 
views, and judges of things ; which is called the 
understanding. The other faculty is that by which 
the soul does not merely perceive and view things, 
but is some way inclined to them, or is disinclined 
and averse from them ; or is the faculty by which the 
soul does /iot behold things as an indifferent, unaf- 
fected spectator ; but either as liking or disliking, 
pleased or displeased, approving or rejecting. This 
faculty, as it has respect to the actions that are 
determined by it, is called the Will." 



28 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

From his work on the Affections, I cite the follow- 
ing to the same import : 

" The Affections of the soul,"' he observes, " are 
not properly distinguished from the Will, as though 
they were two faculties of the soul. All acts of the 
Affections of the soul are, in some sense, acts of the 
Will, and all acts of the Will are* acts of the affec- 
tions. All exercises of the Will are, in some degree 
or other, exercises of the soul's appetition or aver- 
sion ; or which is the same thing, of its love or hat- 
tred. The soul wills one thing rather than another, 
or chooses one thing rather than another, no other- 
wise than as it loves one thing more than another." 
" The Affections are only certain modes of the exer- 
cise of the Will." " The Affections are no other 
than the more vigorous and sensible exercises of the 
inclination and will of the soul." 

Whether he has or has not subsequently confound- 
ed the fundamental characteristics of the phenomena 
of the Will with those of the phenomena of the 
Sensibility will be seen in the progress of the present 
treatise. 



CHAPTER III. 

LIBERTY AND NECESSITY. 

We come now to consider the great and funda- 
mental characteristic of the Will, that by which it is, 
in a special sense, distinguished from each of the 
other mental faculties, to wit : that of Liberty. 

SEC. I. TERMS DEFINED. 

Our first inquiry respects the meaning of the term 
Liberty as distinguished from that of Necessity. 
These terms do not differ, as expressing genus and 
species ; that is, Liberty does not designate a species 
of which Necessity expresses the genus. On the 
other hand, they differ by way of opposition. All 
correct definitions of terms thus related, will pos- 
sess these two characteristics. 1. They will mu- 
tually exclude each other ; that is, what is affirmed 
of one, will, in reality, be denied of the other. 
2. They will be so defined as to be universal in their 
application. The terms right and wrong, for example, 
thus differ from each other. In the light of all cor- 
rect definitions of these terms, it will be seen with 
perfect distinctness, 1st, that to affirm of an action 
that it is right, is equivalent to an affirmation that it 
is not wrong ; and to affirm that it is wrong, is to 
affirm that it is not right ; 2d, that all moral actions^ 



30 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

actual and conceivable, must be either right or wrong. 
So of all other terms thus related. 

The meaning of the terms Liberty and Necessity, 
as distinguished the one from the other, may be 
designated by a reference to two relations perfectly 
distinct and opposite, which may be supposed to exist 
between an antecedent and its consequent. 

1. The antecedent being given, one, and only one, 
consequent can possibly arise, and that consequent must 
arise. This relation we designate by the term Necessi- 
ty. I place my finger, for example, constituted as my 
physical system now is, in the flame of a burning 
candle, and hold it there for a given time. The two 
substances in contact is the antecedent. The feeling 
of intense pain which succeeds is the consequent. 
Now such is universally believed to be the corre- 
lation between the nature of these substances, that 
under the circumstances supposed, but one conse- 
quent can possibly arise, and that consequent must 
arise ; to wit — the feeling of pain referred to. The re- 
lation between such an antecedent and its consequent, 
therefore, we, in all instances, designate by the term 
Necessity. When the relation of Necessity is pre- 
supposed, in the presence of a new consequent, we 
affirm absolutely that of a new antecendent. 

2. The second relation is this. The antecedent 
being given, either of two or more consequents is 
equally possible, and therefore, when one consequent 
does arise, we affirm that either of the others might 



LIBERTY AND NECESSITY. 31 

have arisen in its stead. When this relation is pre- 
supposed, from the appearance of a new consequent, 
we do not necessarily affirm the presence of a new 
antecedent. This relation we designate by the term 
Liberty. 

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ABOVE DEFINITIONS. 

On the above definitions I remark : 

1. That they mutually exclude each other. • To 
predicate Liberty of any phenomenon is to affirm 
that it is not necessary. To predicate Necessity of 
it, is equivalent to an affirmation that it is not free. 

2. They are strictly and absolutely universal in 
their application. All antecedents and consequents, 
whatever the nature of the subjects thus connected 
may be, must fall under one or the other of these 
relations. As the terms right and wrong, when cor- 
rectly defined, will express the nature of all moral 
actions, actual and conceivable, so the terms Liberty 
and Necessity, as above defined, clearly indicate the 
nature of the relation between all antecedents and 
consequents, real and supposable. Take any ante- 
cedent and consequent we please, real or conceiva- 
ble, and we know absolutely, that they must sustain 
to each other one or the other of these relations. 
Either in connection with this antecedent, but this 
one consequent is possible, and this must arise, or in 
connection with the same antecedent, either this, or 
one or more different consequents are possible, and 



32 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

consequently equally so : for possibility has, in reali- 
ty, no degrees. 

3. All the phenomena of the Will, sustaining, as 
they do, the relation of consequents to motives con- 
sidered as antecedents, must fall under one or the 
other of these relations. If we say, that the rela- 
tion between motives and acts of Will is that of 
certainty ) still this certainty must arise from a neces- 
sary relation between the antecedent and its conse- 
quent, or it must be of such a nature as consists 
with the relation of Liberty, in the sense of the term 
Liberty as above defined. 

4. The above definitions have this great advantage 
in our present investigations. They at once free the 
subjct from the obscurity and perplexity in which it is 
often involved by the definitions of philosophers. 
They are accustomed, in many instances, to speak of 
moral necessity and physical necessity, as if these are 
in reality different kinds of necessity : whereas the 
terms moral and physical, in such connections, ex- 
press the nature of the subjects sustaining to each 
other the relations of antecedents and consequents, and 
not at all that of the relation existing between them. 
This is exclusively expressed by the term Necessity 
— a term which designates a relation which is always 
one and the same, whatever the nature of the sub- 
jects thus related may be. An individual in a treatise 
on natural science, might, if he should choose, in 
speaking of the relations of antecedents and conse- 



LIBERTY AND NECESSITY. 33 

quents among solid, fluid, and aeriform substances, 
use the words, solid necessity, fluid necessity, and 
aeriform necessity. He might use as many qualifying 
terms as there are different subjects sustaining to 
each other the relation under consideration. In all 
such instances no error will arise, if these quali- 
fying terms are distinctly understood to designate, 
not the nature of the relation of antecedent and 
consequent in any given case (as if there were as 
many different kinds of necessity as there are quali- 
fying terms used), but to designate the nature of the 
subjects sustaining this relation. If, on the other 
hand, the impression should be made, that each of 
these qualifying terms designates a necessity of a 
peculiar kind, and if, as a consequence, the belief 
should be induced, that there are in reality so many 
different kinds of necessity, errors of the gravest 
character would arise — errors no more important, 
however, than actually do arise from the impression 
often induced, that moral necessity differs in kind from 
physical necessity. 

5. I mention another very decisive advantage 
which the above definitions have in our present in- 
vestigations. In the light of the terms Liberty and 
Necessity, as above defined, the two great schools in 
philosophy and theology are obliged to join issue 
directly upon the real question in difference between 
them, without the possibility on the part of either, 
of escaping under a fog of definitions about moral 
4 



34 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

necessity, physical necessity, moral certainty, &c, 
and then claiming a victory over their opponents. 
These terms, as above defined, stand out with perfect 
clearness and distinctness to all reflecting minds. 
Every one must see, that the phenomena of the Will 
cannot but fall under the one or the other of the re- 
lations designated by these terms ; inasmuch as no 
third relation differing in kind from both of these, is 
conceivable. The question therefore may be fairly 
put to every individual, without the possibility 
of misapprehension or evasion — Do you believe, 
whenever a man puts forth an act of Will, that in 
those circumstances, this one act only is possible, and 
that this act cannot but arise ? In all prohibited acts, 
for example, do you believe that an individual, by 
the resistless providence of God, is placed in circum- 
stances in which this one act only is possible, and 
this cannot but result, that in these identical circum- 
stances, another and a different act is required of him, 
and that for not putting forth this last act, he is justly 
held as infinitely guilty in the sight of God, and of 
the moral universe ? To these questions every one 
must give an affirmative or negative answer. If he 
gives the former, he holds the doctrine of Necessity, 
and must take that doctrine with all its consequences. 
If he gives the latter, he holds the doctrine of Liber- 
ty in the sense of the term as above defined. He 
must hold, that in the identical circumstances in which 



LIBERTY AND NECESSITY. 35 

a given act of Will is put forth, another and different 
act might have been put forth; and that for this 
reason, in all prohibited acts, a moral agent is held 
justly responsible for different and opposite acts. 
Much is gained to the cause of truth, when, as in 
the present instance, the different schools are obliged 
to join issue directly upon the real question in diffe- 
rence between them, and that without the possibility 
of misapprehension or evasion in respect to the nature 
of that question. 

MOTIVE DEFINED. 

Having settled the meaning of the terms Liberty 
and Necessity, as designating two distinct and oppo- 
site relations, the only relations conceivable between 
an antecedent and its consequent, one other term 
which may not unfrequently be used in the following 
treatise, remains to be defined ; to wit — motive — a 
term which designates that which sustains to the 
phenomena of the Will, the relation of antecedent. 
Volition, choice, preference, intention, all the pheno- 
mena of the Will, are considered as the consequent. 
Whatever within the mind itself may be supposed 
to influence its determinations, whether called sus- 
ceptibilities, biases, or anything else ; and all in- 
fluences acting upon it as incentives from without, 
are regarded as the antecedent. I use the term 
motive as synonymous with antecedent as above de- 
fined. It designates all the circumstances and influ- 



86 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL.' 

ences from within or without the mind, which operate 
upon it to produce any given act of Will. 

The term antecedent in the case before us, in 
strictness of speech, has this difference of meaning 
from that of motive as above defined : The former 
Includes all that is designated by the latter, together 
with the Will itself. No difficulty or obscurity, how- 
ever, will result from the use of these terms as synony- 
mous, in the sense explained. 

SEC. II. LIBERTY, AS OPPOSED TO NECESSITY, THE CHA- 
RACTERISTIC OF THE WILL. 

We are now prepared to meet the question, To 
which of the relations above defined shall we refer 
the phenomena of the Will? If these phenomena 
are subject to the law of necessity, then, whenever 
a particular antecedent (motive) is given, but one 
consequent (act of Will) is possible, and that conse- 
quent must arise. It cannot possibly but take place. 
If, on the other hand, these phenomena fall under 
the relation of Liberty, whenever any particular mo- 
tive is present, either of two or more acts of Will is 
equally possible ; and when any particular con- 
sequent (act of Will) does arise, either of the other 
consequents might have arisen in its stead. 

Before proceeding directly to argue the question 
before us, one consideration of a general nature de- 
mands a passing notice. It is this. The simple 
statement of the question, in the light of the above 



LIBERTY AND NECESSITY. 37 

relations, settles it, and must settle it, in the judg- 
ment of all candid, uncommitted inquirers after the 
truth. Let any individual contemplate the action of 
his voluntary powers in the light of the relations of 
Liberty and Necessity as above defined, and he will 
spontaneously affirm the fact, that he is a free and 
not a necessary agent, and affirm it as absolutely as 
he affirms his own existence. Wherever he is, 
while he retains the consciousness of rational being, 
this conviction will and must be to him an omnipre- 
sent reality. To escape it, he must transcend the 
bounds of conscious existence. 

OBJECTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 

Such is the importance of the subject, however, 
that a more extended and particular consideration 
of it is demanded. In the further prosecution of 
the argument upon the subject, we will — 

I. In the first place, contemplate the position, that 
the phenomena of the Will are subject to the laws of 
Necessity. In taking this position we are at once met 
with the following palpable and insuperable difficul- 
ties. 

1. The conviction above referred to — a conviction 
which remains proof against all apparent demonstra- 
tions to the contrary. We may pile demonstration 
upon demonstration in favor of the doctrine of Neces- 
sity, still, as the mind falls back upon the spontane- 
ous affirmations of its own Intelligence, it finds, in 
4* 



38 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

the depths of its inner being, a higher demonstration 
of the fact, that that doctrine is and must be false — 
that man is not the agent which that doctrine affirms 
him to be. In the passage already cited, and which 
I will take occasion here to repeat, the writer has, 
with singular correctness, mapped out the unvarying 
experience of the readers of Edwards on the Will. 
" Even the reader," he says, " who is scarcely at all 
familiar with abstruse science, will, if he follow our 
author attentively, be perpetually conscious of a 
vague dissatisfaction, or latent suspicion, that some 
fallacy has passed into the train of propositions, al- 
though the linking of syllogisms seems perfect. This 
suspicion will increase in strength as he proceeds, 
and will at length condense itself into the form of a 
protest against certain conclusions, notwithstanding 
their apparently necessary connection with the prem- 
ises." What higher evidence can we have that that 
treatise gives a false interpretation of the facts of 
universal consciousness pertaining to the Will, than 
is here presented ? Any theory which gives a dis- 
tinct and true explanation of the facts of conscious- 
ness, will be met by the Intelligence with the re- 
sponse, "That's true; I have found it." Any the- 
ory apparently supported by adequate evidence, but 
which still gives a false interpretation of such facts, 
will induce the internal conflict above described — a 
conflict which, as the force of apparent demonstration 
increases, will, in the very centre of the Intelligence, 



LIBERTY AND NECESSITY. 39 

" condense itself into the form of a protest against 
the conclusions presented, notwithstanding their ap- 
parently necessary connection with the premises."* 
The falsity of the doctrine of Necessity is a first 
truth of the universal Intelligence. 

2. If this doctrine is true, it is demonstrably evi- 
dent, that in no instance, real or supposable, have men 
any power whatever to will or to act differently 
from what they do. The connection between the 
determinations of the Will, and their consequents, 
external and internal, is absolutely necessary. Con- 
stituted as I now am, if I will, for example, a parti- 
cular motion of my hand or arm, no other movement, 
in these circumstances, was possible, and this move- 
ment could not but take place. The same holds true 
of all consequents, external and internal, of all acts of 
Will. Let us now suppose that these acts themselves 
are the necessary consequents of the circumstances 
in which they originate. In what conceivable sense 
have men, in the circumstances in which Providence 
places them, power either to will or to act differently 
from what they do ? The doctrine of ability to will 
or to do differently from what we do is, in every 
sense, false, if the doctrine of Necessity is true. 
Men, when they transgress the moral law, always sin, 
without the possibility of doing right. From this 
position the Necessitarian cannot escape. 

3. On this theory, God only is responsible for all 
human volitions together with their effects. The re- 



40 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

lation between all antecedents and their consequents 
was established by him. If that relation be in all 
instances a necessary one, his Will surely is the sole 
responsible antecedent of all consequents. 

4. The idea of obligation, of merit and demerit, 
and of the consequent propriety of reward and punish- 
ment, are chimeras. To conceive of a being deserv- 
ing praise or blame, for volitions or actions which 
occurred under circumstances in which none others 
were possible, and in which these could not possibly 
but happen, is an absolute impossibility. To con- 
ceive him under obligation to have given existence, 
under such circumstances, to different consequents, 
is equally impossible. It is to suppose an agent 
under obligation to perform that to which Omnipo- 
tence is inadequate. For Omnipotence cannot per- 
form impossibilities. It cannot reverse the law of 
Necessity. Let any individual conceive of creatures 
placed by Divine Providence in circumstances in 
which but one act, or series of acts of Will, can 
arise, and these cannot but arise — let him, then, at- 
tempt to conceive of these creatures as under obliga- 
tion, in these same circumstances, to give existence 
to different and opposite acts, and as deserving of 
punishment for not doing so. He will find it as im- 
possible to pass such a judgment as to conceive of 
*he annihilation of space, or of an event without a 
cause. To conceive of necessity and obligation as 
fundamental elements of the same act, is an absolute 



LIBERTY AND NECESSITY. 41 

■ 

impossibility. The human Intelligence is incapable 
of affirming such contradictions. 

5. As an additional consideration, to show the 
absolute incompatibility of the idea of moral obliga- 
tion with the doctrine of Necessity, permit me to 
direct the attention of the reader to this striking fact. 
While no man, holding the doctrine of Liberty as 
above defined, was ever known to deny moral obli- 
gation, such denial has, without exception, in every 
age and nation, been avowedly based upon] the as- 
sumption of the truth of the doctrine of Necessity. In 
every age and nation, in every solitary mind in which 
the idea of obligation has been denied, this doctrine 
has been the great maelstrom in which this idea has 
been swallowed up and lost. How can the Neces- 
sitarian account for such facts in consistency with his 
theory ? 

6. The commands of God addressed to men as 
sinners and requiring them in all cases of trangres- 
sion of the moral law, to choose and to act differ- 
ently from what they do, are, if this doctrine is true, 
the perfection of tyranny. In all such cases men are 
required — 

(1.) To perform absolute impossibilities; to re- 
verse the law of necessity. 

(2.) To do that to which Omnipotence is inade- 
quate. For Omnipotence, as we have seen, cannot 
reverse the law of necessity. Not only so, but — 

(3.) Men in all such instances are required, as a 



42 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL, 



• 



matter of fact, to resist and overcome Omnipotence, 
To require us to reverse the relation established by 
Omnipotence, between antecedents and consequents, 
is certainly to require us to resist and overcome Om- 
nipotence, and that in the absence of all power, even 
to attempt the accomplishment of that which we 
are required to accomplish. 

7. If this doctrine is true, at the final Judgment 
the conscience and intelligence of the universe will 
and must be on the side of the condemned. Sup- 
pose that when the conduct of 4 the wicked shall be 
revealed at that Day, another fact shall stand out 
with equal conspicuousness, to wit, that God himself 
had placed these beings where but one course of con- 
duct was possible to them, and that course they 
could not but pursue, to wit, the course which they 
did pursue, and that for having pursued this course, 
the only one possible, they are now to be " punished 
with everlasting destruction from the presence of 
God and the glory of his power," must not the in- 
telligence of the universe pronounce such a sentence 
unjust ? All this must be true, or the doctrine of 
Necessity is false. Who can believe, that the pil- 
lars of God's eternal government rest upon such a 
doctrine ? 

8. On this supposition, probation is an infinite ab- 
surdity. We might with the same propriety repre- 
sent the specimens in the laboratory of the chemist^ 
as on probation, as men, if their actions are the ne- 



LIBERTY AND NECESSITY. 43 

cessary result of the circumstances in which Om- 
nipotence has placed them. What must intelligent 
beings think of probation for a state of eternal retri- 
bution, probation based on such a principle ? 

9. The doctrine of Necessity is, in all essential 
particulars, identical with Fatalism in its w r orst form. 
All that Fatalism ever has maintained, or now main- 
tains, is, that men, by a power which they cannot 
control nor resist, are placed in circumstances in which 
they cannot but pursue the course of conduct which 
they actually are pursuing. This doctrine has never 
affirmed, that, in the Necessitarian sense, men cannot 
u do as they please." All that it maintains is, that 
they cannot but please to do as they do. Thus this 
doctrine differs not one " jot or tittle," from Neces- 
sity. No man can show the want of perfect identity 
between them. Fatalists and Necessitarians may 
differ in regard to the origin of this Necessity. 
In regard to its nature, the only thing material, as 
far as present inquiries are concerned, they do not 
differ at all. 

10. In maintaining the Necessity of all acts of the 
Will of mem, we must maintain, that the Will of God 
is subject to the same law. This is universally ad- 
mitted by Necessitarians themselves. Now in main- 
taining the necessity of all acts of the Divine Will, 
the following conclusions force themselves upon us : 

( 1 . ) Motives which necessitate the determinations 
of the Divine Will, are the sole originating and effi- 



44 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

cient causes in existence. God is not the first cause 
of anything*, 

(2.) To motives, which of course exist indepen- 
dently of the Divine Will, we must ascribe the origin 
of all created existences. The glory of originating 
" all things visible and invisible," belongs not to Him, 
but to motives. 

(3.) In all cases in which creatures are required 
to act differently from what they do, as in all acts of 
sin, they are in reality required not only to resist and 
overcome the omnipotent determinations of the Di- 
vine Will, but also the motives by which the action 
of God's Will is necessitated. We ask Necessita- 
rians to look these consequences in the face, and 
then say, whether they are prepared to deny, or to 
meet them. 

11. Finally, if the doctrine under consideration is 
true, in all instances of the transgression of the moral 
law, men are, in reality, required to produce an event 
which, when it does exist, shall exist without a 
cause. In circumstances where but one event is 
possible, and that cannot but arise, if a different event 
should arise, it would undeniably be an event with- 
out a cause. To require such an event under such 
circumstances, is to require an event without a cause, 
the most palpable contradiction conceivable. Now 
just such a requirement as this is laid upon men, in all 
cases of disobedience of the moral law, if the doc- 
trine of Necessity is true. In all such cases, accord- 



LIBERTY AND NECESSITY. 45 

ing to this doctrine men are placed in circumstances 
in which but one act is possible, and that must arise, 
to wit : the act of disobedience which is put forth. 
If, in these circumstances, an act of obedience should 
be put forth, it would be an event without a cause, 
and in opposition also to the action of a necessary 
cause. In these identical circumstances, the act of 
obedience is required, that is, an act is required of 
creatures, which, if it should be put forth, would be 
an event without a cause. Has a God of truth and 
justice ever laid upon men such a requisition as that ? 
How, I ask, can the doctrine of Necessity be extri- 
cated from such a difficulty ? 

DOCTRINE OF LIBERTY DIRECT ARGUMENT. 

II. We will now, as a second general argument, 
consider the position, that the Will is subject in its 
determinations to the relation of Liberty, in opposi- 
tion to that of Necessity. Here I would remark, 
that as the phenomena of the Will must fall under 
one or the other of these relations, and as it has been 
shown, that they cannot fall under that of Necessity, 
but one supposition remains. They must fall under 
that of Liberty, as opposed to Necessity. The in- 
trinsic absurdity of supposing that a being, all of 
whose actions are necessary, is still accountable for 
such actions, is sufficient to overthrow the doctrine 
of Necessity for ever. A few additional considera- 
5 



46 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

tions are deemed requisite, in order to present the 
evidence in favor of the Liberty of the Will. 

1. The first that I present is this. As soon as the 
doctrine of Liberty, as above defined, is distinctly ap- 
prehended, it is spontaneously recognized by every 
mind, as the true, and only true exposition of the 
facts of its own consciousness pertaining to the phe- 
nomena of the Will. This doctrine is simply an an- 
nouncement of the spontaneous affirmations of the 
universal Intelligence. This is the highest possible 
evidence of the truth of the doctrine. 

2. The universal conviction of mankind, that their 
former course of conduct might have been different 
from what it was. I will venture to affirm, that 
there is not a person on earth, who has not this con- 
viction resting upon his mind in respect to his own 
past life. It is important to analyze this conviction, 
in order to mark distinctly its bearing upon our pres- 
ent inquiries. This conviction is not the belief, that 
if our circumstances had been different, we might 
have acted differently from what we did. A man, 
for example, says to himself— " At such a time, and 
in such circumstances, I determined upon a particular 
course of conduct. I might have determined upon 
a different and opposite course. Why did I not ? " 
These affirmations are not based upon the convic- 
tion, that, in different circumstances, we might have 
done differently. In all such affirmations we take 
into account nothing but the particular circum- 



LIBERTY AND NECESSITY. 47 

stances in which our determinations were formed. 
It is in view of these circumstances exclusively, that 
we affirm that our determinations might have been 
different from what they were. Let the appeal be 
made to any individual whatever, whose mind is not 
at the time under the influence of any particular the- 
ory of the Will. You say, that at such a time, and 
under such circumstances, you determined upon a 
particular course, that you might then have resolved 
upon a different and opposite course, and that you 
blame yourself for not having done so. Is not this 
your real meaning ? u If my circumstances had been 
different, I might have resolved upon a different 
course." No, he would reply. That is not my 
meaning. I was not thinking at all of a change of 
circumstances, when I made this affirmation. What 
I mean is, that in the circumstances in which I was, 
I might have done differently from what I did. This 
is the reason why I blame myself for not having done 
so. The same conviction, to wit : that without any 
change of circumstances our past course of life might 
have been different from what it was, rests upon every 
mind on earth in which the remembrance of the past 
dwells. Now this universal conviction is totally false, 
if the doctrine of Necessity is true. The doctrine of 
the Liberty of the Will must be true, or the univer- 
sal Intelligence is a perpetual falsehood. 

3. In favor of the doctrine of Liberty, I next ap- 
peal to the direct, deliberate, and universal testimony 
of consciousness. This testimony is given in three ways. 



48 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

(1.) In the general conviction above referred to, 
that without any change of circumstances, our course 
of conduct might have been the opposite of what it 
was. Nothing but a universal consciousness of the 
Liberty of the Will, can account for this conviction. 

(2.) Whenever any object of choice is submitted 
to the mind, consciousness affirms, directly and posi- 
tively, that, under these identical circumstances, 
either of two or more acts of Will is equally possible. 
Every man in such circumstances is as conscious of 
such power as he is of his own existence. In confirma- 
tion of these affirmations, let any one make the ap- 
peal to his own consciousness, when about to put 
forth any act of Will. He will be just as conscious 
that either of two or more different determinations 
is, in the same circumstances, equally possible, as 
he is of any mental state whatever. 

(3.) In reference to ail deliberate determinations 
of Will in time past, the remembrance of them is at- 
tended with a consciousness the most positive, that ? 
in the same identical circumstances, determinations 
precisely opposite might have been originated. Let 
any one recall any such determination, and the con- 
sciousness of a power to have determined differently 
will be just as distinctly recalled as the act itself. 
He cannot be more sure that he acted at all, than he 
will be, that he might have acted [determined] dif- 
ferently. All these affirmations of consciousness are 
false, if the doctrine of Liberty is not true. 



LIBERTY AND NECESSITY. 49 

4. A fundamental distinction which all mankind 
make between the phenomena of the Will, and those 
of the other faculties, the Sensibility for example, is 
a full confirmation of the doctrine of Liberty, as a 
truth of universal consciousness. A man is taken 
out of a burning furnace, with his physical system 
greatly injured by the fire. As a consequence, he 
subsequently experiences much suffering and incon- 
venience. For the injury done him by the fire, and 
for the pain subsequently experienced, he never 
blames or reproaches himself. With self-reproach 
he never says, Why, instead of being thus injured, 
did I not come out of the furnace as the three wor- 
thies did from that of Nebuchadnezzar ? Why do I 
not now experience pleasure instead of pain, as a 
consequence of that injury ? Suppose, now, that his 
fall into the furnace was the result of a determina- 
tion formed for the purpose of self-murder. For 
that determination, and for not having, in the same cir- 
cumstances, determined differently, he will ever after 
reproach himself, as most guilty in the sight of God 
and man. How shall we account for the absence of 
self-reproach in the former instance, and for its pres- 
ence in the latter ? If the appeal should be made to the 
subject, his answer would be ready. In respect to the 
injury and pain, in the circumstances supposed, they 
could not but be experienced. Such phenomena, 
therefore, can never be the occasion of self-reproach. 
In the condition in which the determination referred 
5* 



50 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

to was formed, a different and opposite resolution 
might have been originated. That particular deter- 
mination, therefore, is the occasion of self-reproach. 
How shall we account for this distinction, which all 
mankind agree in making, between the phenomena of 
the Sensibility on the one hand, and of the Will on 
the other? But one supposition accounts for this 
fact, the universal consciousness, that the former are 
necessary, and the latter free ; that in the circum- 
stances of their occurrence the former may not, and 
the latter may, be different from what they are. 

5. On any other theory than that of Liberty, the 
words, obligation, merit and demerit, &c, are words 
without meaning. A man is, we will suppose, by 
Divine Providence, placed in circumstances in which 
he cannot possibly but pursue one given course, or, 
which is the same thing, put forth given determina- 
tions. When it is said that, in these identical circum- 
stances, he ought to pursue a different and opposite 
course, or to put forth different and opposite deter- 
minations, what conceivable meaning can we attach 
to the word ought, here ? There is nothing, in the 
circumstances supposed, which the word, ought, or 
obligation, can represent. If we predicate merit or 
demerit of an individual thus circumstanced, we use 
words equally without meaning. Obligation and 
moral desert, in such a case, rest upon u airy noth- 
ing," without a u local habitation or a name." 

On the other hand, if we suppose that the right 



LIBERTY AND NECESSITY. 51 

and the wrong are at all times equally possible to an 
individual ; that when he chooses the one, he might, 
in the same identical circumstances, choose the other; 
infinite meaning attaches to the words, ought, obli- 
gation, merit and demerit, when it is said that an 
individual thus circumstanced ought to do the right 
and avoid the wrong, and that he merits reward or 
punishment, when he does the one, or does not do the 
other. The ideas of obligation, merit and demerit, 
reward and punishment, and probation with reference 
to a state of moral retribution, are all chimeras, on 
any other supposition than that of the Liberty of the 
Will. With this doctrine, they all perfectly harmo- 
nize. 

6. All moral government, all laws, human and Di- 
vine, have their basis in the doctrine of Liberty ; and are 
the perfection of tyranny, on any other supposition. To 
place creatures in circumstances which necessitate a 
given course of conduct, and render every other 
course impossible, and then to require of them, under 
the heaviest sanctions, a different and opposite course 
— what can be tyranny if this is not ? 

OBJECTION IN BAR OF AN APPEAL TO CONSCIOUSNESS. 

An objection which is brought by Necessitarians, 
in perpetual bar of an appeal to consciousness, to de- 
termine the fact whether the phenomena of the Will 
fall under the relation of Liberty or Necessity, here 
demands special attention. Consciousness, it is said, 



52 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL, 

simply affirms, that, in given circumstances, we do, in 
fact, puf forth certain acts of Will. But whether we can 
or cannot, in these circumstances, put forth other and 
opposite determinations, it does not and cannot make 
any affirmation at all. It does not, therefore, fall 
within the province of Consciousness to determine 
whether the phenomena of the Will are subject to 
the relation of Liberty or Necessity ; and it is unphi- 
losophical to appeal to that faculty to decide such 
a question. This objection, if valid, renders null and 
void much of what has been said upon this subject ; 
and as it constitutes a stronghold of the Necessita- 
rian, it becomes us to examine it with great care. In 
reply, I remark, 

1. That if this objection holds in respect to the 
phenomena of the Will, it must hold equally in re- 
spect of those of the other faculties ; the Intelligence, 
for example. We will, therefore, bring the objection 
to a test, by applying it to certain intellectual phe- 
nomena. We will take, as an example, the univer- 
sal and necessary affirmation, that " it is impossible 
for the same thing, at the same time, to be and not 
to be." Every one is conscious, in certain circum- 
stances, of making this and other kindred affirma- 
tions. Now, if the objection under consideration is 
valid, all that we should be conscious of is the fact, 
that, under the circumstances supposed, we do, in 
reality, make particular affirmations ; while, in refer- 
ence to the question, whether, in the same circum- 



LIBERTY AND NECESSITY. 53 

stances, we can or cannot make different and oppo- 
site affirmations, we should have no consciousness at 
all. Now, I appeal to every man, whether, when 
he is conscious of making* the affirmation, that it is 
impossible for the same thing, at the same time, to 
be and not to be, he is not equally conscious of the 
fact, that it is impossible for him to make the oppo- 
site affirmation ; whether, when he affirms that three 
and two make five, he is not conscious that it is 
impossible for him to affirm that three and two are 
six 1 In other words, when we are conscious of 
making certain intellectual affirmations, are we not 
equally conscious of an impossibility of making dif- 
ferent and opposite affirmations ? Every man is just 
as conscious of the fact, that the phenomena of his 
Intelligence fall under the relation of Necessity, as he 
is of making any affirmations at all. If this is not so, 
we cannot know but that it is possible for us to affirm 
and believe perceived contradictions. All that we 
could say is, that, as a matter of fact, we do not do 
it. But whether we can or cannot do it, we can 
never know. Do we not know, however, as abso- 
lutely as we know anything, that we cannot affirm 
perceived contradictions] In other words, we do 
and can know absolutely, that our Intelligence is sub- 
ject to the law of Necessity. We do know by con- 
sciousness, with absolute certainty, that the phe- 
nomena of the Intelligence, and I may add, of the 
Sensibility too, do fall under the relation of Neces- 



54 DOCTRtNE OF THE WILL. 

sity. Why may we not know, with equal certainty, 
whether the phenomena of the Will do or do not fall 
under the relation of Liberty % What then becomes of 
the objection under consideration ? 

2. But while we are conscious of the fact, that the 
Intellect is under the law of Necessity, we are equally 
conscious that Will is under that of Liberty. We 
make intellectual affirmations ; such, for example, 
as the propositions, Things equal to the same things 
are equal to one another, There can be no event with- 
out a cause, &c, with a consciousness of an utter 
impossibility of making different and opposite affirm- 
ations. We put forth acts of Will with a conscious- 
ness equally distinct and absolute, of a possibility, in 
the same circumstances, of putting forth different and 
opposite determinations. Even Necessitarians admit 
and affirm the validity of the testimony of conscious- 
ness in the former instance. Why should we doubt 
or deny it in the latter 1 

3. The question, whether Consciousness can or 
cannot give us not only mental phenomena, but also 
the fundamental characteristics of such phenomena, 
cannot be determined by any pre-formed theory, in 
respect to what Consciousness can or cannot affirm. 
If we wish to know to what a witness is able to tes- 
tify, we must not first determine what he can or 
cannot say, and then refuse to hear anything from 
him, except in conformity to such decisions. We 
must first give him a full and attentive hearing, and 
then judge of his capabilities. So in respect to Con- 



LIBERTY AND NECESSITY. 55 

sciousness. If we wish to know what it does or does 
not, what it can or cannot affirm, we must let it give 
its full testimony, untrammelled by any preformed the- 
ories. Now, when the appeal is thus made, we find, 
that, in the circumstances in which we do originate 
given determinations, it affirms distinctly and abso- 
lutely, that, in the same identical circumstances, we 
might originate different and opposite determinations. 
From what Consciousness does affirm, we ought 
surely to determine the sphere of its legitimate af- 
firmations. 

4. The universal solicitude of Necessitarians to take 
the question under consideration from the bar of Con- 
sciousness is, in fact, a most decisive acknowledg- 
ment, on their part, that at that tribunal the cause 
will go against them. Let us suppose that all men 
were as conscious that their Will is subject to the law 
of Necessity, as they are that their Intelligence is. 

Can we conceive that Necessitarians would not be as 

i 

solicitous to carry the question directly to the tri- 
bunal of Consciousness, as they now are to take it 
from that tribunal ? When all men are as conscious 
that their Will is under the law of Liberty, as they 
are that their other faculties are under the relation of 
Necessity, no wonder that Necessitarians anticipate 
the ruin of their cause, when the question is to be 
submitted to the bar of Consciousness. No wonder 
that they so solemnly protest against an appeal to 
that tribunal. Let the reader remember, however, 



56 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

that the moment the 'validity of the affirmations of 
Consciousness is denied, in respect to any question 
in mental science, it becomes infinite folly in us to 
reason at all on the subject ; a folly just as great as 
it would be for a natural philosopher to reason about 
colors, after denying the validity of all affirmations of 
the eye, in respect to the phenomena about which 
he is to reason. 

DOCTRINE OF LIBERTY ARGUED FROM THE EXISTENCE 
OF THE IDEA OF LIBERTY IN ALL MINDS. 

III. I will present a third general argument in 
favor of the doctrine of Liberty ; an argument, which, 
to my mind, is perfectly conclusive, but which differs 
somewhat from either of the forms of argumentation 
above presented. I argue the Liberty of the Will 
from the existence of the idea of Liberty in the human 
mind, in the form in which it is there found. 

If the Will is not free, the idea of Liberty is 
wholly inapplicable to any phenomenon in existence 
whatever. Yet this idea is in the mind. The action 
of the Will in conformity to it is just as conceivable 
as its action in conformity to the idea of Necessity. 
It remains with the Necessitarian to account for the 
existence of this idea in the human mind, in consis- 
tency with his own theory. Here the following con- 
siderations present themselves demanding special 
attention. 

1. The idea of Liberty, like that of Necessity, is 



LIBERTY AND NECESSITY. 57 

a simple, and not a complex idea. This all will 
admit. 

2. It could not have come into the mind from ob- 
servation or reflection ; because all phenomena, ex- 
ternal and internal, all the objects of observation and 
reflection, are, according to the doctrine of Necessi- 
ty, not free, but necessary. 

3. It could not have originated, as necessary ideas 
do, as the logical antecedents of the truths given by 
observation and reflection. For example, the idea 
of space, time, substance, and cause, are given in 
the Intelligence, as the logical antecedents of the 
ideas of body, succession, phenomena, and events, 
all of which are truths derived from observation or 
reflection. Now the idea of Liberty, if the doctrine 
of Necessity is true, cannot have arisen in this way; 
because all the objects of observation and reflection 
are, according to this doctrine, necessary, and there- 
fore their logical antecedents must be. How shall 
we account, in consistency with this theory, for the 
existence of this idea in the mind'? It came not 
from perception external, nor internal, nor as the 
logical antecedent or consequent of any truth thus 
perceived. Now if we admit the doctrine of Liber- 
ty as a tru,th of universal consciousness, we can give 
a philosophical account of the existence of the idea 
of Liberty in all minds. If we deny this doctrine, 
and consequently affirm that of Necessity, we may 
safely challenge any theologian or philosopher to give 

6 



58 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

such an account of the existence of that idea in the 
mind. For all ideas, in the mind, do and must come 
from observation or reflection, or as the logical ante- 
cedents or consequents of ideas thus obtained. We 
have here an event without a cause, if the doctrine 
of Necessity is true. 

4. All simple ideas, with the exception of that of 
Liberty, have realities within or around us, corres- 
ponding to them. If the doctrine of Necessity is 
true, we have one solitary idea of this character, 
that of Liberty, to which no reality corresponds. 
Whence this solitary intruder in the human mind ? 

The existence of this idea in the mind is proof 
demonstrative, that a reality corresponding to it does 
and must exist, and as this reality is found nowhere 
but in the Will, there it must be found. Almost all 
Necessitarians are, in philosophy, the disciples of 
Locke. With him, they maintain, that all ideas in 
the mind come from observation and reflection. 
Yet they maintain that there is in the mind one idea, 
that of Liberty, which never could thus have origi- 
nated ; because, according to their theory, no objects 
corresponding do or can exist, either as realities, or 
as the objects of observation or reflection. We have 
again an event without a cause, if the doctrine of 
Liberty is not true. 

5. The relation of the ideas of Liberty and Ne- 
cessity to those of obligation, merit and demerit, 
&c, next demand out attention. If the doctrine of Ne- 



LIBERTY AND NECESSITY. 59 

cessity is true, the idea of Liberty is, as we have seen, 
a chimera. With it the idea of obligation can have 
no connection or alliance ; but must rest exclusively 
upon that of Necessity. Now, how happens it, that 
no man holding the doctrine of Liberty was ever 
known to deny that of obligation, or of merit and de- 
merit ? How happens it, that the validity of neither 
of these ideas has ever, in any age or nation, been 
denied, except on the avowed authority of the doc- 
trine of Necessity ? Sceptics of the class who deny 
moral. obligation, are universally avowed Necessita- 
rians. We may safely challenge the world to produce 
a single exception to this statement. We may 
challenge the world to produce an individual in an- 
cient or modern times who holds the doctrine of Li- 
berty, and denies moral obligation, or an individual 
who denies moral obligation on any other ground 
than that of Necessity. Now, how can this fact be 
accounted for, that the ideas of obligation, merit 
and demerit, &c, universally attach themselves to a 
chimera, the idea of Liberty, and stand in such irre- 
concilable hostility to the only idea by which, as Ne- 
cessitarians will have it, their validity is affirmed ? 

6. Finally, If the doctrine of Necessity is true 5 
the phenomena of the Intelligence, Sensibility, and 
the Will, are ofiven in Consciousness as alike neces- 
sary. The idea of Liberty, then, if it does exist in 
the mind, would not be likely to attach itself to 
either of these classes of phenomena ; and if to 



60 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

either, it would be just as likely to attach itself to 
one class as to another. Now, how shall we account 
for the fact, that this idea always attaches itself to 
one of these classes of phenomena, those of the 
Will, and never to either of the others ? How is it 
that all men agree in holding, that, in the circum- 
stances of their occurrence, the phenomena of the 
Intelligence and Sensibility cannot but be what they 
are, while those of the Will may be otherwise than 
they are ? Why, if this chimera, the idea of Liber- 
ty, attaches itself to either of these classes, does it 
not sometimes attach kself to the phenomena of the 
Intelligence or Sensibility, as well as to those of the 
Will ? Here, once again, we have an event without 
a cause, a distinction without a difference, if the doc- 
trine of Necessity is true. The facts before us can 
be accounted for only on the supposition, that the 
phenomena of the Intelligence and Sensibility are 
given in Consciousness as necessary, while those of 
the Will are given as free. 

THE DOCTRINE OF LIBERTY, THE DOCTRINE OF THE 

BIBLE. 

IV. We will now, in the fourth place, raise the inqui- 
ry, an inquiry very appropriate in its place, and having, 
an important bearing upon our present investigations, 
whether the doctrine of the Will, above established, 
is the doctrine pre-supposed in the Bible % The fol- 
lowing considerations will enable us to give a de- 
cisive answer to this inquiry. 



LIBERTY AND NECESSITY. 61 

1. If the doctrine of the Will here maintained is 
not, and consequently that of Necessity is, the doc- 
trine pre- supposed in the Scriptures, then we have 
two revelations from God, the external and internal, 
in palpable contradiction to each other. As the 
works of God (see Rom. 1 : 19, 20) are as real a re- 
velation from him as the Bible, so are the necessary 
affirmations of our Intelligence. Now, in our inner 
being, in the depths of our Intelligence, the fact is per- 
petually revealed and affirmed— a fact which we can- 
not disbelieve, if we would — that we are not necessary 
b\\tf>ee agents. Suppose that, in the external revela- 
tion, the Scriptures, the fact is revealed and affirmed 
that we are not free but necessary agents. Has not God 
himself affirmed in one revelation what he has denied 
in another ? Of what use can the internal revelation 
be, but to render us necessarily sceptical in respect 
to the external ? Has the Most High given two such 
revelations as this ? 

2. fn the Scriptures, man is presented as the sub- 
ject, and, of course, as possessing those powers 
which render him the proper subject of command 
and prohibition, of obligation, of merit and demerit, 
and consequently of reward and punishment. Let 
us suppose that God has imparted to a being a cer- 
tain constitution, and then placed him in a condition 
in which, in consequence of the necessary correla- 
tion between his constitution and circumstances, 
but one series of determinations are possible to'him, 
6* 



62 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

and that series cannot but result. Can we conceive it 
proper in the Most High to prohibit that creature from 
pursuing the course which God himself has rendered 
it impossible for him not to pursue, and require him, 
under the heaviest sanctions, to pursue, under these 
identical circumstances, a different and opposite 
course — a course which the Creator has rendered it 
impossible for him to pursue 1 Is this the philoso- 
phy pre-supposed in the Bible ? Does the Bible im- 
ply a system of mental philosophy which renders the 
terms, obligation, merit and demerit, void of all con- 
ceivable meaning, and which lays no other founda- 
tion for moral retributions but injustice and tyranny? 
3. Let us now contemplate the doings of the 
Great Day revealed in the Scriptures, in the light of 
these two opposite theories. Let us suppose that, 
as the righteous and the wicked stand in distinct and 
separate masses before the Eternal One, the Most 
High says to the one class, " You, 1 myself placed in 
circumstances in which nothing but obedience was 
possible, and that you could not but render ; and you, 
I placed in a condition in which nothing but disobe- 
dience was possible to you, and that you could not 
but perpetrate. In consequence of these distinct 
and opposite courses, each of which I myself ren- 
dered unavoidable, you deserve and shall receive my 
eternal smiles; and you as richly deserve and shall 
therefore endure my eternal frowns." What would 
be the response of an assembled universe to a de- 



LIBERTY AND NECESSITY. 63 

cision based upon such a principle ? Is this the prin- 
ciple on which the decisions of that Day are based ? 
It must be so, if the doctrine of Liberty is not, and 
that of Necessity is, the doctrine of the Bible ? 

4. We will now contemplate another class of pas- 
sages which have a bearing equally decisive upon 
our present inquiries. I refer to that class in which 
God expresses the deepest regret at the course which 
transgressors have pursued, and are still pursuing, and 
the most decisive unwillingness that they should pur- 
sue that course and perish. He takes a solemn oath, 
that he is not willing that they should take the 
course of disobedience and death, but that they 
should pursue a different and opposite course. God 
expresses no regret that they are in the circumstances 
in which they are, but that in those circumstances 
they should take the path of disobedience, and not that 
of obedience. Now, can we suppose, what must be 
true, if the doctrine of Necessity is the doctrine pre- 
supposed in the Bible, that God places his creatures 
in circumstances in which obedience is to them an 
impossibility, and in which they cannot but disobey, 
and then takes a solemn oath that he is not willing 
that they should disobey and perish, " but that they 
should turn from their evil way and live ?" What is 
the meaning of the exclamation, "O that thou hadst 
hearkened to my commandment," if God himself had 
so conditioned the sinner as to render obedience an 
impossibility to him ? Is this the philosophy of the 



64 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

Will pre-supposed in the Bible ? On the other hand, 
how perfectly in place are all the passages under 
consideration, on the supposition that the doctrine of 
Liberty is the doctrine therein pre-supposed, and 
that consequently the obedience which God affirms 
Himself desirous that sinners should render, and 
his regret that they do not render, is always possible 
to them ! One of the seven pillars of the Gospel is 
this very doctrine. Take it from the Bible, and we 
have " another Gospel." 

5. One other class of passages claims special at- 
tention here. In the Scriptures, the Most High ex- 
presses the greatest astonishment that men should 
sin under the influences to which he has subjected 
them. He calls upon heaven and earth to unite 
with him in astonishment at the conduct of men 
under those influences. " Hear, O heavens, and 
give ear, O earth," he exclaims, " for the Lord hath 
spoken ; I have nourished and brought up children, 
and they have rebelled against me." Now, let us sup- 
pose, as the doctrine of Necessity affirms, that God 
has placed sinners under influences under which 
they cannot but sin. What must we think of his con- 
duct in calling upon the universe to unite with him 
in astonishment, that under these influences they 
should sin — that is, take the only course possible to 
them, the course which they cannot but take ? With 
the same propriety, he might place a mass of water 
on an inclined plane, and then call upon heaven and 



LIBERTY AND NECESSITY. 65 

earth to unite with him in astonishment at the 
downward flow of the fluid. Is this the philosophy 
pre-supposed in the Bible ? 

SEC. 3. VIEWS OF NECESSITARIANS. 

We are now prepared for a consideration of cer- 
tain miscellaneous questions which have an import- 
ant bearing upon our present inquiries. 

NECESSITY AS HELD BY NECESSITARIANS. 

I. The first inquiry that presents itself is this : Do 
Necessitarians hold the doctrine of Necessity as de- 
fined in this chapter % Do they really hold, in respect 
to every act of will, that, in the circumstances of its 
occurrence, that one act only is possible, and that can- 
not but arise ? Is this, for example, the doctrine of 
Edwards ? Is it the doctrine really held by those 
who professedly agree with him % I argue that it is : 

1. Because they unanimously repudiate the doc- 
trine of Liberty as here defined. They must, there- 
fore, hold that of Necessity ; inasmuch as no third re- 
lation is even conceivable or possible. If they deny 
that the phenomena of the Will fall under either of these 
relations, and still call themselves Necessitarians, they 
must hold to an inconceivable something, which 
themselves even do not understand and cannot de- 
fine, and which has and can have no real existence. 

2. Edwards has confounded the phenomena of the 
Will with those of the Sensibility which are necessary 
in the sense here defined. He must, therefore, hold 






66 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

that the characteristics of the latter class belong to 
those of the former. 

3. Edwards represents the relation between motives 
and acts of Will, as being the same in kind as that 
which exists between causes and effects among exter- 
nal material substances. The former relation he de- 
signates by the words moral necessity ; the latter, by 
that of natural^ or philosophical, or physical necessity. 
Yet he says himself, that the difference expressed by 
these words " does not lie so much in the nature of 
the connection as in the two terms connected." The 
qualifying terms used, then, designate merely the na- 
ture of the antecedents and consequents, while the 
nature of the connection between them is, in all in- 
stances, the same, that of naked necessity. 

4. Edwards himself represents moral necessity as 
just as absolute as physical, or natural necessity. 
" Moral necessity may be," he says, " as absolute as 
natural necessity. That is, the effect may be as per- 
fectly connected with its moral cause as a natural 
necessary effect is with its natural cause." 

5. Necessitarians represent the relation between 
motives and acts of Will as that of cause and effect; 
and for this reason necessary. "If," says Edwards, 
" every act of Will is excited by some motive, then 
that motive is the cause of that act of Will." " And 
if volitions are properly the effects of their motives, 
then they are necessarily connected with their mo- 
tives," Now, as the relation of cause and effect 



LIBERTY AND NECESSITY. 67 

i§ necessary, in the sense of the term Necessity as 
above defined, Edwards must hold, and design to 
teach, that all acts of Will are necessary in this sense. 
6. Necessitarians represent the connection between 
motives and acts of Will as being;, in all instances, 
the same in kind as that which exists between voli- 
tions and external actions. " As external actions," 
says President Day, " are directed by the Will, so 
the Will itself is directed by influence." Now all 
admit, that the connection between volitions and ex- 
ternal actions is necessary in this sense, that when 
we will such action it cannot but take place. No 
other act is, in the circumstances, possible. In the 
same sense, according to Necessitarians, is every act 
of Will necessarily connected with influence, or mo- 
tives. We do Necessitarians no wrong, therefore, 
when we impute to them the doctrine of Necessity 
as here defined. In all cases of sin, they hold, that 
an individual is in circumstances in which none but 
sinful acts of Will are possible, and these he cannot 
but put forth ; and that in these identical circum- 
stances the sinner is under obligation infinite to put 
forth different and opposite acts. 

THE TERM, CERTAINTY, AS USED BY NECESSITARIANS. 

II. We are prepared for another important inquiry, 
to wit : whether the words, certainty, moral certainty, 
&c, as used by Necessitarians, are identical in their 
meaning with that of Necessity as above defined ? 



68 



DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 



The doctrine of Necessity would never be received by 
the public at all, but for the language in which it is 
clothed, language which prevents the public seeing 
it as it is. At one time it is called Moral, in distinc- 
tion from Natural Necessity. At another, it is said to 
be nothing but Certainty, or moral Certainty, &c. 
Now the question arises, what is this Certainty 1 Is 
it or is it not, real Necessity, and nothing else ? That 
it is, I argue, 

1. From the fact, as shown above, that there can 
possibly be no Certainty, which does not fall either 
under the relation of Liberty or Necessity as above 
defined. The Certainty of Necessitarians does not, 
according to their own showing, fall under the former 
relation : it must, therefore, fall under the latter. It 
must be naked Necessity, and nothing else. 

2. While they have defined the term Necessity, 
and have not that of Certainty, they use the latter 
term as avowedly synonymous with the former. The 
latter, therefore, must be explained by the former, 
and not the former by the latter. 

3. The Certainty which they hold is a certainty 
which avowedly excludes the possibility of different 
and opposite acts of Will under the influences, or mo- 
tives, under which particular acts are put forth. The 
Certainty under consideration, therefore, is not neces- 
sity of a particular kind, a necessity consistent with 
liberty and moral obligation. It is the Necessity 
above defined, in all its naked deformity. 



LIBERTY AND NECESSITY. 69 

III. We are now prepared for a distinct statement 
of the doctrine of Ability, according to the Necessi- 
tarian scheme. Even the Necessitarians, with very 
few exceptions, admit, that in the absence of all 
power to do right or wrong, we can be under no ob- 
ligation to do the one or avoid the other. " A man," 
says Pres. Day, " is not responsible for remaining in 
his place if he has no power to move. He is not 
culpable for omitting to walk, if he has no strength 
to walk. He is not under obligation to do anything 
for which he has not what Edwards calls natural 
power." It is very important for us to understand 
the nature of this ability, which lies at the foundation 
of moral obligation ; to understand, I repeat, what 
this Ability is, according to the theory under consider- 
ation. This Ability, according to the doctrine of Lib- 
erty, has been well stated by Cousin, to wit : " The 
moment we take the resolution to do an action, we 
take it with a consciousness of being able to take a 
contrary resolution ;" and by Dr. Dwight, who says 
of a man's sin, that it is " chosen by him unnecessa- 
rily, while possessed of a power to choose otherwise." 
The nature of this Ability, according to the Necessi- 
tarian scheme, has been stated with equal distinct- 
ness in the Christian Spectator. " If we take this 
term [Ability or Power] in the absolute sense, as in- 
cluding all the antecedents to a given volition, there 
is plainly no such thing as power to the contrary ; 
for in this sense of the term, as President Day states, 
7 



70 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

u a man never has power to do anything but what he 
actually performs." " In this comprehensive, though 
rather unusual sense of the word," says President 
Day, a a man has not power to do anything which 
he does not do." The meaning of the above ex- 
tracts cannot be mistaken. Nor can any one deny 
that they contain a true exposition of the doctrine of 
Necessity, to wit : that under the influences under 
which men do will, and consequently act, it is absolute- 
ly impossible for them to will and act differently from 
what they do. In what sense, then, have they power 
to will and act differently according to this doctrine ? 
To this question President Day has given a correct 
and definite answer. " The man who wills in a par- 
ticular way, under the influence of particular feel- 
ings, might will differently under a different influ- 
ence." 

Now, what is the doctrine of Ability, according to 
this scheme ? A man, for example, commits an act 
of sin. He ought, in the stead of that act, to have 
put forth an act of obedience. Without the power 
to render this obedience, as President Day admits, 
there can be no obligation to do it. When the Ne- 
cessitarian says, that the creature, when he sins, has 
power to obey, he means, not that under the influence 
under which the act of sin is committed, the creature 
has power to obey ; but that under a different influ- 
ence he might obey. But mark, it is under the iden- 
tical influence under which a man does sin, and un- 



LIBERTY AND NECESSITY. 71 

der which, according to the doctrine of Necessity, 
he cannot bat sin, that he is required not to sin. 
Now how can a man's ability, and obligation not to 
sin under a given influence, grow out of the fact, that, 
under a different influence, an influence under which 
he cannot but do right, he might not sin ? This is 
all the ability and ground of obligation as far as 
Ability, Natural Ability as it is called, is concerned, 
which the doctrine of Necessity admits. A man is, 
by a power absolutely irresistible, placed in circum- 
stances in which he cannot possibly but sin. In these 
circumstances, it is said, that he has natural ability 
not to sin, and consequently ought not to do it. Why ? 
Because, to his acting differently, no change in his 
nature or powers is required. These are " perfect 
and entire, wanting nothing." All that is required is, 
that his circumstances be changed, and then he might 
not sin. " In what sense," asks President Day, " is 
it true, that a man has power to will the contrary of 
what he actually wills ? He has such power that, 
with a sufficient inducement, he will make an opposite 
choice." Is not this the strangest idea of Natural 
Ability as constituting the foundation of obligation, of 
which the human mind ever tried to conceive ? In 
illustration, let us suppose that a man, placed in the 
city of New York, cannot but sin ; placed in that of 
Boston, he cannot but be holy, and that the fact whether 
he is in the one or the other city depends upon the 
irresistible providence of God. He is placed in 



72 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

New York where he cannot but sin. He is told that 
he ought not to do it, and that he is highly guilty for 
not being perfectly holy. It is also asserted that he 
has all the powers of moral agency, all the ability 
requisite to lay the foundation for the highest con- 
ceivable obligation to be holy. What is the evidence ? 
he asks. Is it possible for me, in my present circum- 
stances, to avoid sin ? and in my present circum- 
stances, you know, I cannot but be. I acknowledge, 
the Necessitarian says, that under present influences, 
you cannot but sin, and that you cannot but be sub- 
ject to these influences. Still, I affirm, that you have 
all the powers of moral agency, all the natural abili- 
ty requisite to obedience, and to the highest conceiva- 
ble obligation to obedience. Because, in the first 
place, even in New York, you could obey if you 
chose. You have, therefore, natural, though not 
moral, power to obey. But stop, friend, right here. 
When you say that I might obey, if I chose, I would 
ask, if choosing, as in the command, " choose life, 5 ' 
is not the very thing required of me % When, 
therefore, you affirm that I might obey, if I chose, 
does it not mean, in reality, that I might choose, 
if I should choose 1 Is not your Natural Ability 
this, that I might obey if I did obey 1* I cannot 

* The above is a perfectly correct statement of the famous 
distinction between natural and moral ability made by Neces- 
sitarians. The sinner is under obligation to do right, they 
say, because he might do what is required of him, if he chose 



LIBERTY AND NECESSITY. 73 

deny, the Necessitarian replies, that you have 
correctly stated this doctrine. Permit me to pro- 
ceed in argument, however. In the next place, all 
that you need in order to be holy as required, is a 
change, not of your powers , but of the influences 
which control the action of those powers. With no 
change in your constitution or powers, you need only 
to be placed in Boston instead of New York, and 
there you cannot but be holy. Is it not as clear as 
light, therefore, that you have now all the powers of 
moral agency, all the ability requisite to the high- 
est conceivable obligation to be holy instead of sinful 1 
I fully understand you, the sinner replies. But 
remember, that it is not in Boston, where, as you 
acknowledge, I cannot be, that I am required not to 
sin ; but here, in New York, where I cannot but be, 
and cannot possibly but sin. It is here, and not some- 
where else, that I am required not to sin. How can 
the'fact, that if I were in Boston, where I could not but 
be holy, I might not sin, prove, that here, in New 

to do it. He has, therefore, natural but not moral power to 
obedience. But the choice which the sinner wants, the 
absence of which constitutes his moral inability, is the 
very thing required of him. When, therefore, the Necessi- 
tarian says, that the sinner is under obligation to obey, be- 
cause he might obey if he chose to do it, the real meaning 
is, that the sinner is under obligation to obedience, because 
if he should choose to obey he would choose to obey. In 
other words he is under obligation to obedience, because, if 
he did obey, he would obey. 
7# 



74 



DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 



York, I have any ability, either natural or moral — 
am under any obligation whatever — not to sin 1 These 
are the difficulties which press upon me. How do 
you remove them according to your theory ? 

I can give no other answer, the Necessitarian re- 
plies, than that already given. If that does not si- 
lence for ever every excuse for sin in your mind, it is 
wholly owing to the perverseness of your heart, to 
its bitter hostility to the truth. I may safely appeal 
to the Necessitarian himself, whether I have not here 
given an uncaricatured expose of his theory. 

SINFUL INCLINATIONS. 

IV. When pressed with such appalling difficulties 
as these, the Necessitarian falls back, in self-justifica- 
tion, upon the reason why the sinner cannot be holy. 
The only reason, it is said, why the sinner does not do 
as he ought is, not the want of power, but the strength 
of his sinful inclinations. Shall he plead these in ex- 
cuse for sin % By no means. They constitute the 
very essence of the sinner's guilt. Let it be borne 
in mind, that, according to the doctrine of Necessity, 
such is the connection between the nature, or con- 
stitution of the sinner's mind — a nature which God 
has given him, and the influences under which he is 
placed by Divine Providence — that none but these 
very inclinations are possible to him, and these can- 
not but exist. From these inclinations, sinful acts of 
Will cannot but arise. How is the matter helped, as 



LIBERTY AND NECESSITY. 75 

far as ability and obligation, on the part of the sin- 
ner, are concerned, by throwing the guilt back from 
acts of Will upon inclinations equally necessary % 

NECESSARIAN DOCTRINE OF LIBERTY. 

The real liberty of the Will, according to the Ne- 
cessitarian scheme, next demands our attention. All 
admit that Liberty is an essential condition of moral 
obligation. In what sense, then, is or is not, man 
free, according to the doctrine of Necessity 1 

u The plain and obvious meaning of the words 
Freedom and Liberty," says President Edwards, " is 
power, opportunity, or advantage, that any one has 
to do as he pleases. Or, in other words, his being 
free from hinderance or impediment in the way of 
doing or conducting in any respect as he wills. And 
the contrary to Liberty, whatever name we please to 
call that by, is a person's being hindered, or unable 
to conduct as he will, or being necessitated to do 
otherwise." " The only idea, indeed, that we can 
form of free-agency, or of freedom of Will," says 
Abercrombie, a is, that it consists in a man's being 
able to do what he wills, or to abstain from doing 
what he will not. Necessary agency, on the other 
hand, would consist in a man's being compelled, by 
a force from without, to do what he will not, or pre- 
vented from doing what he wills." 

With these definitions all Necessitarians agree. 
This is all the Liberty known, or conceivable, accord- 



76 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

ing to their theory. Liberty does not consist in the 
power to choose in one or the other of two or more 
different and opposite directions, under the same in- 
fluence. It is found wholly and exclusively in the 
connection between the act of Will, considered as 
the antecedent, and the effort, external or internal, 
considered as the consequent. On this definition I 
remark, 

1. That it presents the idea of Liberty as distin- 
guished from Servitude^ rather than Liberty as distin- 
guished from Necessity. A man is free, in the first 
sense of the term, when no external restraints hin- 
der the carrying out of the choice within. This, 
however, has nothing to do with Liberty, as distin- 
guished from Necessity. 

2. If this is the only sense in which a man is free, 
then, in the language of a very distinguished philo- 
sopher, " if you cut off a man's little finger, you 
thereby annihilate so much of his free agency ;" be- 
cause, in that case, you abridge so much his power 
to do as he chooses. Is this Liberty, the only liberty 
of man, a liberty which may be destroyed by chains ? 
bolts, and bars ? Is this Liberty as distinguished from 
Necessity — the liberty which lays the foundation of 
moral obligation 1 

3. If this is the only sense in which man is free ? 
then dire Necessity reigns throughout the entire do- 
main of human agency. If all acts of Will are the 
necessary consequents of the influences to which the 



LIBERTY AND NECESSITY. 77 

mind is at the time subjected, much more must a like 
necessity exist between all acts of Will and their 
consequents, external and internal. This has been 
already shown. The mind, then, with all its acts and 
states, exists in a chain of antecedents and consequents, 
causes and effects, linked together in every part and 
department by a dire necessity. This is all the Lib- 
erty that this doctrine knows or allows us ; a Liberty 
to choose as influences necessitate us to choose, and 
to have such acts of Will followed by certain neces- 
sary consequents, external and internal. In this 
scheme, the idea of Liberty, which all admit must 
have a location somewhere, or obligation, is a chime- 
ra ; this idea, I say, after " wandering through dry 
places, seeking rest and finding none," at length is 
driven to a location where it finds its grave, and not 
a living habitation. 

4. It is to me a very strange thing, that Liberty, 
as the foundation of moral obligation, should be lo- 
cated here. Because that acts of Will are followed 
by certain corresponding necessary consequents ex- 
ternal and internal, therefore we are bound to put 
forth given acts of Will, whatever the influences 
acting upon us may be, and however impossible it 
may be to put forth those acts under those influences ! 
Did ever a greater absurdity dance in the brain of a 
philosopher or theologian ? 

5. The public are entirely deceived by this defini- 
tion, and because they are deceived as to the theory 



78 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

intended by it, do they admit it as true *? Suppose 
any man in the common walks of life were asked 
what he means, when he says, he can do as II 
pleases, act as he chooses, &c. Does this express 
your meaning ? When you will to walk, rather 
than sit, for example, no other volition is at the time 
possible, and this you must put forth, and that when 
you have put forth this volition, you cannot but 
walk. Is this your idea, when you say, you can do 
as you please ? No, he would say. That is not my 
idea at all. If that is true, man is not a free agent 
at all. What men in general really mean when they 
say, they can do as they please, and are therefore 
free, is, that when they put forth a given act of 
Will, and for this reason conduct in a given manner, 
they may in the same circumstances put forth diffe- 
rent and opposite determinations, and consequently 
act in a different and opposite manner from what 
they do. 

VI. The argument of Necessitarians in respect to 
the practical tendencies of their doctrine demands a 
passing notice. All acts of the Will, they say, are 
indeed necessary under the circumstances in which 
they occur ; but then we should learn the practical 
lesson not to place ourselves in the circumstances 
where we shall be liable to act wrong. To this I 
reply : 

1. That on the hypothesis before us, our being in 
the circumstances which originate a given choice, is 



LIBERTY AND NECESSITY. 79 

as necessary as the choice itself. For I am in those 
circumstances either by an overruling Providence 
over which I have no control, or by previous acts of 
the Will rendered necessary by such Providence. 
Hence the difficulty remains in all its force. 

2. The solution assumes the very principle denied, 
that is, that our being in circumstances which origi- 
nate particular acts of choice is not necessary. Else ^ 
why tell an individual he is to blame for being in 
such circumstances, and not to place himself there 
again ? 

GROUND WHICH NECESSITARIANS ARE BOUND TO TAKE 
IN RESPECT TO THE DOCTRINE OF ABILITY. 

VII. We are now fully prepared to state the 
ground which Necessitarians of every school are 
bound to take in respect to the doctrine of Ability. 
It is to deny that doctrine wholly, to take the open and 
broad ground, that, according to any appropriate sig- 
nification of the words, it is absolutely impossible for 
men to will, and consequently to act, differently from 
what they do ; that when they do w r rong, they always 
do it, with the absolute impossibility of doing right ; 
and that when they do right, there is always an equal 
impossibility of their doing wrong. If men have not 
power to will differently from what they do, it is 
undeniably evident that they have no power what- 
ever to act differently : because there is an absolutely 
necessary connection between volitions and their 



80 DOCTRINE OP THE WILL. 

consequents, external actions. The doctrine of Ne- 
cessity takes away wholly all ability from the crea- 
ture to will differently from what he does. It there- 
fore totally annihilates his ability to act differently. 
What, then, according to the theory of Necessity, 
becomes of the doctrine of Ability % It is annihilat- 
ed. It is impossible for us to find for it a " local 
habitation or a name." As honest men, Necessitari- 
ans are bound to proclaim the fact. They are bound 
to proclaim the doctrine, that, in requiring men to be 
holy, under influences under which they do sin, and 
cannot but sin (as it is true of all sinful acts accord- 
ing to their theory), God requires of them absolute 
impossibilities, and then dooms them to perdition for 
not performing such impossibilities. 

The subterfuge to which Necessitarians resort 
here, will not avail them at all, to wit : that men are 
to blame for not doing right, because, they might do 
it if they chose. To will right is the thing, and the 
only thing really required of them. The above 
maxim therefore amounts, as we have already seen, 
to this : Men are bound to do, that is, to will, what is 
right, because if they should will what is right, they 
would will what is right. 

DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY, AS REGARDED BY NECESSI- 
TARIANS OF DIFFERENT SCHOOLS. 

VIII. Two schools divide the advocates of Neces- 
sity. According to one class, God produces in men 



LIBERTY AND NECESSITY. 81 

all their volitions and acts, both sinful and holy, by 
the direct exertion of his own omnipotence. With- 
out the Divine agency, men, they hold, are wholly 
incapable of all volitions and actions of every kind. 
With it, none but those which God produces can 
arise, and these cannot but arise. This is the scheme 
of Divine efficiency, as advocated by Dr. Emmons 
and others. 

According to the other school, God does not, in 
all instances, produce volitions and actions by his own 
direct agency, but by creating in creatures a certain 
nature or constitution, and then subjecting them to 
influences from which none but particular voli- 
tions and acts which they do put forth can result, 
and these must result. According to a large portion 
of this school, God, either by his own direct agency, or 
by sustaining their laws of natural generation, produ- 
ces in men the peculiar nature which they do pos- 
sess, and then imputes to them infinite guilt, not only 
for this nature, but for its necessary results, sinful 
feelings, volitions, and actions. 

Such are these two schemes. In the two follow- 
ing particulars, they perfectly harmonize. 1. All 
acts of Will, together with their effects, external and 
internal, in the circumstances of their occurrence, 
cannot but be what they are. 2. The ground of this 
necessity is the agency of God, in the one instance 
producing these effects directly and immediately, and 
in the other producing the same results, mediately, by 
8 



82 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL, 

giving existence to a constitution and influences from 
which such results cannot but arise. They differ 
only in respect to the immediate ground of this neces- 
sity, the power of God, according to the former, pro- 
ducing the effects directly, and according to the 
latter ? indirectly. According to both, all our actions 
sustain the same essential relation to the Divine Will, 
that of Necessity. 

Now while these two theories so perfectly harmo- 
nize, in all essential particulars, strange to tell, the 
advocates of one regard the other as involving the 
most monstrous absurdities conceivable. For God 
to produce, through the energies of his own omni- 
potence, human volitions, and then to impute infinite 
guilt to men for what he himself has produced in 
them, what a horrid sentiment that is, exclaims the 
advocate of constitutional depravity. For God to 
create in men a sinful nature, and then impute to them 
infinite guilt for what he has himself created, together 
with its unavoidable results, what horrid tyranny 
such a sentiment imputes to the Most High, exclaims 
the advocate of Divine efficiency, in his turn. 

The impartial, uncommitted spectator, on the other 
hand, perceives most distinctly the same identical ab- 
surdities in both these theories. He knows perfectly, 
that it can make no essential difference, whether God 
produces a result directly, or by giving existence to 
a constitution and influences from which it cannot 
but arise. If ore theory involves injustice and tyr- 



LIBERTY AND NECESSITY. 83 

anny, the other must involve the same. Let me 
here add, that the reprobation with which each of 
the classes above named regards the sentiments of the 
other, is a sentence of reprobation passed (unconsci- 
ously to be sure) upon the doctrine of Necessity it- 
self which is common to both. For if this one ele- 
ment is taken out of either theory, there is nothing 
left to render it abhorrent to any mind. It is thus 
that Necessitarians themselves, without exception, 
pass sentence of condemnation upon their own the- 
ory, by condemning it, in every system in which 
they meet with it except their own. There is not a 
man on earth, that has not in some form or other 
passed sentence of reprobation upon this system. 
Let any man, whatever, contemplate any theory but 
the one he has himself adopted, any theory that in- 
volves this element, and he will instantly fasten upon 
this one feature as the characteristic which vitiates 
the whole theory, and renders it deserving of univer- 
sal reprobation. It is thus that unsophisticated Nature 
expresses her universal horror at a system which 

" Binding nature fast in fate, 
Enslaves the human Will." 

Unsophisticated Nature abhors this doctrine infinitely 
more than she was ever conceived to abhor a vacu- 
um. Can a theory which the universal Intelligence 
thus agrees in reprobating, as involving the most hor- 
rid absurdity and tyranny conceivable, be the only 
true one ? 



CHAPTER IV. 

EXTENT AND LIMITS OF THE LIBERTY OF 
THE WILL. 

While it is maintained, that, in the sense defined 
in the preceding chapter, the Will is free, it is also 
affirmed that, in other respects, it is not free at all. 
It should be borne distinctly in mind, that, in the re- 
spects in which the Will is subject to the law of 
Liberty, its liberty is absolute. It is in no sense 
subject to the law of Necessity. So far, also, as it 
is subject to the law of Necessity, it is in no sense 
free. What then are the extent and limits of the 
Liberty of the Will ? 

1. In the absence of Motives, the Will cannot act 
at all. To suppose the opposite would involve a 
contradiction. It would suppose the action of the 
Will in the direction of some object, in the absence 
of ail objects towards which such action can be di- 
rected. 

2. The Will is not free in regard to what the Mo- 
tives presented shall be, in view of which its deter- 
minations shall be formed. Motives exist wholly 
independent of the Will. Nor does it depend at all 
upon the Will, what Motives shall be presented for 
its election. It is free only in respect to the parti- 



EXTENT AND LIMITS OF LIBERTY. 85 

cular determinations it shall put forth, in reference to 
the Motives actually presented. 

3. Whenever a Motive, or object of choice, is pre- 
sented to the mind, the Will is necessitated, by the 
presentation of the object, to act in some direction. 
It must yield or refuse to yield to the Motive. But 
such refusal is itself a positive act. So far, there- 
fore, the Will is wholly subject to the law of Neces- 
sity. It is free, not in respect to whether it shall, 
or shall not, choose at all when a Motive is presented ; 
but in respect to what it shall choose. I, for exam- 
ple, offer a merchant a certain sum, for a piece of 
goods. Now while it is equally possible for him to 
receive or reject the offer, one or the other deter- 
mination he must form. In the first respect, he is 
wholly free. In the latter, he is not free in any 
sense whatever. The same holds true in respect to 
all objects of choice presented to the mind. Motive 
necessitates the Will to act in some direction ; while? 
in all deliberate Moral Acts at least, it leaves either 
of two or more different and opposite determinations 
equally possible to the mind. 

4. Certain particular volitions may be rendered 
necessary by other, and what may be termed gene- 
ral, determinations. For example, a determination to 
pursue a particular course of conduct, may render 
necessary all particular volitions requisite to carry 
this general purpose into accomplishment. It ren- 
ders them necessary in this sense, that if the former 

8* 



86 DOCTRINE OP THE WILL. 

does exist, the latter must exist. A man, for exam- 
ple, determines to pass from Boston to New York 
with all possible expedition. This determination 
remaining unchanged, all the particular volitions 
requisite to its accomplishment cannot but exist. 
The general and controlling determination, however, 
may, at any moment, be suspended. To perpetuate 
or suspend it, is always in the power of the Will. 

5. I will here state a conjecture, viz. : that there 
are in the primitive developments of mind, as well 
as in all primary acts of attention, certain necessary 
spontaneities of the Will, as well as of other powers 
of the mind. Is it not in consequence of such actions, 
that the mind becomes first conscious of the power of 
volition, and is it pot now necessary for us under cer- 
tain circumstances to give a certain degree of atten- 
tion to phenomena which appear within and around 
us ? My own convictions are, that such circum- 
stances often do occur. Nor is such a supposition 
inconsistent with the great principle maintained in 
this Treatise. This principle is, that Liberty and Ac- 
countability, in other words, Free, and Moral Agency, 
are co-extensive. 

6. Nor does Liberty, as here defined, imply, that 
the mind, antecedently to all acts of Will, shall be 
in a state of indifference, unimpelled by feeling, or 
the affirmations of the Intelligence, more strongly in 
one direction than another. The Will exists in a 
tri-unity with the Intelligence and Sensibility. Its 



EXTENT AND LIMITS OF LIBERTY. 87 

determinations may be in harmony with the Sensi- 
bility, in opposition to Intelligence, or with the In- 
telligence in opposition to the Sensibility. But while 
it follows either in distinction from the other, under 
the same identical influences, different and opposite 
determinations are equally possible. However the 
Will may be influenced, whether its determinations 
are in the direction of the strongest impulse, or op- 
posed to it, it never, in deliberate moral determina- 
tion, puts forth particular acts, because, that in these 
circumstances, no others are possible. In instances 
comparatively few, can we suppose that the mind, 
antecedently to acts of Will, is in a state of indiffe- 
rence, unimpelled in one direction in distinction from 
others, or equally impelled in the direction of diffe- 
rent and opposite determinations. Indifference is in 
no such sense an essential or material condition of 
Liberty. However strongly the Wilr may be im- 
pelled in the direction of particular determinations, 
it is still in the possession of the highest concei- 
vable freedom, if it is not thereby necessitated to act 
in one direction in distinction from all others. 

7. I now refer to one other fixed law under the 
influence of which the Will is always necessitated 
to act. It is the law of habit. Action in any one 
direction always generates a tendency to subsequent 
action in the same direction under similar influences. 
This tendency may be increased, till it becomes so 
strong as to render action in the same direction in 



88 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

all future time really, although contingently, certain. 
The certainty thus granted will always be of such a 
nature as consists fully with the relation of Liberty. 
It can never, while moral agency continues, come 
under the relation of Necessity. Still the certainty 
is real. Thus the mind, by a continued course of 
well or ill doing, may generate such fixed habits, as 
to render subsequent action in the same direction 
perfectly certain, during the entire progress of its 
future being. Every man, while conscious of free- 
dom, should be fully aware of the existence of this 
law, and it should surely lead him to walk thought- 
fully along the borders of " the undiscovered coun- 
try," his location in which he is determining by the 
habits of thought, feeling, and action, he is now 
generating. 

STRONGEST 'MOTIVE REASONING IN A CIRCLE. 

A singular instance of reasoning in a circle on the 
part of Necessitarians, in respect to what they call 
the strongest Motive, demands a passing notice here. 
One of their main arguments in support of their doc- 
trine is based upon the assumption, that the action 
of the Will is always in the direction of the strongest 
Motive . When , however, we ask them , which is the 
strongest Motive, their reply in reality is, that it is 
the Motive in the direction of which the Will does act. 
" The strength of a Motive," says President Day, 
" is not its prevailing, but the power by which it 
prevails. Yet we may very properly measure this 



EXTENT AND LIMITS OF LIBERTY. 89 

power by the actual result." Again, " We may- 
measure the comparative strength of Motives of dif- 
ferent kinds, from the results to which they lead ; 
just as we learn the power of different causes, from 
the effects which they produce :" that is, we are not 
to determine, a priori, nor by an appeal to conscious- 
ness, which of two or more Motives presented is the 
strongest. We are to wait till the Will does act, and 
then assume that the Motive, in the direction of which 
it acts, is the strongest. From the action of the Will 
in the direction of that particular Motive , we are 
finally to infer the truth of the doctrine of Necessity. 
The strongest Motive, according to the above defini- 
tion, is the motive to which the Will does yield. 
The argument based upon the truism, that the Will 
always acts in the direction of this Motive, that is, 
the Motive towards which it does act, the argument, 
I say, put into a logical form, would stand thus. 
If the action of the Will is always in the direction of 
the strongest Motive, that is, if it always follows the 
Motive it does follow, it is governed by the law of 
Necessity. Its action is always in the direction of 
this Motive, that is, it always follows the Motive it 
does follow. The Will is therefore governed by the 
law of Necessity. How many philosophers and the- 
ologians have become " rooted and grounded" in the 
belief of this doctrine, under the influence of this 
sophism, a sophism which, in the first instance, as- 
sumes the doctrine as true, and then moves round 
in a vicious circle to demonstrate its truth. 



CHAPTER V. 

THE GREATEST APPARENT GOOD. 
SECTION I. 

We now come to a consideration of one of the great 
questions bearing upon our personal investigations — 
the proposition maintained by Necessitarians, as a 
chief pillar of their theory, that " the Will always 
is as the greatest apparent good." 

PHRASE DEFINED. 

The first inquiry which naturally arises here is ; 
What is the proper meaning of this proposition ? 

In reply, I answer, that it must mean one of these 
three things. 

1. That the Will is always, in all its determina- 
tions, conformed to the dictates of the Intelligence, 
choosing those things only which the Intelligence 
affirms to be best. Or, 

2. That the determinations of the Will are always 
in conformity to the impulse of the Sensibility, that is, 
that its action is always in the direction of the 
strongest feeling. Or, 

3. In conformity to the dictates of the Intelligence, 
and the impulse of the Sensibility combined, that is 
that the Will never acts at all, except when impelled 



GREATEST APPARENT GOOD. 91 

by the Intelligence and Sensibility both in the same 
direction. 

MEANING OF THIS PHRASE ACCORDING TO EDWARDS a 

The following passage leaves no room for doubt in 
respect to the meaning which Edwards attaches to 
the phrase, u the greatest apparent good." " I have 
chosen," he says, u rather to express myself thus, 
that the Will always is as the greatest apparent good, 
or as what appears most agreeable, than to say, 
that the Will is determined by the greatest apparent 
good, or by what seems most agreeable ; because an 
appearing most agreeable or pleasing to the mind, 
and the mind's preferring and choosing, seem hardly 
to be properly and perfectly distinct." Here unde- 
niably, the words, choosing, preferring, " appearing 
most agreeable or pleasing," and " the greatest ap- 
parent good," are defined as identical in their mean- 
ing. Hence in another place, he adds, " If strict pro- 
priety of speech be insisted on, it may more properly 
be said, that the voluntary action which is the imme- 
diate consequence and fruit of the mind's volition 
and choice, is determined by that which appears 
most agreeable, than by the preference or choice it- 
self." The reason is obvious. Appearing most 
agreeable or pleasing, and preference or choice, had 
been defined as synonymous in their meaning. To 
say, therefore, that preference or choice is determined 
by " what appears most agreeable or pleasing," 



92 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL, 

would be equivalent to the affirmation, that choice 
determines choice. " The act of volition itself, 
he adds, " is always determined by that in or about the 
mind's view of an object, which causes it to appear 
most agreeable," or what is by definition the same 
thing, causes it to be chosen. The phrases, " the 
greatest apparent good/' and " appearing most agree- 
able or pleasing to the mind," and the words, choos- 
ing, preferring, &c, are therefore, according to Ed- 
wards, identical in their meaning. The proposition, 
" the Will is always as the greatest apparent good," 
really means nothing more nor less than this, that 
Will always chooses as it chooses. The famous ar- 
gument based upon this proposition in favor of the 
doctrine of Necessity may be thus expressed. If the 
Will always is as the greatest apparent good," that 
is, if the Will always chooses as it chooses, it is gov- 
erned by the law of Necessity. The Will is as the 
greatest apparent good, that is, it always chooses as it 
chooses. Therefore it is governed by this law. By 
this very syllogism, multitudes have supposed that 
the doctrine of Necessity has been established with all 
the distinctness and force of demonstration. 

The question now returns, Is " the Will always as 
the greatest apparent good," in either of the senses 
of the phrase as above defined ? 



GREATEST APPARENT GOOD. 93 

THE WILL NOT ALWAYS AS THE DICTATES OF THE 
INTELLIGENCE. 

1. Is the Will then as the greatest apparent good 
in this sense, that all its determinations are in con- 
formity to the dictates of the Intelligence. Does 
the Will never harmonize with the Sensibility in op- 
position to the Intelligence ? Has no intelligent 
being, whether sinful or holy, ever done that which 
his Intellect affirmed at the time, that he ought not to 
do, and that it was best for him not to do ? I answer, 

1. Every man who has ever violated moral obliga- 
tion knows, that he has followed the impulse of de- 
sire, in opposition to the dictates of his Intelligence. 
What individual that has ever perpetrated such deeds 
has not said, and cannot say with truth, " I know the 
good, and approve it ; yet follow the bad ?" Take 
a matter of fact. A Spanish nobleman during the 
early progress of the Reformation, became fully con- 
vinced, that the faith of the Reformers was true, and 
his own false, and that his salvation depended upon his 
embracing the one and rejecting the other. Yet 
martyrdom would be the result of such a change. 
While balancing this question, in the depths of his 
own mind, he trembled with the greatest 'agitation. 
His sovereign who was present, asked the cause. 
The reply was, " the martyr's crown is before me, 
and I have not Christian fortitude enough to 
take it." He died a few weeks subsequent, without 
confessing the truth. Did he obey his Intelligence, 
9 



94 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

or Sensibility there ? Was not the conflict between 
the two, and did not the latter prevail ? In John 
12 : 42, 43, we have a fact revealed, in which men 
were convinced of the truth, and yet, because " they 
loved the praise of men more than the praise of God,' 7 
they did not confess, but denied the truth, a case 
therefore in which they followed the impulse of desire, 
in opposition to the dictates of the Intelligence. The 
Will then is not " always as the greatest apparent 
good," in this sense, that its action is always in the 
direction of the dictates of the Intelligence. 

2. If this is so, sin, in all instances, is a mere blun- 
der, a necessary result of a necessary misjudgment 
of the Intelligence ? Is it so ? Can the Intelligence 
affirm that a state of moral impurity is better than a 
state of moral rectitude ? How easy it would be, 
in every instance, to u convert a sinner from the 
error of his way," if all that is requisite is to carry 
his Intellect in favor of truth and righteousness ? 
Who does not know, that the great difficulty lies 
in the enslavement of the Will to a depraved Sensi- 
bility ? 

3. If the Will of all Intelligents is always in har- 
mony with the Intellect, then I affirm that there is 
not, and never has been, any such thing as sin, or ill 
desert, in the universe. What more can be said of 
God, or of any being ever so pure, than that he has 
always done what his Intellect affirmed to be best ? 
What if the devil, and all creatures called sinners, 



GREATEST APPARENT GOOD. 95 

had always done the same thing? Where is the 
conceivable ground for the imputation of moral guilt 
to them ? 

4. If all acts of Will are always in perfect har- 
mony with the Intelligence, and in this sense, " as 
the greatest apparent good," then, when the Intel- 
lect affirms absolutely that there can be no ground of 
preference between two objects, there can be no 
choice between them. But we are, in fact, putting 
forth every day just such acts of Will, selecting one 
object in distinction from another, when the Intellect 
affirms their perfect equality, or affirms absolutely 
that there is and can be no perceived ground of pre- 
ference between them. I receive a letter, I will sup- 
pose, from a friend, informing me that he has just 
taken from a bank two notes, perfectly new and of 
the same value, that one now lies in the east and the 
other in the west corner of his drawer, that I may 
have one and only one of them, the one that I shall 
name by return of mail, and that I must designate one 
or the other, or have neither. Here are present to 
my Intelligence two objects absolutely equal. Their 
location is a matter of indifference, equally absolute. 
Now if, as the proposition " the Will is always as 
the greatest apparent good,"! affirms, I cannot 
select one object in distinction from another, with- 
out a perceived ground for such selection, I could not 
possibly, in the case supposed, say which bill I would 
have. Yet I make the selection without the least 



96 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

conceivable embarrassment. I might mention num- 
berless cases, of daily occurrence, of a nature pre- 
cisely similar. Every child that ever played at 
S odd or even," knows perfectly the possibility of 
selecting between objects which are, to the Intelli- 
gence, absolutely equal. 

I will now select a case about which there can 
possibly be no mistake. Space we know perfectly to 
be absolutely infinite. Space in itself is in all parts 
alike. So must it appear to the mind of God. Now 
w r hen God determined to create the universe, he must 
have resolved to locate its centre in some one point 
of space in distinction from all others. At that 
moment, there was present to the Divine Intelligence 
an infinite number of points, all and each absolutely 
equally eligible. Neither point could have been se- 
lected, because it was better than any other : for all 
were equal. So they must have appeared to God. 
Now if the u Will is always as the greatest apparent 
good," in the sense under consideration, God could 
not in this case make the selection, and consequently 
could not create the universe. He did make the 
selection, and did create. The Will, therefore, is 
not, in this sense, " always as the greatest apparent 
good." 

THE WILL NOT ALWAYS AS THE STRONGEST DESIRE. 

II. Is the u Will always as the greatest apparent 
good " in this sense, that it is always as the strongest 
desire, or as the strongest impulse of the Sensibility ? 



GREATEST APPARENT GOOD. 97 

Does the Will never harmonize with the Intelligence, 
in opposition to the Sensibility, as well as with the 
Sensibility in opposition to the Intelligence ? If this 
is not so, then — 

1. It would be difficult to define self-denial accord- 
ing to the ordinary acceptation of the term. What 
is self-denial but placing the Will with the Intelli- 
gence, in opposition to the Sensibility ? How often 
in moral reformations do we find almost nothing else 
but this, an inflexible purpose placed directly before 
an almost crushing and overwhelming tide of feeling 
and desire ? 

2. When the Will is impelled in different direc- 
tions, by conflicting feelings, it could not for a mo- 
ment be in a state of indecision, unless we suppose 
these conflicting feelings to be absolutely equal in 
strength up to the moment of decision. Who 
believes that ? Who believes that his feelings are in 
all instances in a state of perfect equilibrium up to 
the moment of fixed determination between two dis- 
tinct and opposite courses ? This must be the case, if 
the action of the Will is always as the strongest 
feeling, and in this sense as the u greatest apparent 
good." How can Necessitarians meet this argu- 
ment ? Will they pretend that, in all instances, up 
to the moment of decisive action, the feelings im- 
pelling the Will in different directions are always ab- 
solutely equal in strength ? This must be, if the 

Will is always as the strongest feeling. 
9 * 



98 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

3. When the feelings are in a state of perfect equi- 
librium, there can possibly, on this supposition, be no 
choice at all. The feelings often are, and must be, 
in this state, even when we are necessitated to act in 
some direction. The case of the bank notes 
above referred to, presents an example of this kind. 
As the objects are in the mind's eye absolutely 
equal, to suppose that the feelings should, in such a 
case, impel the Will more strongly in the direction of 
the one than the other, is to suppose an event with- 
out a cause, inasmuch as the Sensibility is governed 
by the law of Necessity. If A and B are to the In- 
telligence, in all respects, absolutely equal, how can 
the Sensibility impel the Will towards A instead of 
B ? What is an event without a cause, if this is 
not ? Contemplate the case in respect to the loca- 
tion of the universe above supposed. Each point 
of space was equally present to God, and was in it- 
self, and was perceived and affirmed to be, equally 
eligible with all the others. How could a stronger 
feeling arise in the direction of one point in distinc- 
tion from others, unless we suppose that God's Sen- 
sibility is not subject to the law of Necessity, a 
position which none will assume, or that here was an 
event without a cause ? When, therefore, God did 
select this one point in distinction from all the others, 
that determination could not have been either in the 
direction of what the Intelligence affirmed to be 
best, nor of the strongest feeling. The proposition, 



GREATEST APPARENT GOOD. 99 

therefore, that " the Will always is as the greatest ap- 
parent good," is in both the senses above defined de- 
monstrably false. 

4. Of the truth of this every one is aware when 
he appeals to his own Consciousness. In the ampu- 
tation of a limb, for example, who does not know 
that if an individual, at the moment when the opera- 
tion commences, should yield to the strongest feeling, 
he would refuse to endure it ? He can pass through 
the scene, only by placing an inflexible purpose di- 
rectly across the current of feeling. How often do 
we hear individuals affirm, " If I should follow my 
feelings^ I should do this ; if I should follow my 
judgment, I should do that." In all such instances, 
we have the direct testimony of consciousness, that 
the action of the Will is not always in the direction 
of the strongest feeling : because its action is some- 
times consciously in the direction of the Intelligence, 
in opposition to such feelings ; and at others, in the 
conscious presence of such feelings, the Will re- 
mains, for periods longer or shorter, undecided in 
respect to the particular course which shall be pur- 
sued. 

THE WILL NOT ALWAYS AS THE INTELLIGENCE AND 
SENSIBILITY COMBINED. 

III. Is not the Will always as the greatest apparent 
good in this sense, that its determinations are always 
as the affirmations of the Intelligence and the im- 



100 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

pulse of the Sensibility combined ? That it is not, 
I argue for two reasons. 

1. If this was the case, when the Intelligence and 
Sensibility are opposed to each other — a fact of very 
frequent occurrence, — there could be no acts of 
Will in either direction. The Will must remain in 
a state of absolute inaction, till these belligerent 
powers settle their differences, and unite in impelling 
the Will in some particular direction. But we know 
that the Will can, and often does, act in the direction 
of the Intelligence or Sensibility, when the affirma- 
tions of one and the impulses of the other are in 
direct opposition to each other. 

2. When both the Intellect and Sensibility, as 
in the cases above cited, are alike indifferent, there 
can be, on the present hypothesis, no acts of Will 
whatever. Under these identical circumstances, 
however, the Will does act. The hypothesis, there- 
fore, falls to the ground. 

I conclude, then, that the proposition, " the Will 
is always as the greatest apparent good," is ei her a 
mere truism, having no bearing at all upon our pre- 
sent inquiries, or that it is false. 

In the discussion of the above propositions, the 
doctrine of Liberty has received a full and distinct il- 
lustration. The action of the Will is sometimes in 
the direction of the Intelligence, in opposition to the 
Sensibility, and sometimes in the direction of the Sen- 
sibility, in opposition to the Intelligence, and never 



GREATEST APPARENT GOOD. 101 

in the direction of either, because it must be. Some- 
times it acts where the Sensibility and Intelligence 
both harmonize, or are alike indifferent. When also 
the Will acts in the direction of the Intelligence or 
Sensibility, it is not necessitated to follow, in all in- 
stances, the highest affirmation, nor the strongest 
desire. 

SEC. II — MISC ELLANEOIJS TOPICS. 
NECESSITARIAN ARGUMENT. 

I. We are now prepared to appreciate the Neces- 
sitarian argument, based upon the assumption, that 
" the Will always is as the greatest apparent good." 
This assumption is the great pillar on which that 
doctrine rests. Yet the whole argument based upon 
it is a perpetual reasoning in a circle. Ask the Ne- 
cessitarian to give the grand argument in favor of his 
doctrine. His answer is, because " the Will always 
is as the greatest apparent good." Cite now such 
facts as those stated above in contradiction of his 
assumption, and his answer is ready. There must 
be, in all such cases, some perceived or felt ground 
of preference, or there could be no act of Will in the 
case. There must have been, for example, some 
point in space more eligible than any other for the 
location of the universe, and this must have been the 
reason why God selected the one he did. Ask him 
why he makes this declaration ? His reply is, be- 
cause " the Will is always as the greatest apparent 
good." Thus this assumption becomes premise or 



102 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

conclusion, just as the exigence of the theory based 
upon it demands. Nothing is so convenient and ser- 
viceable as such an assumption, when one has a very- 
difficult and false position to sustain. But who does 
not see, that it is a most vicious reasoning in a circle 1 
To assume the proposition, " the Will always is as 
the greatest apparent good," in the first instance, as 
the basis of a universal theory, and then to assume 
the truth of that proposition as the basis of the ex- 
planation of particular facts, which contradict that 
theory, what is reasoning in a circle if this is not ? 
No one has a right to assume this proposition as true 
at all, until he has first shown that it is affirmed by 
all the phenomena of the Will. On its authority he 
has no right to explain a solitary phenomenon. To 
do it is not only to reason in a circle, but to beg the 
question at issue. 

MOTIVES CAUSE ACTS OF WILL, IN WHAT SENSE. 

II. We are also prepared to notice another assump- 
tion of President Edwards, which, if admitted in the 
sense in which he assumes it as true, necessitates 
the admission of the Necessitarian scheme, to wit : 
that the determination of the Will is always caused 
by the Motive present to the mind for putting forth . 
that determination. " It is that motive," he says, 
a which, as it stands in the view of the mind, is the 
strongest which determines the Will." Again, u that 
every act of the Will has some cause, and conse- 



GREATEST APPARENT GOOD. 103 

quently (by what has been already proved) has a 
necessary connection with its cause, and so is neces- 
sary by a necessity of connection and consequence, 
is evident by this, that every act of Will, whatsoever, 
is excited by some motive." " But if every act of 
the Will is excited by some motive, then that motive 
is the cause of that act of the Will." " And if voli- 
tions are properly the effects of their motives, then 
they are necessarily connected with their motives." 
If we grant the principle here assumed, the con- 
clusion follows of necessity. But let us inquire in 
what sense motive and volition sustain to each other 
the relation of cause and effect. The presence and 
action of one power causes the action of another ', so far , 
and so far only, as it necessitates such action; and 
causes its action in a particular direction, so far only as 
it necessitates its action in that direction, in opposi- 
tion to every other. Now the action of one power 
may cause the action of another, in one or both these 
ways. 

1. It may* necessitate its action, and necessitate it 
in one direction in opposition to any and every other. 
In this sense, fire causes the sensation of pain. It 
necessitates the action of the Sensibility, and in that 
one direction. Or, 

2. One power may necessitate the action of ano- 
ther power, but not necessitate its action in one direc- 
tion in opposition to any or all others. We have 
seen, in a former chapter, that the Motive causes the 



104 DOCTRTNE OF THE WILL. 

action of the Will in this sense only, that it necessi- 
tates the Will to act in some direction, but not in one 
direction in distinction from another. Now the error 
of President Edwards lies in confounding these two 
senses of the word cause. He assumes that when 
one power causes the action of another in any sense, 
it must in every sense. It is readily admitted, that 
in one sense the Motive causes the action of the Will. 
But when we ask for the reason or cause of any one 
particular choice in distinction from another, we find it, 
not in the motive, but in the power of willing itself. 

OBJECTION — PARTICULAR VOLITION, HOW ACCOUNTED 

FOR. 

III. We are also prepared to notice the great objec- 
tion of Necessitarians to the doctrine of Liberty as here 
maintained. How, it is asked, shall we account, on 
this theory, for particular volitions ? The power to 
will only accounts for acts of Will in some direction, 
but not for one act in distinction from another. This 
distinction must be accounted for, or we have an 
event without a cause. To this argument I reply, 

1. It assumes the position in debate, to wit : that 
there cannot be consequents which are not necessa- 
rily .connected with particular antecedents, which 
antecedents necessitate these particular consequents 
in distinction from all others. 

2. To account for any effect, all that can properly 
be required is, to assign the existence and operation of 
a cause adequate to the production of such effects. 



GREATEST APPARENT GOOD. 105 

Free- agency itself is such a cause in the case now 
under consideration. We have here given the exist- 
ence and operation of a cause which must produce one of 
of two effects,andis equally capable,under the circum- 
stances, of producing either. Such a cause accounts 
for the existence of such an effect, just as much as 
the assignment of an antecedent necessarily producing 
certain consequents, accounts for those consequents, 
3. If, as this objection affirms, an act of Will, when 
there is no perceived or felt reason for that act in 
distinction from every other, is equivalent to an event 
without a cause ; then it would be as impossible for 
us to conceive of the former as of the latter. We 
cannot even conceive of an event without a cause . 
But we can conceive of an act of Will when no rea- 
son, but the power of willing, exists for that particular 
act in distinction from others. We cannot conceive 
of an event without a cause. But we can conceive 
of the mind's selecting odd, for example, instead of 
even, without the Intellect or Sensibility impelling the 
Will to that act in distinction from others. Such 
act, therefore, is not equivalent to an event without 
a cause. The objection under consideration is con- 
sequently wholly baseless. 

FACTS LIKE THE ABOVE WRONGLY ACCOUNTED FOR. 

IV. The manner in which Necessitarians sometimes 
endeavor to account for acts of Will in which a selec- 
tion is made between objects perceived and felt to be 
10 



106 DOCTRINE OP THE WILL. 

perfectly equal, requires attention. Suppose that A 
and B are before the mind. One or the other is to 
be selected, or no selection at all is to be made. 
These objects are present to the mind as perfectly 
equal. The Intelligence and Sensibility are in a state 
of entire equilibrium between them. Now when 
one of these objects is selected in distinction from 
the other, this act of Will is to be accounted for, it 
is said, by referring back to the determination to make 
the selection instead of not making it. The Will 
does not choose between A and B, at all. The 
choice is between choosing and not choosing. But 
mark : To determine to select A or B is one thing. 
To select one in distinction from the other, is quite 
another. The former act does not determine the 
Will towards either in distinction from the other. 
This last act remains to be accounted for. When we 
attempt to account for it, we cannot do it, by refer- 
ring to the Intelligence or Sensibility ; for these are 
in a state of perfect equilibrium between the ob- 
jects. We can account for it only by falling back 
upon the power of willing itself, and admitting that 
the Will is free, and not subject to the law of Ne- 
cessity. 

CHOOSING BETWEEN OBJECTS KNOWN TO BE EQUAL 

HOW TREATED BY NECESSITARIANS. 

V. The manner in which Necessitarians treat facts 
of this kind, to wit ? choosing between things per- 



GREATEST APPARENT GOOD. 107 

ceived and felt to be equal, also demands a passing 
notice. Such facts are of very little importance, one 
way or the other, they say, in mental science. It is 
the height of folly to appeal to them to determine 
questions of such moment as the doctrine of Liberty 
and Necessity. I answer : Such facts are just as 
important in mental science, as the fall of a piece of 
gold and a feather, in an exhausted receiver, is in 
Natural Philosophy. The latter reveals with per- 
fect clearness the great law of attraction in the ma- 
terial universe. The former reveals with equal con- 
spicuousness the great law of Liberty in the realm 
of mind. The Necessitarian affirms, that no act of 
Will is possible, only in the direction of the dictates 
of the Intelligence, or of the strongest impulse of the 
Sensibility. Facts are adduced in which, from the 
necessity of the case, both Faculties must be in a 
state of perfect equilibrium. Neither can impel the 
Will in one direction, in distinction from the other. 
In such circumstances, if the doctrine of Necessity 
is true, no acts of Will are possible. In precisely 
these circumstances acts of Will do arise. The doc- 
trine of Necessity therefore is overthrown, and the 
truth of that Liberty is demonstrated. So impor- 
tant are those facts which Necessitarians affect to 
despise. True philosophy, it should be remembered, 
never looks contemptuously upon facts of any kind, 



108 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

PALPABLE MISTAKE. 

VI. We are prepared to notice a palpable mistake 
into which Necessitarians have fallen in respect to 
the use which the advocates of the doctrine of Lib- 
erty design to make of the fact, that the Will can 
and does select between objects perceived and felt to 
be equal. 

" The reason why some metaphysical writers," 
says President Day, " have laid so much stress upon 
this apparently insignificant point, is probably the 
inference which they propose to draw from the posi- 
tion which they assume. If it be conceded that the 
mind decides one way or the other indifferently, when 
the motives on each side are perfectly equal, they 
infer that this may be the fact, in all other cases, even 
though the motives to opposite choices may be ever 
so unequal. But on what ground is this conclusion 
warranted ? If a man is entirely indifferent which 
of two barley-corns to take, does it follow that he 
will be indifferent whether to accept of a guinea or a 
farthing ; w r hether to possess an estate or a trinket ?" 
The advocates of the doctrine of Liberty design to 
make, and do make, no such use of the facts under 
consideration, as is here attributed to them. They 
never argue that, because the Will can select between 
A and B, when they are perceived and felt to be 
equal, therefore, when the Will acts in one direction, 
in distinction from another, it is always, up to the mo- 
ment of such action, impelled in different directions 



DIVINE PRESCIENCE. 109 

by feelings and judgments equally strong. What 
they do argue from such facts is, that the Will is sub- 
ject to the law of Liberty and not to that of Neces- 
sity. If the Will is subject to the latter, then, when 
impelled in different directions by Motives equally 
strong (as in the cases above cited), it could no more 
act in the direction of one in distinction from the 
other, than a heavy body can move east instead of 
west, when drawn in each direction by forces per- 
fectly equal. If the Will is subject to the law of 
Necessity, then, in all instances of selection between 
objects known and felt to be equal, we have an event 
without a cause. Even the Necessitarians, many of 
them at least, dare not deny that, under these very 
circumstances, selection does take place. They must, 
therefore, abandon their theory, or admit the dogma ? 
of events without causes. 



10' 



CHAPTERVI. 

CONNECTION OF THE DOCTRINE OF LIBERTY 
WITH THE DIVINE PRESCIENCE. 

The argument on which Necessitarians chiefly rely, 
against the doctrine of Liberty, and in support of that 
of Necessity, is based upon the Divine prescience of 
human conduct. The argument runs thus : all acts 
of the Will, however remote in the distant future, 
are foreknown to God. This fact necessitates the 
conclusion, that such acts are in themselves certain, 
and, consequently, not free, but necessary. Either 
God cannot foreknow acts of Will, or they are neces- 
sary. The reply to this argument has already been 
anticipated in the Introduction. The Divine presci- 
ence is not the truth to which the appeal should be 
made, to determine the philosophy of the Will pre- 
supposed in the Bible. This I argue, for the obvious 
reason, that of the mode, nature, and degree, of the 
Divine prescience of human conduct we are pro- 
foundly ignorant. These we must know with per- 
fect clearness, before we can affirm, with any cer- 
tainty, whether this prescience is or is not consis f ent 
with the doctrine of Liberty. The Divine pre- 
science is a truth of inspiration, and therefore a fact. 
The doctrine of Liberty is, as we have seen, a truth 



DIVINE PRESCIENCE. Ill 

of inspiration, and therefore a fact. It is also a fact, 
as affirmed by the universal consciousness of man. 
How do we know that these two facts are not per- 
fectly consistent with each other? How do we 
know but that, if we understood the mode, to say 
nothing of the nature and degree of the Divine pre- 
science, we should not perceive with the utmost clear- 
ness, that this truth consists as perfectly with the 
doctrine of Liberty, as with that of Necessity. 

If God foresees events, he foreknows them as they 
are, and not as they are not. If they are free and 
not necessary, as free and not necessary he foresees 
them. Having ascertained by consciousness that the 
acts of the Will are free, and having, from reason and 
revelation, determined, that God foreknows such acts, 
the great truth stands revealed to our mind, that 
God does and can foreknow human conduct, and yet 
man in such conduct be free ; and that the mode, na- 
ture, and degree, of the former are such as most 
perfectly to consist with the latter. 

I know with perfect distinctness, that I am now 
putting forth certain acts of Will. With equal dis- 
tinctness I know, that such acts are not necessary, 
but free. My present knowledge is perfectly consist- 
ent with present freedom. How do I know but that 
God's foreknowledge of future acts is equally con- 
sistent with the most perfect freedom of such acts. 

Perhaps a better presentation of this whole subject 
cannot be found than in the following extract from 



112 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

Jouffroy's " Introduction to Ethics. " The extract, 
though somewhat lengthy, will well repay a most at- 
tentive perusal. 

DANGER IN REASONING FROM THE MANNER IN WHICH 
WE FOREKNOW EVENTS TO THAT OF DIVJNE PRE- 
SCIENCE. 

" To begin, then, with a very simple remark : if we 
conceive that foreknowledge in the Divine Being acts 
as it does in us, we run the risk of forming a most in- 
correct notion of it, and consequently, of seeing a 
contradiction between it and liberty, that would dis- 
appear altogether had we a truer notion. Let us 
consider that we have not the same faculty for fore- 
seeing the future as we have of reviewing the past ; 
and even in cases where we do anticipate it, it is 
by an induction from the past. This induction may 
amount either to certainty, or merely to probability. 
It will amount to certainty when we are perfectly 
acquainted with necessary causes, and their law of 
operation. The effects of such causes in given cir- 
cumstances having been determined by experience, 
we can predict the return of similar effects under sim- 
ilar circumstances with entire certainty, so long at 
least as the present laws of nature remain in force. 
It is in this way that we foresee, in most cases, the 
physical occurrences, whose law of operation is 
known to us ; and such foresight would extend much 
further, were it not for unexpected circumstances 
which jcome in to modify the result. This induction 
can never go beyond probability," however, when we 
consider the acts of free causes ; and for the very 
reason that they are free, and that the effects which 
arise from such causes are not of necessary occur- 



DIVINE PRESCIENCE. 113 

rence, and do not invariably follow the same antece- 
dent circumstances. Where the question is, then, as 
to the acts of any free cause, we are never able to 
foresee it with certainty, and induction is limited to 
conjectures of probability. 

" Such is the operation, and such are the limits of 
human foresight. Our minds foresee the future by 
induction from the past ; this foresight can never at- 
tain certainty except in the case of causes and effects 
connected by necessary dependence ; when the ef- 
fects of free causes are to be anticipated, as all such 
effects are contingent, our foresight must be merely 
conjecture. 

MISTAKE RESPECTING THE DIVINE PRESCIENCE. 

"If, now, we attempt to attribute to the Deity the 
same mode of foresight of which human beings are 
capable, 'it will follow, as a strict consequence, that, 
as God must know exactly and completely the laws 
to which all the necessary causes in nature are sub- 
ject — laws which change only according to his will, 
— he can foresee with absolute certainty all events 
which will take place in future. The certain fore- 
sight of effects, therefore, which is to us possible only 
in particular cases, and which, even then, is always 
liable to the limitation that the actual laws of nature 
are not modified, — this foresight, which, even when 
most sure, is limited and contingent, must be com- 
plete and absolute certainty in God, supposing his 
foreknowledge to be of like kind with ours. 

" But it is evident that, according to this hypothesis, 
the Deity cannot foresee with certainty the volitions 
of free causes any more than we can ; for, as his 
foresight is founded, as ours is, upon the knowledge 
of the laws which govern causes, and as the law of 



114 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

free causes is precisely this, that their volitions are 
not necessary, God cannot calculate, any more than 
a human being can, the influence of motives, which, 
in any given case, may act upon such causes. Even 
his intelligence can lead no further than to conjec- 
tures, more probable, indeed, than ours, but never 
amounting to certainty. According to this hypothe- 
sis, we must, therefore, say either that God can fore- 
see, certainly, the future volitions of men, and that 
man, therefore, is not a free being, or that man is 
free, and that God, therefore, cannot, any more than 
we can, foresee his volitions with certainty ; and 
thus Divine prescience and human free-will are 
brought into direct contradiction. 

" But, gentlemen, why must there be this contra- 
diction ? Merely because we suppose that God fore- 
sees the future in the same way in which we foresee 
it ; that his foreknowledge operates like our own. 
Now, is this, I ask, such an idea as we ought to form 
of Divine prescience, or such an idea as even the 
partisans of this system, which I am opposing, form ? 
Have we any reason for thus imposing upon the 
Deity the limitation of our own feebleness ? I think 
not. 

" Unendowed as we are, with any faculty of foresee- 
ing the future, it may be difficult for us to conceive 
of such a faculty in God. But yet can we not from 
analogy form such an idea ? We have now two fa- 
culties of perception— of the past by memory, of the 
present by observation ; can we not imagine a third 
to exist in God — the faculty of perceiving the future, 
as we perceive the past ? What would be the con- 
sequence ? This : that God, instead of conjecturing, 
by induction, the acts of human beings from the laws 
of the causes operating upon them, would see them 



DIVINE PRESCIENCE. 115 

simply as the results of the free determinations of the 
will. Such perception of future acts no more im- 
plies the necessity of those actions, than the percep- 
tion of similar acts in the past. To see that effects 
arise from certain causes is not to force causes to 
produce them ; neither is it to compel these effects 
to follow. It matters not whether such a perception 
refers to the past, present, or future ; it is merely a 
perception ; and, therefore , far from producing the 
effect perceived, it even presupposes this effect al- 
ready produced. 

~ u I do not pretend that this vision of what is to be is 
an operation of which our minds easily conceive. It 
is difficult to form an image of what we have never 
experienced ; but I do assert, that the power of see- 
ing what no longer exists is full as remarkable as that 
of seeing what has as yet no being, and that the rea- 
son of our readily conceiving of the former is only 
the fact that we are endowed with such a power : to 
my reason, the mystery is the same. 

" But whatever may or may not be in reality the 
mode of Divine foreknowledge, or however exact 
may be the image which we attempt to form of it, 
it always, I say, — and this is the only point I am de- 
sirous of proving, — it always remains a matter of un- 
certainty, which cannot be removed, whether the Di- 
vine foreknowledge is of a kind like our own, or not ; 
and as, in the one case, there would not be the same 
contradiction that there is in the other, between our 
belief in Divine foreknowledge and human freedom, 
it is proved true, I think, that no one has a right to 
assert the existence of such a contradiction, and the 
necessity that human reason should choose between 
them." * 



116 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL, 

LINGULAR INCONSISTENCY OF NECESSITARIANS. 

There is no class of men who dwell with more 
frequency and apparent reverence, upon the truth, that 
il secret things belong to God," and those and those 
only, u that are revealed to us ;" that " none by search- 
ing can -find out God ;" that u as the heavens are high 
above the earth, so are His ways above our ways, and 
His thoughts above our thoughts ;" and that it is the 
height of presumption in us, to pretend to understand 
God's mode of knowing and acting. None are more 
ready to talk of mysteries in religion than they. Yet, 
strange as it may appear, it is nevertheless true, that 
their whole argument, drawn from the Divine fore- 
knowledge, against the doctrine of Liberty, and in 
favor of that of Necessity, is based entirely upon 
the assumption that they have found out and fully 
understand the mode of the Divine prescience of hu- 
man conduct ; that they have so measured and deter- 
mined the " ways and thoughts" of God, that they 
know that he cannot foresee any but necessary events ; 
that among many events, all in themselves equally 
possible, and none of them necessary in distinction 
from others, he cannot foreknow which, in fact, will 
arise. We may properly ask the Necessitarian 
whence he obtained this knowledge, so vast and 
deep ; whence he has thus " found out the Almighty 
to perfection ?" To me, the pretension to such 
knowledge appears more like presumption than that 
deep self-distrust and humiliation w T hich becomes the 



DIVINE PRESCIENCE. 117 

Finite in the presence of the Infinite. This know- 
ledge has not been obtained from revelation. God 
has never told us that He can foresee none but necessa- 
ry events. Whether He can or cannot foresee events 
free as well as necessary, is certainly one of the 
" secret things" which God has not revealed. If we 
admit ourselves ignorant of the mode of God's fore- 
knowledge of future events (and who will dare deny 
the existence of such ignorance in his own case ?), the 
entire argument of the Necessitarian, based upon 
that fore-knowledge, in favor of his doctrine, falls to 
the ground at once. 

NECESSITARIAN OBJECTION TO THE ABOVE ARGUMENT. 

To all that has been said above, the Necessitarian 
brings an objection which he deems perfectly unan- 
swerable. It is this: If actions are free in the 
sense maintained in this treatise, then in themselves 
they are uncertain. If they are still certainly known 
to God, they are both certain and uncertain, at the 
same time. True, I answer, but not in the same 
sense. As far as the powers of the agent are con- 
cerned, the action may be uncertain, while God at 
the same time may know certainly how he will exert 
his powers. In reference merely to the powers of 
the agent, the event is uncertain. In reference to 
the mind of God, who knows instinctively how he 
will exert these powers, the event is certain. 

n 



CHAPTER VIL 

BEARING OF THE DOCTRINE OF LIBERTY UP- 
ON THE PURPOSES AND AGENCY OF GOD 5 
JN RESPECT TO HUMAN CONDUCT. 

All truth is in harmony with itself. Every particu- 
lar truth is, and must be, in harmony with every other 
truth. If the doctrine of Necessity be assumed as 
true, we must take one view of the relation of God's 
purposes and agency in respect to the conduct of 
moral agents. If, on the other hand, we assume as 
true the doctrine of Liberty, quite another and a dif- 
ferent view, in respect to this whole subject, must 
be taken. In the remarks which I have to make 
upon this subject, I shall assume the truth of the 
doctrine of Liberty, together with those of the per- 
fect Divine Omniscience, Wisdom, and Benevolence, 
The question now arises, in the light of all these 
great truths, What relation do the Divine purposes 
and agency sustain to human action ? In what sense 
does God purpose, preordain, and bring to pass, the 
voluntary conduct of moral agents ? To this ques- 
tion but one answer can be given, in the light of the 
truths before us. God purposes human action in this 
sense only : He determines himself to act in a given 
manner, because it is wisest and best for him to act 



DIVINE PURPOSES. 119 

in that manner, and in that manner only. He deter- 
mines this, knowing how intelligent beings will act 
under the influence brought to bear upon them by 
the Divine conduct. He purposes and brings about, 
or causes human action in this sense only, that in the 
counsels of eternity, He, in the exercise of infinite 
wisdom and goodness, preordains, and at the time 
appointed, gives existence to the motives and influences 
under which moral agents do act, and in the light of 
which they voluntarily determine their own charac- 
ter and conduct. 

conclusions from the above. 

god's purposes consistent with the liberty of 
creatures. 

1. We perceive the perfect consistency of God's 
purposes and agency with human liberty. If the 
motives and influences in view of which men do act, 
do not destroy their free agency, — a fact which must 
be true from the nature of the Will, — then God's pur- 
poses to give existence, and his agency in giving ex- 
istence, to these motives and influences, cannot in any 
sense destroy, or interfere with such agency. This 
is a self-evident truth. 

SENSES IN WHICH GOD PURPOSED MORAL GOOD AND 

EVIL. 

2. We also perceive the senses in which God pur- 
posed the existence of moral good and evil, in the 
universe. He purposed the existence of the motives, 



120 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

in view of which He knew that a part of His sub- 
jects would render themselves holy, and a part would 
render themselves sinful. But when we contem- 
plate all the holiness and consequent happiness which 
do exist, we then perceive the reason why God 
gave existence to these motives. The sin conse- 
quent, in the sense above explained, constitutes no 
part of the reason for their existence, but was always, 
in the Divine Mind, a reason against their existence; 
which reason, however, was overpowered by infinite- 
ly more important reasons on the other side. The 
good which results from creation and providence is 
the great and exclusive object of creation and provi- 
dence. The evil, God always regretted, and would 
have prevented, if possible, i. e. if compatible with 
the existence of the best possible system." 

DEATH OF THE INCORRIGIBLE PREORDAINED BUT NOT 

WILLED. 

3. We also perceive the perfect consistency of 
those Scriptures which represent God as, on the 
whole, purposing the death of incorrigible transgres- 
sors, and yet as not willing it, but as willing the op- 
posite. The purpose to destroy is based upon the 
foreseen incorrigibleness of the transgressor, — a pur- 
pose demanded by perfect wisdom and benevolence^ 
in view of that foreseen incorrigibleness. The in- 
corrigibleness itself, however, and the perdition con- 
sequent, are evils, the existence of which God never 



DIVINE PURPOSES. 121 

willed; but are the opposite of what he willed, are 
evils which a being of perfect wisdom and goodness 
never could, and never can will. It is with perfect 
consistency, therefore, that the Scriptures represent 
God, in view of incorrigibleness foreseen, as purpos- 
ing the death of the transgressor, and at the same 
time, in view of the fact that such incorrigibleness 
is the opposite of what He wills the creature to do, 
as affirming, that He is not " willing that any should 
perish, but that all should come to a knowledge of 
the truth." 

GOD NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEATH OF THE 
INCORRIGIBLE. 

4. We see, also, how it is, that, while God does 
that, and eternally purposed to do that, in view of 
which he eternally knew that certain of his creatures 
would for ever destroy themselves, none but them- 
selves are in fault for such destruction. The reasons 
are these : 

( 1 . ) God never did anything in view of which men 
ought to act thus, nor which did not lay them under 
obligations infinite, to act differently, and which was 
not best adapted to secure that end. 

(2.) Their destruction constituted no part of the 
object of God in creation and providence, the oppo- 
site of this beino; true. 

(3. ) The great object of God in creation and provi- 
dence was and is, to produce the greatest possible 
11* 



122 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

amount of holiness and consequent happiness, and to 
prevent, in every possible way consistent with this 
end, the existence of sin, and consequently of misery, 
— Now if creatures perish under such an influence^ 
they perish by their own fault. 

SIN A MYSTERY. 

5. I have a single remark to make upon those 
phenomena of the Will, in which evil is chosen in- 
stead of good, or sin instead of holiness. That all 
intelligent beings possess the power to make such a 
choice, is a fact affirmed by universal consciousness. 
But that any being, under any circumstances, should 
make such a choice, and that he should for ever re- 
fuse to return to the paths of virtue, notwithstanding 
his experience of the consequences of sin, is an 
abuse of human liberty, which must for ever remain 
an inexplicable mystery. When a being assigns the 
real reason in view of which right is chosen, we are 
always satisfied with such reason. But we are never 
satisfied with the reason for the opposite course. 

CONCLUSION FROM THE ABOVE. 

One conclusion forces itself upon us, from that 
view of the Divine government which consists with 
the doctrine of Liberty. The aspect of that gov- 
ernment which results from this view of the subject 
commends itself to the reason and conscience of the 
intelligent universe. Mysteries we do and must find 



DIVINE PURPOSES. 123 

in it ; but absurdities and contradictions, never. Un- 
der such a Government, no being is condemned for 
what he cannot avoid, nor rewarded for what he 
could but do. While 

11 God sits on no precarious throne, 
Nor borrows leave to be," 

the destiny of the creature turns upon his own de- 
serts, his own choice of good or evil. The elucida- 
tion of the principles of such a government " com- 
mends itself to every man's conscience in the sight 
of God." 



CHAPTER VIII. 
OBLIGATION PREDICABLE ONLY OF THE WILL. 

SECTION I. 

The Will, as I have already said, exists in a trinity 
with the Intelligence and Sensibility. In respect 
to the operations of the different departments of our 
mental being, I lay down the two following proposi- 
tions : 

1. Obligation, moral desert, &c, are directly predi- 
cate only of the action of the Will. 

2. For the operations of the other faculties we are 
accountable so far forth only as the existence and 
character of such operations depend upon the Will. 
In other words, it is for voluntary acts and states 
only that we are accountable. This I argue because, 

1. Obligation, as we have seen, consists only with 
Liberty. All the phenomena of the Intelligence 
and Sensibility, in the circumstances of their occur- 
rence, are not free, but necessary. Accountability, 
therefore, cannot be predicated of such phenomena. 
We may be, and are, accountable for such phenomena, 
so far forth as their existence and character depend 
upon the Will : in other words, so far forth as they are 
voluntary, and not involuntary, states of mind. 

2. The truth of the above proposition, and of that 



MORAL Oh OT9. 129 

only, really corresponds with the universal conviction 
of the race. This conviction is expressed in two 
ways. 

(1.) When blame is affirmed of the operations 
of the Intelligence or Sen* ^riabJy thus 

thoughts or sentiments. You nave no right to 
<fo£/e sneh feelings. " In other words, praise or blame 
is never directly predicated of these operations them- 
selves, but of the action of the Will relatively to them . 
■ en agree, that the moral cha; all 

actions, of all states of mind whatever 3s upon 

in/™ In no point is there a more universal bar- 

mony among moral philosophers than in respect to 
this. But intention is undeniab] .oomenon of 

the Will, and of that exclusively. We must there- 
fore admit, that moral obligation is predicable of the 
Wul only, or deny the fundamental convictions of the 
nee 

The truth of the above propos it ions is intuitively 
evident, the moment die mind apprehends their real 
import. A man, as he steps out of a warm room, 
amid the external frosts of winter, feels an involun- 
tary chill over his whole system. We might with 
die same propriety attribute blame to him for such 
feelings, as for any other feelings, thoughts, or per- 
ceptions which exist alike independent of his Will, 
and especially in opposition to its determinations, 
4. If we suppose all die voluntary acts and states 



126 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

of a moral agent to be, and always to have been, in 
perfect conformity to moral rectitude, it is impossi- 
ble for us to impute moral guilt to him for any feel- 
ings or thoughts which may have risen in his mind 
independently of his Will. We can no more conceive 
him to have incurred ill desert, than we can conceive 
of the annihilation of space. We may safely put it to 
the consciousness of every man whether this is not 
the case. This renders demonstrably evident the 
truth, that moral obligation is predicable only of the 
Will. 

7. With the above perfectly harmonize the posi- 
tive teachings of Inspiration. For example. u Lust, 
when it is conceived, bringeth forth sin." The invol- 
untary feeling does not constitute the sin, but the 
action of the Will in harmony with that feeling. 

8. A single supposition will place this whole subject 
in a light perfectly conspicuous before the mind. We 
can readily conceive that the Will, or voluntary 
states of the mind, are in perfect harmony with the 
moral law, while the Sensibility, or involuntary states, 
are opposed to it. We can also with equal readi- 
ness make the opposite supposition, to w T it, that the 
Sensibility, or involuntary states, are in harmony with 
the law, while the determinations of the Will are all 
opposed to it. What shall we think of these two 
states ? Let us suppose a case of no unfrequent oc- 
currence, that the feelings, or involuntary state of 
the mind, are in perfect harmony with thel aw, while 



MORAL OBLIGATION. 127 

the action of this Will, or the voluntary states, are in 
determined opposition to the law, the individual be- 
ino* inflexibly determined to quench such feelings, 
and act in opposition to them. Is there any virtue 
at all in such a state of mind ? Who would dare to 
say that- there is ? Is not the guilt of the individ- 
ual aggravated in proportion to the depth and intensity 
of the feeling which he is endeavoring to sup- 
press ? Now if, as all will admit, there is no virtue 
at all, when the states of the Sensibility are in har- 
mony with the lav/, and the determinations of the 
Will, or voluntary states of the mind, are opposed to it, 
how can there be guilt when the Will, or voluntary 
states, are in perfect harmony with the law, and the 
Sensibility or involuntary states, opposed to it ? This 
renders it demonstrably evident that obligation and 
moral desert of praise or blame are predicable only of 
the Will, or voluntary states of mind. 

7. We will make another supposition ; one, if possi- 
ble, still more to the point. The tiger, we well know, 
has received from his Maker, either directly or through 
the laws of natural generation sustained by the Most 
High, a ferocious nature. Why do we not blame 
the animal for this nature ? The answer, perhaps, 
would be, that he is not a rational being, and is 
therefore not responsible for anything. 

Let us suppose, then, that with this nature, God 
had associated Intelligence and Free-Will, such as 
man possesses. Why should the animal now be 
held responsible for the bare existence of this na- 



128 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

tare, any more than in the first instance, when the 
effect, in both instances, exists, alike independent of 
his knowledge, choice, and agency ? A greater ab- 
surdity than this never lay upon the brain of a Theo- 
logian, that the mere existence of rationality renders 
the subject properly responsible for what God him- 
self produces in connection with that rationality, and 
produces wholly independent of the knowledge, 
choice, and agency of that subject. 

Let us suppose, further, that the animal under 
consideration, as soon as he becomes aware of the 
existence and tendencies of this nature, holds all its 
impulses in perfect subjection to the law of love, 
and never suffers them, in a single instance, to induce 
a voluntary act contrary to that law e Is it in the 
power of the Intelligence to affirm guilt of that 
creature ? Do we not necessarily affirm his virtue to 
be great in proportion to the strength of the propen- 
sity thus perfectly subjected to the Moral law ? The 
above illustration renders two conclusions demon- 
strably evident : 

1. For the mere existence of any constitutional 
propensity whatever, the creature is not and cannot 
be responsible. 

2. When all the actions of the Will, or voluntary 
power, are in perfect harmony with the moral law, 
and all the propensities are held in full subjection to 
that law, the creature stands perfect and complete in 
the discharge of his duty to God and Man. For the 



MORAL OBLIGATION. 129 

involuntary and necessary actings of those propensi- 
ties, he cannot be responsible. 

It is no part of my object to prove that men have 
not derived from their progenitors, propensities which 
impel and induce them to sin ; but that, for the mere 
existence of these propensities, together with their 
necessary involuntary action, they are not guilty. 

SEC. II. DOGMAS IN THEOLOGY. 

Certain dogmas in Theology connected with the 
subject above illustrated here claim our attention. 

MEN RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SIN OF THEIR PROGENITORS, 

I. The first that I notice is the position, 
that creatures are now held responsible, even as " de- 
serving God's wrath and curse, not only in this life, 
but in that which is to come," not merely for their 
own voluntary acts of disobedience, nor for their in- 
voluntary exercises, but for the act of a progenitor, 
performed when they had no existence. If God holds 
creatures responsible for such an act, we may safely 
affirm that it is absolutely impossible for them to 
conceive of the justice of such a principle ; and that 
God has so constituted them, as to render it impossi- 
ble for them to form such a conception. Can a 
being who is not a moral agent sin ? Is not existence 
necessary to moral agency ? How then can creatures 
"sin in and through another" six thousand years 
before their own existence commenced ? We can- 
12 



130 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

not conceive of creatures as guilty for the involuntary 
and necessary exercises of their own minds. How- 
can we conceive of them as guilty for the act of 
another being, — an act of which they had, and could 
have, no knowledge, choice, or agency whatever 1 
How can intelligent beings hold such a dogma, and 
hold it as a revelation from Him who has declared 
with an oath, that the " son shall not bear the iniqui- 
ty of the father," but that " every man shall die for 
his own sins ?" 

CONSTITUTIONAL ILL-DESERT. 

II. The next dogma deserving attention is the posi- 
tion, that mankind derive from our first progenitor a 
corrupt nature, which renders obedience to the com- 
mands of God impossible, and disobedience necessa- 
ry, and that for the mere existence of this nature, men 
" deserve God's wrath and curse, not only in this 
world, but in that which is to come." 

If the above dogma is true, it is demonstrably evi- 
dent, that this corrupt nature comes into existence 
without the knowledge, choice, or agency of the 
creature, who, for its existence, is pronounced de- 
serving of, and "bound over to the wrath of God." 
Equally evident is it, that this corrupt nature exists 
as the result of the direct agency of God. He pro- 
claims himself the Maker of "every soul of man." 
As its Maker, He must have imparted to that soul the 
constitution or nature which it actually possesses. It 



MORAL OBLIGATION. 131 

does not help the matter at all, to say, that this nature 
is derived from our progenitor : for the laws of gene- 
ration, by which this corrupt nature is derived from 
that progenitor, are sustained and continued by God 
himself. It is a truth of reason as well as of revela- 
tion, that, even in respect to plants, derived " by ordi- 
nary generation " from the seed of those previously 
existing, it is God who " giveth them a body as it 
hath pleased him, and to every seed its own body." 
If this is true of plants, much more must it be so of 
the soul of man. 

If, then, the above dogma is true, man, in the first 
place, is held as deserving of eternal punishment for 
that whi$h exists wholly independent of his know- 
ledge, choice, or agency, in any sense, direct or in- 
direct. He is also held responsible for the result, not 
of his own agency, but for that. which results from 
the agency of God. . On this dogma, I remark, 

1. It is impossible for the Intelligence to affirm, or 
even to conceive it to be true, that a creature deserves 
eternal punishment for that which exists wholly in- 
dependent of his knowledge, choice, or agency ; for 
that which results, not from his own agency, but from 
that of another. The Intelligence can no more affirm 
the truth of such propositions, than it can conceive 
of an event without a cause. 

2. This dogma is opposed to the intuitive convic- 
tions of the race. Present the proposition to any 



132 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

mind, that, under the Divine government, the creature 
is held responsible for his own voluntary acts and 
states of minds only, and such a principle u com- 
mends itself to every man's conscience in the sight 
of God." Present the dogma, on the other hand, 
that for a nature which renders actual obedience im- 
possible, a nature which exists as the exclusive re- 
sult of the agency of God himself, independently of 
the knowledge, choice, or agency of the creature, 
such creature is justly " bound over to the wrath of 
God, and curse of the law, and so made subject to 
death, with all miseries, spiritual, temporal, and eter- 
nal," and there is not a conscience in the universe 
which will not reprobate with perfect horror such a 
principle. The intuitive convictions of the race are 
irreconcilably opposed to it. 

3. If mankind, as this dogma affirms, have a nature 
from which voluntary acts of a given character neces- 
sarily result, to talk of real growth or confirmation in 
holiness or sin, is to use words without meaning. All 
that influence, or voluntary acts, can do in such a case, 
is to develope the nature already in existence. They 
can do nothing to confirm the soul in its tendencies, 
one way or the other. What should we think of the 
proposition, that a certain tree had formed and con- 
firmed the habit of bearing particular kinds of fruits, 
when it commenced bearing, with the necessity of 
bearing this kind only, and with the absolute impos- 
sibility of bearing any other ? So the soul, according 



MORAL OBLIGATION. 133 

to this dogma, commences action with the absolute 
impossibility of any but sinful acts, and with the equal 
necessity of putting forth sinful ones. Now, Neces- 
sity and Impossibility know and can know no degrees. 
How then can a mind, thus constituted, generate and 
confirm the habit of sinning ? What, on this suppo- 
sition, is the meaning of the declaration, " How can 
ye, who are accusto ncd to do evil, learn to do well ?" 
All such declarations are without meaning, if this 
dogma is true. 

4. If God imputes guilt to the creature, for the ex- 
istence of the nature under consideration, he must 
have required the creature to prevent its existence. 
For it is a positive truth of reason and inspiration 
both, that as " sin is a transgression of the law ;'' that 
"where there is no law, there is no transgression ;" 
and that " sin is not imputed where there is no law," 
that is, where nothing is required, no obligation does 
or can exist, and consequently no guiit is imputed. 
The existence of the nature under consideration, then, 
is not and cannot be sin to the creature, unless it is a 
transgression of the law ; and it can not be a trans- 
gression of the law, unless the law required the crea- 
ture to prevent its existence, and prevent it when 
that existence was the exclusive result of God's 
agency, and when the creature could have no know- 
ledge, choice, or agency, in respect to what God was 
to produce. Can we conceive of a greater absurdity 
than that ? God is about to produce a certain na- ure 
12* 



134 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

by his own creative act, or by sustaining the laws of 
natural generation. He imputes infinite guilt to the 
creature for not preventing the result of that act, and 
inducing a result precisely opposite, and that in the 
absence of all knowledge of what was required of 
him, and of the possibility of any agency in respect 
to it. Is this a true exposition of the Government of 
God? 

i 

PRESENT IMPOSSIBILITIES REQUIRED. 

III. The last dogma that I notice is the position, that 
the Moral law demands of us, as sinners, not what is 
now possible to us on the ground of natural powers 
and proffered grace, but what would be possible, had 
we never sinned. It is admitted by all, that we have 
not now a capacity for that degree of virtue which 
would be possible to us, had we always developed 
our moral powers in harmony with the Divine law. 
Still it is maintained, that this degree of virtue, not- 
withstanding our present total incapacity to exercise 
it, is demanded of us. For not rendering it, we are 
justly bound over to the wrath and curse of God. In 
reply, I remark : 

1. That this dogma, which is professedly founded 
on the express teachings of Inspiration, has not even 
the shadow of a foundation in any direct or implied 
affirmation of the Bible. I may safely challenge the 
world to adduce a single passage of Holy Writ, that 
either directly or indirectly asserts any such thing. 



MORAL OBLIGATION. 135 

2. This dogma is opposed not only to the spirit, 
but to the letter of the law. The law, addressing men, 
enfeebled as their powers now are, in consequence of 
sin previously committed, requires them to love God 
with all their " mind and strength," that is, not with 
the power they would have possessed, had they 
never sinned, but with the power they now actually 
possess. On what authority does any Theologian 
affirm, when the law expressly makes one demand 
upon men, that it, in reality, makes another, and 
different demand ? In such an assertion, is he not 
wise, not only above, but against what is written ? 

3. This dogma is opposed to the express and posi- 
tive teachings of Inspiration. The Scriptures ex- 
pressly affirm, Rom. xiii. 8, that every one that ex- 
ercises love, " hath fulfilled the law," hath done all 
that the law requires of him. This would not be 
true, did the law require a degree of love not now 
practicable to the creature. Again, in Deut. x. 12, 
it is positively affirmed, that God requires nothing of 
his creatures but to " love him with all the heart and 
with all the soul," that is, with all the powers they 
actually possess. This could not be true, if the dog- 
ma under consideration is true. 

4. If we conceive an individual to yield a volun- 
tary conformity to moral obligations of every kind, to 
the full extent of his present capacities, it is impos- 
sible for us to conceive that he is not now doing all 
that he really ought to do. No person would ever 



136 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

think of exhorting him to do more, nor of charging 
him with guilt for not doing it. We may properly 
blame him for the past, but as far as the present is 
concerned, he stands guiltless in the eye of reason 
and revelation both. 

5. Let us suppose that an individual continues for 
fifty years in sin. He is then truly converted, and 
immediately after dies. All admit that he enters 
heaven in a state of perfect holiness. Yet no one 
supposes that he now exercises, or has the capacity 
to exercise, as high a degree of holiness, as he would, 
had he spent those fifty years in obedience, instead of 
disobedience to God. This shows that even those 
who theoretically hold the dogma under consideration 
do not practically believe it themselves. 

The conclusion to which our inquiries lead us is 
this : Holiness is a voluntary conformity to all per- 
ceivable obligation. Sin is a similar violation of such 
obligation. Nothing else is or can be holiness. No- 
thing else is or can be sin. 



CHAPTER IX. 

THE STANDARD BY WHICH THE MORAL CHA- 
RACTER OF VOLUNTARY STATES OF MIND, 
OR ACTS OF WILL, SHOULD BE DETERMINED. 

In the remarks which I have to make in elucida- 
tion of this subject, I shall, on the authority of evi- 
dence already presented, take two positions for 
granted : 

1. Moral obligation and moral desert are predica- 
ble only of acts of Will. 

2. It is only of those acts of Will denominated In- 
tentions^ and of course ultimate intentions, that obli- 
gation, merit and demerit, are predicable. 

In this last position, as I have already said, there 
is a universal agreement among moral philosophers. 
We may also safely assume the same as a first truth 
of the universal Intelligence. The child, the phi- 
losopher, the peasant, men of all classes, ages, 
and conditions, agree in predicating obligation and 
moral desert of intention, and of ultimate intention 
only. By ultimate intention, I, of course, refer to 
those acts, choices, or determinations of the Will, to 
which all other mental determinations are subordi- 
nate, and by which they are controlled. Thus, when 
an individual chooses, on the one hand, the Divine 



138 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

glory, and the highesl good of universal "being, as the 
end of his existence ; or, on the other, his own per- 
sonal gratification ; and subordinates to one or the 
other of these acts of choice all the law of his being, 
here w r e find his ultimate intention. In this exclu- 
sively all mankind agree in finding the moral charac- 
ter of all mental acts and states. 

Now an important question arises, By what stand- 
ard shall we judge of the moral character of inten- 
tions ? Of course, they are to be placed in the light 
of the two great precepts of the Moral law by which 
we are required to love God with all our powers, 
and our neighbor as ourselves. But two distinct and 
opposite explanations have been given of the above 
precepts, presenting entirely different standards of 
moral judgment. According to one, the precept re- 
quiring us to love God with all our heart and strength, 
requires a certain degree of intensity of intention and 
feeling. On no other condition, it is said, do we love 
God with all the heart. 

According to the other explanation, the precept 
requiring us to love God with all the heart, &c, 
means, that we devote our entire powers and interests 
to the glory of God and the good of his creatures, 
with the sincere intention to employ these powers 
and interests for the accomplishment of these objects 
in the best possible manner. When all our powers 
are under the exclusive control of such an intention 
as this, we then, it is affirmed, love God according 



STANDARD OF CHARACTER. 139 

to the letter and spirit of the above precept, " with 
all our heart, and with all our strength." 

SINCERITY, AND NOT INTENSITY, THE TRUE STANDARD. 

My object now is to show, that this last is the right 
exposition, and presents the only true standard by 
which to judge of all moral acts and states of mind. 
This I argue from the following considerations. 

1. If intensity be fixed upon as the standard, no one 
can define it, so as to tell us what he means. The 
command requiring us to love with all the heart, if 
understood as requiring a certain degree of intensity 
of intention, may mean the highest degree of tension 
of which our nature is susceptible. Or it may mean 
the highest possible degree, consistent with our ex- 
istence in this body ; or the highest degree consistent 
with the most perfect health ; or some inconceivable 
indefinable degree, nobody knows what. It cannot 
include all, and may and must mean some one of the 
above-named dogmas. Yet no one would dare to 
tell us which. Has God given, or does our own 
reason give us, a standard of moral judgment of which 
no one can form a conception, or give us a definition 1 

2. No one could practically apply this standard, if 
he could define it, as a test of moral action. The 
reason is obvious. No one, but Omniscience, can 
possibly know what degree of tensity our nature is 
capable of; nor precisely what degree is compatible 
with life, or with the most perfect health. If inten- 



140 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

sity, then, is the standard by which we are required to 
determine definitely the character of moral actions, we 
are in reality required to fix definitely the value of 
an unknown quantity, to wit : moral action, by a 
standard of which we are, and of necessity must be, 
most profoundly ignorant. We are required to find 
the definite by means of the indefinite ; the plain by 
means of the "palpable obscure." Has God, or our own 
reason, placed us in such a predicament as this, in 
respect to the most momentous of all questions, the 
determination of our true moral character and deserts? 

3. While the standard under consideration is, and 
must be, unknown to us, it is perpetually varying, and 
never fixed. The degree of intensity of mental effort 
of which we are capable at one moment, differs from 
that which is possible to us at another. The same 
holds equally of that which is compatible with life 
and health. Can we believe that " the judge of all 
the earth " requires us to conform, and holds us re- 
sponsible for not conforming to a standard located we 
cannot possibly know where, and which is always 
movable, and never for a moment remaining fixed ? 

4. The absurdity of attempting to act in conform- 
ity to this principle, in reference to particular duties, 
will show clearly that it cannot be the standard of 
moral obligations in any instance. Suppose an indi- 
vidual becomes convinced that it is his duty, that is, 
that God requires him to walk or travel a given dis- 
tance, or for a time to compose himself for the pur- 



STANDARD OF CHARACTER. 141 

pose of sleeping. Now he must will with all his 
heart to perform the duty before him. What if he 
should judge himself bound to will to sleep, for ex- 
ample, and to will it with all possible intensity, or 
with as great an intensity as consists with his health ? 
How long would it take him to compose himself to 
sleep in this manner ? What if he should with all 
possible intensity will to walk ? What if, when with 
all sincerity, he had intended to perform, in the best 
manner, the duty devolved upon him, he should in- 
quire whether the intention possessed the requisite 
intensity ? It would be just as rational to apply this 
standard in the instances under consideration, as in 
any other. 

5. That Sincerity, and not intensity of intention, 
presents the true standard of moral judgment, is evi- 
dent from the fact, that the former commends itself 
to every man's conscience as perfectly intelligible, of 
ready definition in itself, and of consequently ready 
application, in determining the character and moral 
desert of all moral actions. We can readily conceive 
what it is to yield all our powers and interests to the 
Will of God, and to do it with the sincere intention 
of employing them in the wisest and best manner for 
the accomplishment of the highest good. We can 
conceive, too, what it is to employ our powers and 
interests under the control of such an intention. We 
can also perceive with perfect distinctness our obli- 
gation to live and act under the supreme control of 
13 



142 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

such an intention. If we are bound to yield to God 
at all, we are bound to yield our entire being to his 
supreme control. If we are bound to will and em- 
ploy our powers and resources to produce any good 
at all, we are bound to will and aim to produce the 
highest good. 

This principle also is equally applicable in. deter- 
mining the character and deserts of all moral actions. 
Every honest mind can readily determine the fact, 
whether it is or is not acting under the supreme con- 
trol of the intention under consideration. If we adopt 
this principle, as expressing the meaning of the com- 
mand requiring us to love with all the heart, perfect 
sunlight rests upon the Divine law. If we adopt any 
other standard, perfect midnight hangs over that law. 

6. If we conceive a moral agent really to live and 
act in full harmony with the intention under conside- 
ration, it is impossible for us to conceive, or affirm, 
that he has not done his entire duty. What more 
ought a moral agent to intend than the highest good 
he can accomplish ? Should it be said, that he ought 
to intend this with a certain degree of intensity, the 
reply is, that Sincerity implies an intention to will and 
act, at all times, with that degree of intensity best 
adapted to the end to be accomplished. What more 
can properly or wisely be demanded ? Is not this 
loving with all the heart ? 

7. On this principle, a much greater degree of in- 
tensity, and consequent energy of action, will be se- 



STANDARD OF CHARACTER. 143 

cured, than on the other principle. Nothing tends 
more effectually to palsy the energies of the mind, 
than the attempt always to act with the greatest in- 
tensity. It is precisely like the attempt of some ora- 
tors, to speak, on all subjects alike, with the greatest 
possible pathos and sublimity. On the other hand, 
let an individual throw his whole being under the 
control of the grand principle of doing all the good he* 
can, and his powers will energize with the greatest 
freedom, intensity, and effect. If, therefore, the 
standard of moral obligation and moral desert has been 
wisely fixed, Sincerity, and nothing else, is that 
standard. 

8. I remark, once more, that Sincerity is the stan- 
dard fixed in the Scriptures of truth. In Jer. iii. 16, 
the Jews are accused of not " turning to the Lord 
with the whole heart , but feignedly," that is, with in- 
sincerity. If they had turned sincerely, they would, 
according to this passage, have done it with the whole 
heart. The whole heart, then, according to the ex- 
press teachings of the Bible, is synonymous with Sin- 
cerity ; and Sincerity according to the above defini- 
tion of the term. This is the true standard, accord- 
ing to revelation as well as reason. I have other 
arguments, equally conclusive as the above, to pre- 
sent, but these are sufficient. The importance of the 
subject, together with its decisive bearing upon the 
momentous question to be discussed in the next Chap- 
ter, is my apology for dwelling thus long upon it. 



CHAPTER X. 

INTUITIONS, OR MORAL ACTS, NEVER OF A MIX- 
ED CHARACTER; THAT IS, PARTLY RIGHT 
AND PARTLY WRONG. 

We are now prepared to consider the question, 
whether each moral act, or exercise, is not always 
of a character purely unmixed 1 In other words, 
whether every such act, or intention, is not always 
perfectly right or perfectly wrong 1 I would here 
be understood to speak of single acts, or intuitions, in 
distinction from a series, which continues through 
some definite period, as an hour or a day. Such 
series of acts may, of course, be of a mixed charac- 
ter ; that is, it may be made up of individual acts, 
some of which are right and some wrong. But the 
question is, can distinct, opposite, and contradictory 
elements, such as sin and holiness, right and wrong, 
selfishness and benevolence, enter into one and the 
same act % "No one will pretend that an individual 
is virtuous at all, unless he intends obedience to the 
moral law. The question is, can an individual in- 
tend to obey and to disobey the law, in one and the 
same act ? On this question I remark, 

1. That the principle established in the last Chap- 
ter really settles the question. No one, to my 



SIMPLICITY OF MORAL ACTION. 145 

knowledge, pretends, that, as far as sincerity is con- 
cerned, the same moral act can be of a mixed cha- 
racter. Very few, if any, will be guilty of the folly 
of maintaining, that an individual can sincerely intend 
to obey and to disobey the law at one and the same 
time. ,> When such act is contemplated in this point 
of light, it is almost universally admitted that it can- 
not be of a mixed character. But then another test 
is applied — that of intensity. It is conceivable, at 
least, it is said, that the intention might possess a 
higher degree of intensity than it does possess. It 
is, therefore, pronounced defective. On the same 
supposition, every moral act in existence might be 
pronounced defective. For we can, at least, con- 
ceive, that it might possess a higher degree of in- 
tensity. It has been abundantly established in the 
last Chapter, however, that there is no such test of 
moral actions as this, a test authorized either by rea- 
son or revelation. Sincerity is the only standard by 
which to determine the character and deserts of all 
moral acts and states. In the light of this standard, 
it is intuitively evident, that no one act can combine 
such contradictory and opposite elements as sin and 
holiness, right and wrong, an intention to obey and 
to disobey the moral law. 

2. The opinions and reasonings of distinguished 
philosophers and theologians on the subject may be 
adduced in confirmation of the doctrine under con- 
sideration. Let it be borne in mind, that if the same 
13* 



146 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

act embraces such contradictory and opposite ele- 
ments as sin and holiness, it must be, in reality, op- 
posed to itself, one element constituting the act, be- 
ing in harmony with the law, and in opposition to the 
other element which is opposed to the law. 

Now the remark of Edwards upon this subject 
demands our special attention. " It is absurd,' 5 he 
says, " to suppose the same individual Will to oppose 
itself in its present act ; or the present choice to be 
opposite to and resisting present choice ; as absurd 
as it is to talk of two contrary motions in the same 
moving body at the same time." Does not the com- 
mon sense of the race affirm the truth of this state- 
ment ] Sin and holiness cannot enter into the same 
act, unless it embraces a serious intention to obey 
and not to obey the moral law at the same time. Is 
not this, in the language of Edwards, as u absurd as it 
is to talk of two contrary motions in the same mov- 
ing body at the same time." 

Equally conclusive is the argument of Kant upon 
the same subject. Having shown that mankind are 
divided into two classes, the morally good and the 
morally evil ; that the distinguishing characteristic 
of the former is, that they have adopted the Moral 
law as their maxim, that is, that it is their serious 
intention to comply with all the claims of the law ; 
and of the latter, that they have not adopted the law 
as their maxim ; he adds, u The sentiment of man- 
kind is, therefore, never indiffexent relatively to the 



SIMPLICITY OF MORAL ACTION. 147 

law, and he never can be neither good nor evil." 
Then follows the paragraph to which special atten- 
tion is invited. "In like # manner, mankind cannot 
be, in some points of character, morally good, while 
he is, at the same time, in others evil ; for, is he in 
any point good, then the moral law is his maxim 
(that is, it is his serious intention to obey the law in 
the length and breadth of its claims) ; but is he like- 
wise, at the same time, in some points bad, then 
quoad [as to] these, the Moral law is not his maxim, 
(that is, in these particulars, it is his intention not to 
obey the law). But since the law is one and uni- 
versal, and as it commands in one act of life, so in 
all, then the maxim referring to it would be, at the 
same time universal and particular, which is a con- 
tradiction ;" (that is, it would be his intention to obey 
the law universally, and at the same time, not to 
obey it in certain particulars, one of the most palpa- 
ble contradictions conceivable.) To my mind the 
above argument has all the force of demonstration. 
Let it be borne in mind, that no man is morally good 
at all, unless it is his intention to obey the Moral 
law universally. This being his intention, the law 
has no higher claims upon him. Its full demands 
are, and must be, met in that intention. For what 
can the law require more, than that the voluntary 
powers shall be in full harmony with its demands, 
which is always true, when there is a sincere inten- 
tion to obey the law universally. Now, with this 



148 doctri;;e of the will. 

intention, there can be nothing in the individual mo- 
rally evil ; unless there is, at the same time, an in- 
tention not to obey the law in certain particulars ; 
that is, not to obey it universally. A mixed moral 
act, or intention, therefore, is possible, only on this 
condition, that it shall embrace these two contradict- 
ory elements — a serious determination to obey the 
law universally, and a determination equally deci- 
sive, at the same time, to disobey it in certain parti- 
culars ; that is, not to obey it universally. I leave it 
with the advocates of the doctrine of Mixed Moral 
Action to dispose of this difficulty as they can. 

3. If we could conceive of a moral act of a mixed 
character, the Moral law could not recognize it as 
holy at all. It presents but one scale by which to 
determine the character of moral acts, the command 
requiring us to love with all the heart. It knows 
such acts only as conformed, or not conformed, to 
this command. The mixed action, if it could exist, 
would, in the light of the Moral law, be placed 
among the not-conformed, just as much as those 
which are exclusively sinfuL The Moral law does 
not present two scales, according to one of which 
actions are classed as conformed or not-conformed, 
and according to the other, as partly conformed and 
partly not-conformed. Such a scale as this last is 
unknown in the circle of revealed truth. The Moral 
law presents us but one scale. Those acts which 
are in full conformity to its demands, it puts down as 



SIMPLICITY OF MORAL ACTION. 149 

holy. Those not thus conformed, it puts down as 
sinful ; as holy or sinful is the only light in which 
actions stand according to the law. 

4. Mixed actions, if they could exist, are as posi- 
tively prohibited by the law, and must therefore be 
placed under the category of total disobedience, just 
as much as those which are in themselves entirely 
sinful. While the law requires us to love with all 
the heart, it positively prohibits everything short of 
this. The individual, therefore, who puts forth an 
act of a mixed character, puts forth an act as totally 
and positively prohibited as the man who puts forth 
a totally sinful one. Both alike must be placed 
under the category of total disobedience. A father 
requires his two sons to go to the distance of ten 
rods, and positively prohibits their stopping short of 
the distance required. One determines to go nine 
rods, and there to stop. The other determines not to 
move at alL One has put forth an act of total diso- 
bedience just as much as the other. So of all moral 
acts which stop short of loving with all the heart. 

5. A moral act of a mixed character cannot pos- 
sibly proceed from that regard to moral obligation 
which is an essential condition of the existence of 
any degree of virtue at all. Virtue, in no degree, can 
exist, except from a sacred regard to moral obligation. 
The individual who thus regards moral obligation in 
one degree, will regard it equally in all degrees. 
The individual, therefore, who, from such regard, 



150 



DOCTRINE OF THE WILL« 



yields to the claims of the law at all, will and must 
conform to the full measure of its demands. He 
cannot be m voluntary opposition to any one demand 
of that law. A mixed moral act, then, cannot pos- 
sibly proceed from that regard to moral obligation 
which is the essential condition of holiness in any 
degree. This leads me to remark, 

6. That a moral act of a mixed character, if it 
could exist, could arise from none other than the 
most purely selfish and wicked intention conceivable. 
Three positions, we will suppose, are before the 
mind — a state of perfect conformity to the law, a 
state of total disobedience, and a third state combin- 
ing the elements of obedience and disobedience. 
By a voluntary act of moral election, an individual 
places himself in the last state, in distinction from 
each of the others. What must have been his in- 
tention in so doing ? He cannot have acted from a 
regard to moral rectitude. In that case, he would 
have elected the state of total obedience. His in- 
tention must have been to secure, at the same time, 
the reward of holiness and the u pleasures of sin " — 
a most selfish and wicked state surely. The suppo- 
sition of a moral act, that is, intention combining 
the elements of holiness and sin — is as great an ab- 
surdity as the supposition, that a circle has become 
a square, without losing any of its properties as a 
circle. 

7. I remark again that the doctrine of mixed moral 



SIMPLICITY OF MORAL ACTION. 151 

action is contradicted by the express teachings of 
inspiration. " Whosoever cometh after me," says 
Christ, " and forsaketh not all that he hath, he can- 
not be my disciple." The Bible knows men only as 
the disciples, or not disciples, of Christ. All who 
really comply with the condition above named are 
His disciples. All others, however near their com- 
pliance^ are not His disciples, any more than those 
who have not conformed in any degree. If an indi- 
vidual has really conformed to this condition, he has 
surely done his entire duty. He has loved with all 
his heart. What other meaning can we attach to the 
phrase, " forsaketh all that he hath ?" All persons 
who have not complied with this principle are de- 
clared to be wholly without the circle of disciple- 
ship. What is this, but a positive assertion, that a 
moral action of a mixed character is an impossi- 
bility ? 

Again. u No man can serve two masters." " Ye 
cannot serve God and mammon." Let us suppose 
that we can put forth intentions of a mixed charac- 
ter — intentions partly sinful and partly holy. So far 
as they are in harmony with the law, we serve God. 
So far as they are not in harmony with the law, we 
serve Mammon. Now, if all our moral exercises 
can be of a mixed character, then it is true that, at 
every period of our lives, w r e can serve God and 
Mammon. The service which we can render also to 
each, may be in every conceivable degree. We may 



152 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

render, for example, ninety-nine degrees of service 
to God and one to Mammon, or ninety-nine to Mam- 
mon and one to God. Or our service may be equal- 
ly divided between the two. Can we conceive of a 
greater absurdity than this ? 

What also is the meaning of such declarations as 
this, u no fountain can send forth both sw r eet water 
and bitter," if the heart of man may exercise in- 
tentions combining such elements as sin and holi- 
ness ? Declarations of a similar kind abound in the 
Bible. They are surely without meaning, if the 
doctrine of Mixed Moral Actions is true. 

8. Finally. It may be questioned whether the 
whole range of error presents a dogma of more per- 
nicious tendency than the doctrine of Mixed Moral 
Actions. It teaches moral agents that they may be 
selfish in all their moral exercises, and yet have 
enough of moral purity mingled with them to secure 
acceptance with the "Judge of all the earth." A 
man who has adopted such a principle will almost 
never, whatever his course of life may be, seem to 
himself to be destitute of real virtue. He will al- 
ways seem to himself to possess enough of it, to ren- 
der his acceptance with God certain. The kind of 
virtue which can mingle itself with selfishness and 
sin in individual intentions or moral acts, may be 
possessed, in different degrees, by the worst men on 
earth. If this be assumed as real holiness — that ho- 
liness which will stand the ordeal of eternity, who 



SIMPLICITY OF MORAL ACTION. 153 

will, who should conceive himself destitute of a title 
to heaven ? Here is the fatal rock on which myri- 
ads of minds are wrecked for ever. Let it ever be 
borne in mind, that the same fountain cannot, at the 
same time and place, " send forth both sweet water 
and bitter." " Y e cannot serve God and Mammon." 

OBJECTIONS. 

Two or three objections to the doctrine above es- 
tablished demand a passing notice here. 

AN ACT OF WILL MAY RESULT FROM A VARIETY OF 

MOTIVES. 

1. It is said that the mind may act under the influ- 
ence of a great variety of motives at one and the 
same time. The same intention, therefore, may be 
the result of different and opposite motives, and as a 
consequence, combine the elements of good and evil. 
In reply, I remark, that when the Will is in harmony 
with the Moral law, it respects the good and rejects 
the bad, alike in all the motives presented. The op- 
posite is true when it is not in harmony with the 
law. The same regard or disregard for moral obli- 
gation which will induce an individual to reject the 
evil and choose the good, or to make an opposite 
choice, in respect to one motive, will induce the 
same in respect to all other motives present at the 
same time. A mixed moral act can no more result 
from a combination of motives, than different and op- 
14 



154 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

posite motions can result in the same body at the 
same time, from forces acting upon it from different 
directions. 

LOVING WITH GREATER INTENSITY AT ONE TIME 
THAN ANOTHER. 

2. It is said that we are conscious of loving our 
friends, and serving God, with greater strength and in- 
tensity at one time than at another. Yet our love, in 
all such instances, is real. Love, therefore, may be 
real, and yet be greatly defective — -that is, it may be 
real, and embrace elements morally wrong. It is 
true, that love may exist in different degrees, as far 
as the action of the Sensibility is concerned. It is 
not so, however, with love in the form of intention- 
intention in harmony with moral obligation, the only 
form of love demanded by the moral law. Such in- 
tention, in view of the same degrees of light, and under 
the same identical influences, cannot possess different 
degrees of intensity. The Will always yields, when 
it really does yield at all to moral obligation, with all 
the intensity it is, for the time being, capable of, or 
the nature of the case demands. 

MOMENTARY REVOLUTIONS OF CHARACTER. 

3. On this theory, it is said, an individual may be- 
come perfectly good and perfectly bad, for any inde- 
finite number of instances, in any definite period of 
time. This consequence, to say nothing of what 



SIMPLICITY OF MORAL ACTION. 155 

is likely to take place in fact, does, as far as possibili- 
ty is concerned, follow from this theory. But let us 
contemplate it, for a moment, in the light of an ex- 
ample or two. An individual, from regard to moral 
obligation, maintains perfect integrity of character, up 
to a given period of time. Then, under the influ- 
ence of temptation, he tells a deliberate falsehood. 
Did his previous integrity so fuse itself into that lie, 
as to make it partly good and partly bad ? — as to 
make it anything else than a total falsehood ? Did 
the prior goodness of David make his acts of adul- 
tery and murder partly good and partly bad ? Let 
the advocate of mixed moral action extract the ele^ 
ments of moral goodness from these acts if he can. 
He can just as well find these elements here, as in 
any other acts of disobedience to the Moral law. 
u The righteousness of the righteous cannot save 
him " from total sinfulness, any more than from con- 
demnation " in the day of his transgression." 



CHAPTER XI. 

RELATION OF THE WILL TO THE INTELLI- 
GENCE AND SENSIBILITY, IN ALL ACTS OR 
STATES, MORALLY RIGHT OR WRONG. 

The Will, sustaining the relation it does to the In- 
telligence and Sensibility, must yield itself to the 
control of one or the other of these departments of 
our nature. In all acts and states morally right, the 
Will is in harmony with the Intelligence, from re- 
spect to moral obligation or duty ; and all the desires 
and propensities, all the impulses of the Sensibility, 
are held in strict subordination. In all acts morally 
wrong, the Will is controlled by the Sensibility, ir- 
respective of the dictates of the Intelligence. Im- 
pulse, and not a regard to the just, the right, the 
true and the good, is the law of its action. In all 
such cases, as the impulses which control the Will 
are various, the external forms through which the 
internal acts, or intentions, will manifest themselves, 
will be equally diversified. Yet the spring of action 
is in all instances one and the same, impulse instead 
of a regard to duty. Virtue does not consist in being 
controlled by amiable^ instead of dissocial and malign 
impulses, and in a consequent exterior of a corres- 
ponding beauty and loveliness. It consists in a volun- 



NATURE OF VIRTUE, 



157 



tary harmony of intention with the just, the right, 
the true and the good — from a sacred respect to 
moral obligation, instead of being controlled by mere 
impulse of any kind whatever. On the principle 
above illustrated, I remark : 

THOSE WHO ARE OR ARE NOT TRULY VIRTUOUS, 
HOW DISTINGUISHED. 

1. That the real distinction between those who 
are truly virtuous, and those who are not, now be- 
comes apparent. It does not consist, in all instances, 
in the mere exterior form of action, but in the spring 
or intention from which all such action proceeds. 
In most persons, and in all, at different periods, the 
amiable and social propensities predominate over the 
dissocial and malign. Hence much of the exterior 
will be characterized by much that is truly beautiful 
and lovely. In many, also, the impulsive power of 
conscience— that department of the Sensibility which 
is correlated to the idea of right and wrong, and im- 
pels to obedience to the Moral law — is strongly de- 
veloped, and may consequently take its turn in con- 
trolling the WilL In all such instances, there will 
be the external forms of real virtue. It is one thing, 
however, to put on the exterior of virtue from mere 
impulse, and quite another, to do the same thing from 
an internal respect and sacred regard for duty. 

How many individuals, who may be now wearing 
the fairest forms of virtue, will find within them, as 
14* 



158 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

soon as present impulses are supplanted by the strong- 
action of others, in opposition to rectitude, no max- 
ims of Will, in harmony with the law of goodness, 
to resist and subject such impulses. Their conduct 
is in conformity to the requirements of virtue, not 
from any internal intention to be in universal har- 
mony with moral obligation, but simply because, 
for the time being, the strongest impulse happens to 
be in that direction. No individual, it should ever 
be kept in mind, makes any approach to real virtue, 
whatever impulses he may be controlled by, till, 
by a sealing act of moral election, the Will is 
placed in harmony with the universal law of duty, 
and all external action of a moral character pro- 
ceeds from this internal, all-controlling intention. 
Here we find the broad and fundamental distinction 
between those who are truly virtuous, and those who 
are not. 

SELFISHNESS AND BENEVOLENCE. 

2. We are also prepared to explain the real dif- 
ference between Selfishness and Benevolence. The 
latter expresses and comprehends all the forms of 
real virtue of every kind and degree. The former 
comprehends and expresses the forms of vice or sin. 
Benevolence consists in the full harmony of the Will 
or intention with the just, the right, the true, and 
the good, from a regard to moral obligation. Self- 
ishness consists in voluntary subjection to impulse^ 



NATURE OF VIRTUE. 159 

irrespective of such obligation. Whenever self- 
gratification is the law of action, there is pure self- 
ishness, whatever the character or direction of the 
impulse may be. Selfishness has sometimes been 
very incorrectly defined, as a supreme regard to our 
own interest or happiness. If this is a correct defi- 
nition, the drunkard is not selfish at all ; for he sacri- 
fices his present and future happiness, to gratify a 
beastly appetite, and destroys present peace in the 
act of self-gratification. If selfishness, however, 
consists in mere subjection to impulse, how supreme 
his selfishness at once appears ! A mother who does 
not act from moral obligation, when under the strong 
influence of maternal affection, appears most distin- 
guished in her assiduous care of her offspring. Now 
let this affection be crossed by some plain question 
of duty, so that she must violate the latter, or sub- 
ject the former, and how soon will selfishness mani- 
fest itself, in the triumph of impulse over duty ! A 
gift is not more effectual in blinding the eyes, than 
natural affection uncontrolled by a regard to moral 
obligation. Men are just as selfish, that is, as per- 
fectly subject to the law of self-gratification, when 
under the influence of the social and amiable pro- 
pensities, as when under that of the dissocial and 
malign, when, in both instances alike, impulse is the 
law of action. Moral agents were made, and are 
required to be, social and amiable, from higher princi- 
ples than mere impulse. 



160 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

COMMON MISTAKE. 

3. I notice a mistake of fundamental importance 
into which many appear to have fallen, in judging of 
the moral character of individuals. As we have 
seen, when the Will is wholly controlled by the Sen- 
sibility irrespective of moral obligation, the impulsive 
department of conscience takes its turn, among the 
other propensities, in controlling the action of the 
voluntary power. Now because, in all such instan- 
ces, there are the exterior forms of virtue, together 
with an apparently sincere internal regard for the 
same, the presence of real virtue is consequently in- 
ferred. Now before such- a conclusion can be 
authorized, one question needs to be determined, 
the spring from which such apparent virtues origi- 
nate. They may arise from that regard to moral 
obligation which constitutes real virtue. Or they 
may be the result purely of excited Sensibility, which, 
in such instances happens to be in the direction of 
the forms of virtue. 

DEFECTIVE FORMS OF VIRTUE. 

4. Another very frequent mistake bearing upon 
moral character deserves a passing notice here. 
Men sometimes manifest, and doubtless with a con- 
sciousness of inward sincerity, a very high regard 
for some one or more particular principles of virtue, 
while they manifest an equal disregard of all other 
principles. Every real reform, for example, has its 



NATURE OF VIRTUE. 161 

basis in some great principle of morality. Men 
often advocate, with great zeal, such reforms, together 
with the principle on which they rest. They talk of 
virtue, when called to defend that principle, of a re- 
gard to moral obligation, together with the necessity 
of self-sacrifice at the shrine of duty, as if respect 
for universal rectitude commanded the entire powers 
of their being. Yet but a slight observation will 
most clearly evince, that their regard for the right, 
the true, and the good, is wholly circumscribed by this 
one principle. Still, such persons are very likely to 
regard themselves as virtuous in a very high degree. 
In reality, however, they have not made the first ap- 
proach to real virtue. Their respect for this one 
principle, together with its specific applications, has 
its spring in some other department of their nature, 
than a regard for what is right in itself. Otherwise 
their respect for what is right, would be co-extensive 
with the entire range of moral obligation. 

SEC. II. TEST OF CONFORMITY TO MORAL PRINCIPLE. 

In preceding chapters, the great truth has been 
fully established, that the Moral law addresses its 
commands and prohibitions to the Will only, and 
that moral obligation is predicable only of the action 
of the voluntary power, other states being required, 
only as their existence and character are conditioned 
on the right exercise of that power. From this, it 
undeniably follows, that the Moral law, in all the 



162 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

length and breadth of its requirements, finds its entire 
fulfilment within the sphere of the Will. A ques- 
tion of great importance here presents itself: By what 
test shall we determine whether the Will is, or is 
not, in full harmony with the law ? In the investi- 
gation of this question, we may perhaps be thought 
to be intruding somewhat into the domain of Moral 
Philosophy. Reasons of great importance, in the 
judgment of the writer, however, demand its intro- 
duction here. 

The Moral law is presented to us through two 
comprehensive precepts. Yet, a moment's reflec- 
tion will convince us that both these precepts have 
their basis in one common principle, and are, in 
reality, the enunciation of that one principle. The 
identical reason why we are bound to love God 
with all the heart, requires us to love our neighbors 
as ourselves. So the subject is presented by our 
Saviour himself. After speaking of the first and 
great commandment, He adds, " the second is like 
unto it," that is, it rests upon the same principle 
as the first. 

Now the question is, What is this great principle, 
obedience to which implies a full discharge of all 
obligation, actual and conceivable ; the principle 
which comprehends all other principles of the Moral 
law, and of which each particular precept is only the 
enunciation of this one common principle in its end- 
lessly diversified applications ? This principle has 



NATURE OF VIRTUE. 163 

been announced in forms somewhat different, by dif- 
ferent philosophers. I will present two or three of 
these forms. The first that I notice is this. 

It shall be the serious intention of all moral agents to 
esteem and treat all persons, interests, and objects ac- 
cording to their perceived intrinsic and relative im- 
portance, and out of respect for their intrinsic worth, 
or in obedience to the idea of duty, or moral obligation. 

Every one will readily apprehend, that the above is 
a correct enunciation of the principle under consider- 
ation. It expresses the fundamental reason why 
obedience to each and every moral principle is bind- 
ing upon us. The reason and only reason why we 
are bound to love God with all the heart, is the in- 
trinsic and relative importance of the object present- 
ed to the mind in the contemplation of the Infinite 
and Perfect. The reason why we are bound to love 
our neighbor as ourselves, is the fact, that his rights 
and interests are apprehended, as of the same value 
and sacredness as our own. In the intention under 
consideration,, all obligation, actual and conceivable, 
is really met. God will occupy his appropriate place 
in the heart, and the creature his. No real right or 
interest will be dis-esteemed, and each will intention- 
ally command that attention and regard which its in- 
trinsic and relative importance demands. Every 
moral agent is under obligation infinite ever to be 
under the supreme control of such an intention, and 
no such agent can be under obligation to be or to do 
anything more than this. 



164 DOCTRINE OF THE WILLo 

The same principle has been announced in a form 
somewhat different by Kant, to wit : " So act that 
thy maxim of Will (intention) might become law in 
a system of universal moral obligation "—that is, let 
your controlling intention be always such, that all In- 
telligents may properly be required ever to be under 
the supreme control of the same intention. 

By Cousin, the same principle is thus announced : 
H The moral principle being universal, the sign, the 
external type by which a resolution may be recog- 
nized as conformed to this principle, is the impossi- 
bility of not erecting the immediate motive (inten- 
tion) of the particular act or resolution, into a maxim 
of universal legislation " — that is, we cannot but 
affirm that every moral agent in existence is bound 
to act from the same motive or intention. 

It will readily be perceived, that each of these 
forms is really identical with that above announced 
and illustrated. It is only when we are conscious of 
the supreme control of the intention, to esteem and 
treat all persons and interests according to their in- 
trinsic and relative importance, from respect to the 
idea of duty, that, in conformity with the principle 
as announced by Kant, our maxim of Will might be- 
come law in a system of universal legislation. When 
we are conscious of the control of such an intention, 
it is impossible for us not to affirm, according to the 
principle, as announced by Cousin, that all Intelli- 
gents are bound always to be under the control of 



NATURE OF VIRTUE. 165 

the same intention. Two or three suggestions will 
close what I have to say on this point. 

4 

COMMON MISTAKE. 

1. We notice the fundamental mistake of many 
philosophers and divines in treating of moral exer- 
cises, or states of mind. Such exercises are very 
commonly represented as consisting wholly in excit- 
ed states of the Sensibility. Thus Dr. Brown re- 
presents all moral exercises and states as con- 
sisting in emotions of a given character. One of the 
most distinguished Professors of Theology in this 
country laid down this proposition, as the basis of a 
course of lectures on Moral Philosophy, that " every- 
thing right or wrong in a moral agent, consists ex- 
clusively of right or wrong feelings " — feelings as dis- 
tinguished from volitions as phenomena of Will. 
Now precisely the reverse of the above proposition 
is true, to wit : that nothing right or wrong, in a 
moral agent, consists in any states of the Sensibility 
irrespective of the action of the Will. Who would 
dare to say, when he has particular emotions, desires, 
or involuntary feelings, that the Moral law has no 
further claim upon him, that all its demands are fully 
met in those feelings ? Who would dare to affirm, 
when he has any particular emotions, that all moral 
agents in existence are bound to have those identical 
feelings ? If the demands of the Moral law are fully 
met in any states of the Sensibility — which would be 
15 



166 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

true, if everything right or wrong, in moral agents, 
consists of right or wrong feelings — then all moral 
agents, at all times, and under all circumstances, are 
bound to have these same feelings. For what the 
law demands, at one time, it demands at all times. 
All the foundations of moral obligation are swept 
away by the theory under consideration. 

LOVE AS REQUIRED BY THE MORAL LAW. 

2. We are now prepared to state distinctly the na- 
ture of that love which is the "fulfilling of the law." 
It does not, as all admit, consist in the mere external 
act. Nor does it consist, for reasons equally obvi- 
ous and universally admitted, in any mere convictions 
of the Intelligence. For reasons above assigned, it 
does not consist in any states of the Sensibility. No 
man, when he is conscious of such feelings, can 
affirm that all Intelligents are bound, under all cir- 
cumstances, to have the same feelings that he now 
has. This would be true, if the love under consi- 
deration consists of such feelings. But when, from 
a regard to the idea of duty, the whole being is vol- 
untarily consecrated to the promotion, in the highest 
degree, of universal good ; and when, in the pursuit of 
this end, there is a serious intention to esteem and 
treat all beings and interests according to their intrin- 
sic and relative importance ; here is the love which is 
the fulfilling of the law. Here is the intention by 
which all intelligents, in reference to all interests and 



NATURE OF VIRTUE. 167 

objects, are, at all times, bound to be controlled, and 
which must be imposed, as universal law, upon such 
Intelligents in every system of righteous moral legis- 
lation. Here is the intention, in the exercise of 
which all obligation is fully met. Here, consequent- 
ly, is that love which is the fulfilling of the law. 
In a subsequent Chapter, my design is to show that 
this is the view of the subject presented in the 
Scriptures of truth. I now present it merely as a 
necessary truth of the universal Intelligence. 

IDENTITY OF CHARACTER AMONG ALL BEINGS 
MORALLY VIRTUOUS. 

3. We now perceive clearly in what consists the 
real identity of moral character, in all Intelligents of 
true moral rectitude. Their occupations, forms of 
external deportment, and their internal convictions 
and feelings, may be endlessly diversified. Yet one 
omnipresent, all-controlling intention, an intention 
which is ever one and identical, directs all their moral 
movements. It is the intention, in the promotion of 
the highest good of universal being, to esteem and 
treat all persons and interests according to their in- 
trinsic and relative importance, from regard to moral 
obligation. Thus moral virtue, in all Intelligents 
possessed of it, is perfectly one and identical. In 
this sense only are all moral agents capable of per- 
fect identity of* character. They cannot all have, at 
all times, or perhaps at any time, precisely the same 



168 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

thoughts and feelings. But they can all have, at all 
times, one and the same intention. The omnipresent 
influence and control of the intention above illustrat- 
ed, constitutes a perfect identity of character in God 
and all beings morally pure in existence. For this 
reason, the supreme control of this intention implies, 
in all moral agents alike, a perfect fulfilment of the 
law, a full discharge of all obligation of every kind, 



CHAPTER XII. 

THE ELEMENT OF THE WILL IN COMPLEX 
PHENOMENA. 

SECTION I. 

Every perception, every judgment, every thought, 
which appears within the entire sphere of the Intel- 
ligence ; every sensation, every emotion, every de- 
sire, all the states of the Sensibility, present objects 
for the action of the Will in one direction or another. 
The sphere of the Will's activity, therefore, is as 
extensive as the vast and almost boundless range of 
the Intelligence and Sensibility both. Now while 
all the phenomena of these two last named faculties 
are, in themselves, wholly destitute of moral charac- 
ter, the action of the Will, in the direction of such 
phenomena, constitutes complex states of mind, 
which have a positive moral character. In all in- 
stances, the moral and voluntary elements are one 
and identical. As the distinction under considera- 
tion has been overlooked by the great mass of phi- 
losophers and theologians, and as very great errors 
have thereby arisen, not only in philosophy, but in 
theology and morals both, I will dwell at more 
length upon the subject than I otherwise should have 
done. My remarks will be confined to the action tff 
the Will in the direction of the natural propensities 
and religious affections. 
15* 



170 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

ACTION OF THE WILL IN THE DIRECTION OF THE NA- 
TURAL PROPENSITIES. EMOTION, DESIRE, AND WISH 

DEFINED. 

1. In respect to the action of the Will in the di- 
rection of the natural propensities, such as the ap- 
petites, the love of esteem, of power, &c, I would 
remark, that the complex states thence resulting, are 
commonly explained as simple feelings or states of 
the Sensibility. In presenting this subject in a pro- 
per light, the following explanations are deemed ne- 
cessary. When any physical power operates upon 
any of the organs of sense, or when any thought is 
present in the Intelligence, the state of the Sensibili- 
ty immediately and necessarily resulting is called a 
sensation or emotion. When any feeling arises im- 
pelling the Will to seek or avoid the object of that 
sensation or emotion, this impulsive state of the 
Sensibility is called a desire. When the Will con- 
curs with the desire, a complex state of mind results, 
called a wish. Wish is distinguished from Desire in 
this, that in the former, the desire is cherished and 
perpetuated by the concurrence of the Will with the 
desire. When the Desire impels the Will towards a 
prohibited object, the action of the Will, in concur- 
rence with the desire, constitutes a wish morally 
wrong. When the Desire impels the Will in a re- 
quired direction, and the Will, from a respect to the 
idea of duty, concurs with the desire, a wish arises 
which is morally virtuous. This principle holds true 



COMPLEX PHENOMENA. 171 

in regard to the action of all the propensities. The 
excitement of the propensity, as a state of the Sen- 
sibility, constitutes desire — a feeling in itself desti- 
tute of all moral qualities. The action of the Will in 
concurrence with, or opposition to, this feeling, consti- 
tutes a complex state of mind morally right or wrong. 

ANGER, PRIDE, AMEITION, &C. 

Anger, for example, as prohibited by the moral 
law, is not a mere feeling of displeasure awakened 
by some injury, real or supposed, perpetrated by 
another. This state, on the other hand, consists in 
the surrendering of the Will to the control of that 
feeling, and thus acting from malign impulse. Pride 
also is not the mere desire of esteem. It consists in 
voluntary subjection to that propensity, seeking es- 
teem and admiration as the great end of existence. 
Ambition, too, is not mere desire of power, but the 
voluntary surrendering of our being to the control of 
that propensity. The same, I repeat, holds true in 
respect to all the propensities. No mere excitement 
of the Sensibility, irrespective of the action of the 
Will, has any moral character. In the action of the 
Will in respect to such states — action which must 
arise in some direction under such circumstances — 
moral guilt, or praise worthiness, arises. 

I might here adduce other cases in illustration of 
the same principle ; as, for example, the fact that in- 
temperance in food and drink does not consist, as a 
moral act or state, in the mere strength of the appe- 



172 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

tite — that is, in the degree in which it is excited in 
the presence of its appropriate objects. Nor does it 
consist in mere excess in the quantity partaken of — 
excess considered as an external act. It consists, on 
the other hand, in the surrendering of the voluntary 
power to the control of the appetite. The excess 
referred to is the consequent and index of such volun- 
tary subjection. The above examples, however, are 
abundantly sufficient to illustrate the principle. 

RELIGIOUS AFFECTIONS. 

2. We will now contemplate' the element of the 
Will in those complex phenomena denominated reli- 
gions affectio?is. The position which 1 here assume 
is this, that whatever in such affections is morally 
right and praiseworthy, that which is directly refer- 
red to, where such affections are required of us, is 
the voluntary element to be found in them. The 
voluntary element is directly required. Other ele- 
ments are required only on the ground that their ex- 
istence is conditioned upon, and necessarily results 
from, that of the voluntary element. This must be 
admitted, or we must deny the position established 
in the last Chapter, to wit : that all the requirements 
of the Moral law are fully met in the right action of 
the Will. 

SCRIPTURE TESTIMONY. 

My object now is to show, that this is the light in 



COMPLEX PHENOMENA. 173 

which the subject is really presented in the Scrip- 
tures. I will cite, as examples, the three cardinal 
virtues of Christianity, Repentance, Love, and Faith. 
The question is, Are these virtues or affections, pre- 
sented in the Bible as mere convictions of the Intelli- 
gence, or states of the Sensibility ? Are they not, 
on the other hand, presented as voluntary states of 
mind, or as acts of Will] Are not the commands 
requiring them fully met in such acts 1 

REPENTANCE. 

In regard to Repentance, I would remark, that the 
term is scarcely used at all in the Old Testament. 
Other terms and phrases are there employed to ex- 
press the same thing; as for example, " Turn ye ;" 
" Let the wicked forsake his way ;" u Let him turn 
unto the Lord ;" " He that confesseth and forsake th 
his sins shall find mercy," &e. In all such passages 
repentance is most clearly presented as consisting 
exclusively of voluntary acts or intentions. The com- 
mands requiring it are, therefore, fully met in such 
acts. In the New Testament this virtue is distin- 
guished from Godly Sorrow, the state of the Sensi- 
bility which accompanies its exercise. As distin- 
guished from the action of the Sensibility, what can 
it be, but a voluntary state, as presented in the Old 
Testament % When the mind places itself in volun- 
tary harmony with those convictions and feelings 
which attend a consciousness of sin as committed 



174 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

against God and man, this is the repentance recog- 
nized and required as such in the Bible. It does not 
consist in the mere conviction of sin ; for then the 
worst of men, and even devils, would be truly re- 
pentant. Nor does it consist in the states of the Sen- 
sibility which attend such convictions ; else Repent- 
ance would be Godly Sorrow, from which the Bible, 
as stated above, definitely distinguishes it. It must 
consist in a voluntary act, in which, in accordance 
with those convictions and feelings, the mind turns 
from sin to holiness, from selfishness to benevolence, 
from the paths of disobedience to the service of God. 

LOVE. 

A single passage will distinctly set before us the 
nature of Love as required in the Bible — that Jove 
which comprehends all other virtues, and the exer- 
cise of which is the " fulfilling of the law." " Hereby," 
says the sacred writer, " we perceive the love of 
God." The phrase u ofGod"i& not found in the origin- 
al. The passage, as it there stands, reads thus : " By 
this we know love ;" that is, we know the nature of 
the love which the Scriptures require, when they 
affirm, that u love is the fulfilling of the law." 
What is that in which, according to the express 
teaching of inspiration, we learn the nature of this 
love 1 u Because he laid down his life for us : and 
we ought to lay down our lives for the brethren." 
In the act of " laying down his life for lis," we are 



COMPLEX PHENOMENA. 175 

here told, that the love required of us is embodied 
and revealed. What is the nature of this love ? I 
answer, 

1. It is not a conviction of the Intelligence, nor any 
excited state of the Sensibility. No such thing is 
here referred to. 

2. It does and must consist exclusively in a volun- 
tary act, or intention. " He laid down his life for 
us." What is this but a voluntary act % Yet this 
is love, the " love which is the fulfilling of the law." 

3. As an act of Will, love must consist exclusive- 
ly in a voluntary devotion of our entire powers to one 
end, the highest good of universal being, from a re- 
gard to the idea of duty. " He laid down his life for us." 
" We ought to lay down our lives for the brethren." 
In each particular here presented, a universal prin- 
ciple is expressed and revealed. Christ " laid down 
his life for us," because he was in a state of volun- 
tary consecration to the good of universal being. The 
particular act was put forth, as a means to this end. 
In a voluntary consecration to the same end, and as 
a means to this end, it is declared, that " we ought 
to lay down our lives for the brethren." When, 
therefore, the Scriptures require love of us, they do 
not demand the existence of particular convictions of 
the Intelligence, nor certain states of the Sensibility. 
They require the voluntary consecration of our en- 
tire being and interests to the great end of universal 
good. In this act of consecration, and in the employ- 



176 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

ment of all our powers and interests, under the con- 
trol of this one intention, we fulfil the Law. We 
fully discharge all obligations, actual and conceiva- 
ble, that are devolved upon us. The exercise of 
love, like that of repentance, is attended with parti- 
cular convictions and feelings. These feelings are 
indirectly required in the precepts demanding love, 
and required, because when the latter does exist, the 
former will of course exist. 

OF FAITH. 

But little need be said in explanation of the nature 
of Faith. It is everywhere presented in the Bible, 
as synonymous with trwt, reposing confidence, 
committing our interests to God as to a " faithful 
Creator." Now Trust is undeniably a voluntary 
state of mind. " I know," says Paul, u in whom I 
have believed," that is, exercised faith, u that he 
is able to keep that which I have committed to him 
against that day." Here the act of committing to 
the care of another, which can be nothing else than 
an act of Will, is presented as synonymous with 
Faith. Faith, then, does not consist in conviction, nor 
in any excited feelings. It is a voluntary act, en- 
trusting our interests to God as to a faithful Creator. 
The principle above established must apply to all reli- 
gious affections of every kind. 



COMPLEX PHENOMENA. 177 

SEC. II. GENERAL TOPICS SUGGESTED BY THE TRUTH 
ILLUSTRATED IN THE PRECEDING SECTION. 

Few truths are of greater practical moment than 
that illustrated in the preceding section. My object, 
now, is to apply it to the elucidation of certain im- 
portant questions which require elucidation. 

CONVICTIONS, FEELINGS AND EXTERNAL ACTIONS — WHY 
REQUIRED, OR PROHIBITED. 

1. We see why it is, that, while no mere external 
action, no state of the Intelligence or Sensibility, has 
any moral character in itself, irrespective of the ac- 
tion of the Will, still such acts and states are spe- 
cifically and formally required or prohibited in the 
Bible. In such precepts the effect is put for the 
cause. These acts and states are required, or 
prohibited, as the natural and necessary results of 
right or wrong intentions. The thing really referred 
to, in such commands and prohibitions, is not the 
acts or states specified, but the cause of such acts 
and states, to wit : the right or wrong action of the 
Will. Suppose, that a certain loathsome disease of 
the body would necessarily result from certain inten- 
tions, or acts of Will. Now God might prohibit 
the intention which causes that disease, in either of 
two ways. He might specify the intention and di- 
rectly prohibit that ; or he might prohibit the same 
thing, in such a form as this : Thou shalt not have 
this disease. Every one will perceive that, in both 
prohibitions, the same thing, precisely, would be re- 
16 



178 DOCTRINE OF TfiE WILL. 

ferred to and intended, to wit : the intention which 
sustains to the evil designed to be prevented, the 
relation of a cause. The same principle, precisely, 
holds true in respect to all external actions and 
states of the Intelligence and Sensibility, which are 
specifically required or prohibited. 

OUR RESPONSIBILITY IN RESPECT TO SUCH PHENOMENA. 

2. We also distinctly perceive the ground of our 
responsibility for the existence of external actions, 
and internal convictions and feelings. Whatever ef- 
fects, external or internal, necessarily result, and are 
or may be known to result, from the right or wrong 
action of the Will, we may properly be held respon- 
sible for. Now, all external actions and internal 
convictions and feelings which are required of or 
prohibited to us, sustain precisely this relation to the 
right or wrong action of the Will. The intention 
being given, the effect follows as a consequence. 
For this reason we are held responsible for the effect. 

FEELINGS HOW CONTROLLED BY THE WILL. 

3. We now notice the power of control which the 
Will has over the feelings. 

(1.) In one respect its control is unlimited. It 
may yield itself to the control of the feelings, or 
wholly withhold its concurrence. 

(2.) In respect to all feelings, especially those 
which impel to violent or unlawful action, the Will 



COMPLEX PHENOMENA. 179 

may exert a direct influence which will either greatly 
modify, or totally suppress the feeling. For exam- 
ple, when there is an inflexible purpose of Will not 
to yield to angry feelings, if they should arise, and to 
suppress them, as soon as they appear, feelings of a 
violent character will not result to any great extent, 
whatever provocations the mind may be subject to. 
The same holds true of almost all feelings of every 
kind. Whenever they appear, if tkey are directly 
and strongly willed down, they will either be greatly 
modified, or totally disappear. 

(3.) Over the action and states of the Sensibility 
the Will may exert an indirect influence which is 
all-powerful. If, for example, the Will is in full 
harmony with the infinite, the eternal, the just, 
the right, the true and the good, the Intelligence 
will, of course, be occupied with " whatsoever 
things are true, honest, just, pure, lovely and of good 
report," and the Sensibility, continually acted upon 
by such objects, will mirror forth, in pure emotions and 
desires, the pure thoughts of the Intelligence, and 
the hallowed purposes of the Will. The Sensibility 
will be wholly isolated from all feelings gross and 
sensual. On the other hand, let the Will be yielded 
to the control of impure and sensual impulse, and 
how gross and impure the thoughts and feelings will 
become. In yielding, or refusing to yield, to the 
supreme control of the law of Goodness, the Will 
really, though indirectly, determines the action of 
the Intelligence and Sensibility both. 



180 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

(4.) To present the whole subject in a proper 
light, a fixed law of the affections demands special 
attention. A husband, for example, has pledged to 
his wife, not only kind intentions, but the exclusive 
control of those peculiar affections which constitute 
the basis of the marriage union. Let him cherish a 
proper regard for the sacredness of that pledge, and 
the wife will so completely and exclusively fill and 
command her appropriate sphere in the affections, 
that, under no circumstances whatever, will there 
be a tendency towards any other individual. The 
same holds true of every department of the affections, 
not only in respect to those which connect us with 
the creature, but also with the Creator. The affections 
the Will may control by a fixed and changeless law. 

Such being the relation of the Will to the Sensi- 
bility, while it is true that there is nothing right 
or wrong in any feelings, irrespective of the action 
of the Will, still the presence of feelings impure 
and sensual, may be a certain indication of the wrong 
action of the voluntary power. In such a light their 
presence should always be regarded. 

EELATION OF FAITH TO OTHER EXERCISES MORALLY 

RIGHT. 

4. In the preceding Section it has been fully shown, 
that love, repentance, faith, and all other religious 
exercises, are, in their fundamental and characteristic 
elements, phenomena of the Will. We will now, 



COMPLEX PHENOMENA. 181 

for a few moments, contemplate the relations of 
these different exercises to one another, especially 
the relation of Faith to other exercises of a kindred 
character. While it is true, as has been demon- 
strated in a preceding Chapter, that the Will cannot 
at the same time put forth intentions of a contra- 
dictory character, such as sin and holiness, it is 
equally true, that it may simultaneously put forth 
acts of a homogeneous character. In view of our 
obligations to yield implicit obedience to God, we 
may purpose such obedience. In view of the fact, 
that, in the Gospel, grace is proffered to perfect us 
in our obedience, at the same time that we purpose 
obedience with all the heart, we may exercise im- 
plicit trust, or faith for " grace whereby we may 
serve God acceptably with reverence and godly 
fear." Now, such is our condition as sinners, that 
without a revelation of this grace, we should never 
purpose obedience in the first instance. Without 
the continued influence of that grace, this purpose 
would not subsequently be perfected and perpe- 
tuated. The purpose is first formed in reliance upon 
Divine grace ; and but for this grace and consequent 
reliance, would never have been formed. In con- 
sequence of the influence of this grace relied upon, 
and received by faith, this same purpose is afterwards 
perfected and perpetuated. Thus, we see, that the 
purpose of obedience is really conditioned for its 
existence and perpetuity upon the act of reliance 
16* 



182 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

upon Divine grace. The same holds true of the 
relation of Faith to all acts or intentions morally right 
or holy. One act of Will, in itself perfectly pure, 
is really conditioned upon another in itself equally 
pure. This is the doctrine of Moral Purification, or 
Sanctification by faith, a doctrine which is no less 
true, as a fact in philosophy, than as a revealed truth 
of inspiration. 



CHAPTER XIII. 

INFLUENCE OF THE WILL IN INTELLECTUAL 
JUDGMENTS. 

MEN OFTEN VOLUNTARY IN THEIR OPINIONS. 

It is an old maxim, that the Will governs the un- 
derstanding. It becomes a very important inquiry 
with us, To what extent, and in what sense, is this 
maxim true ? It is undeniable, that, in many impor- 
tant respects, mankind are voluntary in their opi- 
nions and judgments, and therefore, responsible for 
them. We often hear the declaration, " You ought, 
or ought not, to entertain such and such opinions, to 
form such and such judgments." " You are bound 
to admit, or have no right to admit, such and such 
things as true." Men often speak, also, of pre-judging 
particular cases, and thus incurring guilt. A ques- 
tion may very properly be asked here, what are these 
opinions, judgments, admissions, pre-judgments, &c. ? 
Are they real affirmations of the Intelligence, or are 
they exclusively phenomena of the Will ? 

ERROR NOT FROM THE INTELLIGENCE, BUT THE WILL. 

The proposition which I lay down is this, that 
the Intelligence , in its appropriate exercise, can seldom 



184 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL* 

if ever , make wrong affirmations ; that wrong opinion^ 
admissions , pre-judgments, Sfc. , are in most, if not all 
instances, nothing else than phenomena, or assumptions 
of Will If the Intelligence can make wrong affir- 
mations, it is important to determine in what depart- 
ment of its action such affirmations may be found. 

PRIMARY FACULTIES CAJSNOT ERR. 

Let us first contemplate the action of the primary 
intellectual faculties— Sense, or the faculty of external 
perception ; Consciousness, the faculty of internal ob- 
servation ; and Reason, the faculty which gives us 
necessai'y and universal truths. The two former 
faculties give us phenomena external and internal. 
The latter gives us the logical antecedents of phe- 
nomena, thus perceived and affirmed,— to wit : the 
ideas of substance, cause, space, time, &c. In the 
action of these faculties, surely, real error is im- 
possible. 

SO OF THE SECONDARY FACULTIES. 

Let us now contemplate the action of the secon- 
dary faculties, the Understanding and Judgment* 
The former unites the elements given by the three 
primary faculties into notions of particular objects. 
The latter classifies these notions according to quali- 
ties perceived. Here, also, we find no place for 
wrong affirmations. The understanding can only 
combine the elements actually given by the primary 



SOURCE OF ERROR. 185 

faculties. The Judgment can classify only according 
to qualities actually perceived. Thus I might go 
over the entire range of the Intelligence, and show, 
that seldom, if ever, in its appropriate action, it can 
make wrong affirmations. 

ERROR, WHERE FOUND. ASSUMPTION. 

Where then is the place for error, for wrong 
opinions, and pre-judgments ? Let us suppose, that 
a number of individuals are observing some object 
at a distance from them. No qualities are given 
but those common to a variety of objects, such as a 
man, horse, ox, &c. The perceptive faculty has 
deceived no one in this case. It has given nothing 
but real qualities. The Understanding can only 
form a notion of it, as an object possessing these par- 
ticular qualities. The Judgment can only affirm, 
that the qualities perceived are common to different 
classes of objects, and consequently, that no affirma- 
tions can be made as to what class the object per- 
ceived does belong. The Intelligence, therefore, 
makes no false affirmations. Still the inquiry goes 
round. " What is it ?" One answers, " It is a 
man." That is my opinion. Another : " It is a horse." 
That is my judgment. Another still says, " I differ 
from you all. It is an ox." That is my notion. 
Now, what are these opinions, judgments, and no- 
tions ? Are they real affirmations of the Intelligence ? 
By no means. The Intelligence cannot affirm at all, 






186 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

under such circumstances. They are nothing in 
reality, but mere assumptions of the Will. A vast 
majority of the so called opinions, beliefs, judg- 
ments, and notions among men, and all where error- 
is found, are nothing but assumptions of the Will. 

Assumptions are sometimes based upon real affir- 
mations of the Intelligence, and sometimes not. 
Suppose the individuals above referred to approach 
the object, till qualities are given which are peculiar 
to the horse. The Judgment at once classifies the 
object accordingly. As soon as this takes place, 
they all exclaim, u well, it is a horse." Here are 
assumptions again, but assumptions based upon real 
affirmations of the Intelligence. In the former in- 
stance we had assumptions based upon no such affir- 
mations. 

False assumptions do net always imply moral 
gtftlt. Much of the necessary business of life has 
no other basis than prudent or imprudent guessing. 
When the farmer, for example, casts any particular 
seed into the ground, it is only by balance of proba- 
bilities that he often determines, as far as he does 
or can determine, what is best ; and not unfrequently 
is he necessitated to assume and act, when all proba- 
bilities are so perfectly balanced, that he can find no 
reasons at all for taking one course in distinction 
from another. Yet no moral guilt is incurred when 
one is necessitated to act in some direction, and 
when all available light has been sought and em- 
ployed to determine the direction w 7 hich is best. 



SOURCE OF ERROR. 187 

As false assumptions, however, often involve very 
great moral guilt, it may be important to develope 
some of the distinguishing characteristics of assump- 
tions of this class. 

1. All assumptions involve moral guilt, which are 
in opposition to the real and positive affirmations of 
the Intelligence. As the Will may assume in the 
absence of such affirmations, and in the direction of 
them, so it may in opposition to them. When you 
have carried a man's Intellect in favor of a given pro- 
position, it is by no means certain that you have gain- 
ed his assent to its truth. He may still assume, that 
all the evidence presented is inadequate, and conse- 
quently refuse to admit its truth. When the Will 
thus divorces itself from the Intelligence, guilt of no 
ordinary character is incurred. Men often express 
their convictions of the guilt thus incurred, by saying 
fo individuals, " You are bound to admit that fact or 
proposition as true. You are already convinced. 
What excuse have you for not yielding to that con- 
viction ?" Yet individuals will often do fatal violence 
to their intellectual and moral nature, by holding on 
to assumptions, in reality known to be false. 

2 . Assumptions involve moral guilt which are form- 
ed without availing ourselves of all the light within 
our reach as the basis of our assumptions. For us 
to assume any proposition, or statement, to be true or 
false, in the absence of affirmations of the Intelligence, 
as the basis of such assumptions, when adequate light 



188 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

is available, involves the same criminality, as assump- 
tions in opposition to the Intelligence. Hence we 
often have the expression in common life, " You had 
no right to form a judgment under such circumstan- 
ces. You were bound, before doing it, to avail your- 
self of all the light within your reach." 

3. Positive assumptions, without intellectual affir- 
mations as their basis, equally positive, involve mo- 
ral guilt of no ordinary character. As remarked 
above, we are often placed in circumstances in which 
we are necessitated to act in some direction, and to 
select some particular course without any perceived 
reasons in favor of that one course in distinction from 
another. Now while action is proper in such a condi- 
tion, it is not proper to make a positive assumption 
that the course selected is the best. Suppose, that 
all the facts before my mind bearing upon the charac- 
ter of a neighbor, are equally consistent with the 
possession, on his part, of a character either good or 
bad. I do violence to my intellectual and moral na- 
ture, if, under such circumstances, I make the as- 
sumption that his character is either the one or the 
other, and especially, that it is the latter instead of 
the former. How often do flagrant transgressions 
of moral rectitude occur in such instances ! 

PRE-JUDGMENTS. 

A few remarks are deemed requisite on this topic. 
A pre-judgment is an assumption, that a proposition 



SOURCE OF ERROR. 189 

or statement is true or false, before the facts, bearing 
upon the case, have been heard. Such assumptions 
are generally classed under the term prejudice. Thus 
it is said of individuals, that they are prejudiced in 
favor or against certain persons, sentiments, or causes. 
The real meaning of such statements is, that individ- 
uals have made assumptions in one direction or an- 
other, prior to a hearing of the facts of the case, and 
irrespective of such facts. 

INTELLECT NOT DECEIVED IN PRE-JUDGMENTS. 

It is commonly said, that such prejudices, or pre- 
judgments, blind the mind to facts of one class, and 
render it quick to discern those of the other, and thus 
lead to a real mis-direction of the Intelligence. This 
I think is not a correct statement of the case. Pre- 
judgments may, and often do, prevent all proper inves- 
tigation of a subject. In this case, the Intelligence 
is not deceived at all. In the absence of real data, 
it can make no positive affirmations whatever. 

So far also as pre-judgments direct attention 
from facts bearing upon one side of a question, 
and to those bearing upon the other, the Intelligence 
is not thereby deceived. All that it can affirm is the 
true bearing of the facts actually presented. In re- 
spect to those not presented, and consequently in re- 
spect to the real merits of the whole case, it makes 
no affirmations. If an individual forms an opinion 
from a partial hearing, that opinion is a mere assump- 
tion of Will, and nothing else, 
17 



190 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

THE MIND HOW INFLUENCED BY PRE-JUDGMENTS, 

But the manner in which pre-judgments chiefly 
affect the mind in the hearing of a cause, still remains 
to be stated. In such pre-judgments, or assump- 
tions, an assumption of this kind is almost invariably 
included, to wit : that all facts of whatever character 
bearing upon one side of the question, are wholly 
indecisive, while all other's bearing upon the other 
side are equally decisive. In pre-judging, individu- 
als do not merely pre-judge the real merits of the case, 
but the character of all the facts bearing upon it. 
They enter upon the investigation of a given subject, 
with an inflexible determination to treat all the facts 
and arguments they shall meet with, according to 
previous assumptions. Let the clearest light 
poured upon one side of the question, and the reply 
is, " After all, I am not convinced," while the most 
trivial circumstances conceivable bearing upon the 
other side, will be seized upon as perfectly decisive. 
In all this, we do not meet with the operations of a 
deceived Intelligence, but of a " deceived heart," that 
is, of a depraved Will, stubbornly bent upon verifying 
its own unauthorized, pre-formed assumptions. Such 
assumptions can withstand any degree of evidence 
whatever. The Intelligence did not give them exist- 
ence, and it cannot annihilate them. They are ex- 
clusively creatures of Will, and by an act of Will, 
they must be dissolved, or they will remain proof 
against all the evidence which the tide of time can 
roll against them. 



SOURCE OF ERROR. 191 

INFLUENCES WHICH INDUCE FALSE ASSUMPTIONS. 

The influences which induce false and unauthor- 
ized assumptions, are found in the strong action of 
the Sensibility, in the direction of the appetites, nat- 
ural affections, and the different propensities, as the 
love of gain, ambition, party spirit, pride of charac- 
ter, of opinion, &c. When the Will has long been 
habituated to act in the direction of a particular pro- 
pensity, how difficult it is to induce the admission, 
or assumption, that action in that direction is wrong ! 
The difficulty, in such cases, does not, in most in- 
stances, lie in convincing the Intelligence, but in 
inducing the Will to admit as true what the Intelli- 
gence really affirms. 

CASES IN WHICH WE ARE APPARENTLY, THOUGH NOT 
REALLY, MISLED BY THE INTELLIGENCE. 

As there are cases of this kind, it is important to 
mark some of their characteristics. Among these I 
eite the following : 

1. The qualities of a particular object, actually 
perceived, as in the case above cited, may be common 
to a variety of classes which we know, and also to 
others which we do not know. On the perception 
of such qualities, the Intelligence will suggest those 
classes only which we know, while the particular 
object perceived may belong to a class unknown. If, 
in such circumstances, a positive assumption, as to 
what class it does belong, is made, a wrong assump- 



192 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

tion must of necessity be made. The Intelligence 
in this case is not deceived. It places the Will, 
however, in such a relation to the object, that if a 
positive assumption is made, it must necessarily be 
a wrong one. In this manner, multitudes of wrong 
assumptions arise. 

2. When facts are before the mind, an explanation 
of them is often desired. In such circumstances, 
the Intelligence may suggest, in explanation, a num- 
ber of hypotheses, which hypotheses may be all alike 
false. If a positive assumption is made in such a 
case, it must of necessity be a false one ; because it 
must be in the direction of some one hypothesis be- 
fore the mind at the time. Here, also, the Intelli- 
gence necessitates a wrong assumption, if any is 
made. Yet it is not itself deceived ; because it gives 
no positive affirmations as the basis of positive as- 
sumptions. In such circumstances, error very fre- 
quently arises. 

3. Experience often occasions wrong assumptions, 
which are attributed incorrectly to real affirmations 
of the Intelligence. A friend, for example, saw an 
object which presented the external appearance of 
the apple. He had never before seen those qualities, 
except in connection with that class of objects. He 
assumed, at once, that it was a real apple ; but sub- 
sequently found that it was an artificial, and not a 
real one. Was the Intelligence deceived in this 
instance ? By no means. That faculty had never 
affirmed, that those qualities which the apple presents 



SOURCE OF ERROR. 193 

to the eye, never exist in connection with any other 
object, and consequently, that the apple must have 
been present in the instance given. Experience^ and 
not a positive affirmation of the Intelligence, led to 
the wrong assumption in this instance. The same 
principle holds true, in respect to a vast number of 
instances that might be named, 

4. Finally, the Intelligence may not only make 
positive affirmations in the presence of qualities per- 
ceived, but it may affirm hypothetical ly, that is, 
when a given proposition is assumed as true, the In- 
telligence may and will present the logical antece- 
dents and consequents of that assumption. If the as- 
sumption is false, such will be the character of the 
antecedents and consequents following from it. An 
individual, in tracing out these antecedents and con- 
sequents, however, may mistake the hypothetical, for 
the real, affirmations of the Intelligence. One wrong 
assumption in theology or philosophy, for example, 
may give an entire system, all of the leading princi- 
ples of which are likewise false. In tracing out, and 
perfecting that system, how natural the assumption, 
that one is following the real, and not the hypotheti- 
cal , affirmations of the Intelligence ! From this one 
source an infinity of error exists among men. 

In an enlarged Treatise on mental science, the 
subject of the present chapter should receive a much 
more extensive elucidation than could be given to it 
in this connection. Few subjects would throw 
17* • 



194 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

more clear light over the domains of truth and error 
than this, if fully and distinctly elucidated. 

In conclusion, I would simply remark, that one of 
the highest attainments in virtue which we can con- 
ceive an intelligent being to make, consists in a con- 
tinued and vigorous employment of the Intelligence 
in search of the right, the just, the true, and the 
good, in all departments of human investigation ; and 
in a rigid discipline of the Will, to receive and treat, 
as true and sacred, whatever the Intelligence may 
present, as possessed of such characteristics, to the 
full subjection of all impulses in the direction of un- 
authorized assumptions. 



CHAPTER XIV. 

LIBERTY AND SERVITUDE. 

LIBERTY OF WILL AS OPPOSED TO MORAL SERVITUDE. 

There are, among others, two senses of the term 
Liberty, which ought to be carefully distinguished 
from each other. In the first sense, it stands oppos- 
ed to Necessity; in the second, to what is called 
Moral Servitude. It is in the last sense that I pro- 
pose to consider the subject in the present Chapter. 
What, then, is Liberty as opposed to Moral Servi- 
tude ? It is that state in which the action of Will is 
in harmony with the Moral Law, with the idea of the 
right, the* just, the true, and the good } while all th 



LIBERTY AND SERVITUDE. 195 

propensities are held in perfect subordination — a state 
in which the mind may purpose obedience to the law of 
right with the rational hope of carrying that determina- 
tion into accomplishment. This state all mankind 
agree in calling a state of moral freedom. The indi- 
vidual who has attained to it, is not in servitude to 
any propensity whatever. He " rules his own 
spirit." He is the master of himself. He pur- 
poses the good, and performs it. He resolves against 
the evil, and avoids it. " Greater," says the maxim 
of ancient wisdom, " is such a man than he that 
taketh a city.'" 

Moral Servitude, on the other hand, is a state in 
which the Will is so ensnared by the Sensibility , so 
habituated to subjection to the propensities , that it has 
so lost the prerogative of self -control ^ that it cannot re- 
solve upon action in the direction of the law of right , 
with any rational expectation of keeping that resolu- 
tion. The individual in this condition " knows the 
good, and approves of it, yet follows the bad." 
" The good that he would (purposes to do), he does 
not, hut the evil that he would not (purposes not to 
do), that he does." All men agree in denominating 
this a state of Moral Servitude. Whenever an indi- 
vidual is manifestly governed by appetite, or any 
other propensity, by common consent, he is said to be 
a slave in respect to his propensities. 

The reason why the former state is denominated 
Liberty, and the latter Servitude, is obvious. Liberty 3 



196 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

as opposed to Servitude, is universally regarded as a 
good in itself. As such, it is desired and chosen. Se»- 
vitude, on the other hand, may be submitted to, as the 
least of two evils. Yet it can never be desired and 
chosen, as a good in itself. Every man who is in a 
state of servitude, is there, in an important sense, 
against his Will. The state in which he is, is regard- 
ed as in itself the greatest of evils, excepting those 
which would arise from a vain attempt at a vindica- 
tion of personal freedom. 

The same principle holds true in respect to Moral 
Liberty and Servitude. When any individual con- 
templates the idea of the voluntary power rising to 
full dominion over impulse of every kind, and acting 
in sublime harmony with the pure and perfect law of 
rectitude, as revealed in the Intelligence, every one 
regards this as a state, of all others, the most to be 
desired and chosen as a good in itself. To enter 
upon this state, and to continue in it, is therefore re- 
garded as a realization of the idea of Liberty in the 
highest and best sense of the term. Subjection to 
impulse, in opposition to the pure dictates of the In- 
telligence, to the loss of the high prerogative of 
" ruling our own spirits," on the other hand^ is re- 
garded by all men as in itself a state the most abject, 
and least to be desired conceivable. The individual 
that is there, cannot but despise his own image. He, 
of necessity, loathes and abhors himself. Yet he 
submits to self-degradation rather than endure the 



LIBERTY AND SERVITUDE. 197 

pain and effort of self-emancipation. No term but 
Servitude, together with others of a kindred import, 
expresses the true conception of this state. No man 
is in a state of Moral Servitude from choice — that is, 
from choice of the state as a good in itself. The 
state he regards as an evil in itself. Yet, in the ex- 
ercise of free choice, he is there, because he submits 
to self-degradation rather than vindicate his right to 
freedom. 

REMARKS. 

MISTAKE OF GERMAN METAPHYSICIANS. 

1. We notice a prominent and important mistake 
common to metaphysicians, especially of the Ger- 
man school, in their Treatises on the Will. Liberty 
of Will with them is Liberty as distinguished from 
Moral Servitude, and not as distinguished from Ne- 
cessity. Hence, in all their works, very little light is 
thrown upon the great idea of Liberty, which lies at 
the foundation of moral obligation, to wit : Liberty as 
distinguished from Necessity. " A free Will," says 
Kant, " and a Will subjected to the Moral Law, are 
one and identical." A more capital error in philoso- 
phy is not often met with than this. 

MORAL SERVITUDE OF THE RACE. 

2. In the state of Moral Servitude above describ- 
ed, the Bible affirms all men to be, until they are 
emancipated by the influence of the Remedial Sys- 



198 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

tern therein revealed— a truth affirmed by what every 
man experiences in himself, and by the entire mass 
of facts which the history of the race presents. 
Where is the individual that, unaided by an influence 
out of himself, has ever attained to a dominion over 
his own spirit ? Where is the individual that, with- 
out such an influence, can resolve upon acting in har- 
mony with the law of pure benevolence, with any 
rational hope of success ? To meet this great want 
of human nature ; to provide an influence adequate 
to its redemption, from what the Scriptures, with 
great propriety, call the " bondage of corruption," is 
a fundamental design of the Remedial System. 



CHAPTER XV. 
LIBERTY AND DEPENDENCE. 

COMMON IMPRESSION. 

A very common impression exists, — an impression 
universal among those who hold the doctrine of 
Necessity, — that the doctrine of Liberty, as main- 
tained in this Treatise, renders man, really, in most 
important respects, independent of his Creator, and 
therefore, tends to induce in the mind, that spirit of 
haughty independence which is totally opposite and 
antagonistic to that spirit of humility and depen- 
dence which lies at the basis of all true piety and 
virtue. If this is the real tendency of this doctrine, 



LIBERTY AND DEPENDENCE. 199 

it certainly constitutes an important objection against 
it. If, on the other hand, we find in the nature of 
this doctrine, essential elements totally destructive of 
the spirit of pride and self-confidence, and tending 
most strongly to induce the opposite* spirit, — a spirit 
of humility and dependence upon the grace prof- 
fered in the Remedial System ; if we find, also, 
that the doctrine of Necessity, in many fundamental 
particulars, lacks these benign tendencies, we have, 
in such a case, the strongest evidence in favor of the 
former doctrine, and against the latter. The object 
of the present Chapter, therefore, is to elucidate the 
tendency of the doctrine of Liberty to destroy the 
spirit of pride, haughtiness, and self-dependence, and 
to induce the spirit of humility and dependence upon 
Divine Grace. 

SPIRIT OF DEPENDENCE DEFINED. 

Before proceeding directly to argue this question, 
we need to settle definitely the meaning of the 
phrase spirit of dependence. The conviction of our 
dependence is one thing. The spirit of dependence 
is quite another. What is this spirit ? In its ex- 
ercise, the mind rests in voluntary dependence upon 
the grace of God. The heart is fully set upon 
doing the right, and avoiding the wrong, while the 
mind is in the voluntary exercise of trust in God for 
"grace whereby we may serve Him acceptably.' 5 
The spirit of dependence, then, implies obedience 



200 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

actually commenced. The question is, does the 
belief of the doctrine of Liberty tend intrinsically 
to induce the exercise of this spirit ? In this res- 
pect, has it altogether a superiority over the doctrine 
of Necessity ? 

DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY TENDS NOT TO INDUCE THE 
SPIRIT OF DEPENDENCE. 

1. In accomplishing my object, I will first con- 
sider the tendency, in*this one respect, of the doctrine 
of Necessity. An individual, we will suppose, 
finds himself under influences which induce him to 
sin, and which consequently, if this doctrine is true, 
render it impossible for him, without the interposi- 
tion of Divine power, not to sin. A consideration of 
his condition tends to convince him, that is, to induce 
the intellectual conviction, of his entire dependence 
upon Divine grace. But the intellectual conviction 
of our dependence, as above shown, is one thing. 
The spirit of dependence, which, as there stated, 
consists in actually trusting the Most High for grace 
to do what he requires, and implies actual obedience 
already commenced, is quite another thing. Now 
the doctrine of Necessity has a tendency to produce 
this conviction, but none to induce the spirit of de- 
pendence : inasmuch as with this conviction, it 
produces another equally strong, to wit : that the 
creature, without a Divine interposition, will not, 
and cannot, exercise the spirit of dependence. In 



LIBERTY AND DEPENDENCE. 201 

thus producing the conviction, that, under present 
influences, the subject does not, and cannot exercise 
that spirit, this doctrine tends exclusively to the 
annihilation of that Spirit. 

When an individual is in a state of actual obedi- 
ence, the tendency of this doctrine upon him is no 
better ; since it produces the conviction, that while 
a Divine influence, independently of ourselves, pro- 
duces in us a spirit of dependence, we shall and must 
exercise it ; and that while it does not produce that 
spirit, we do not and cannot exercise it. Where is 
the tendency to induce a spirit of dependence, in 
such a conviction \ According to the doctrine of 
Necessity, nothing but the actual interposition of Di- 
vine grace has any tendency to induce a spirit of 
dependence. The belief of this doctrine has no such 
tendency whatever. The grand mistake of the Ne- 
cessitarian here, consists in the assumption, that, be- 
cause his doctrine has a manifest tendency to produce 
the conviction of dependence, it has a tendency equal- 
ly manifest to induce the spirit of dependence ; when, 
in fact, it has no such tendency whatever. 

2. We will now contemplate the intrinsic tenden- 
cies of the doctrine of Liberty to induce the spirit of 
humility and dependence. Every one will see, at 
once, that the consciousness of Liberty cannot itself 
be a ground of dependence, in respect to action, in 
favor of the right and in opposition to the wrong : 
for the possession of such Liberty, as far as the power 
18 



202 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

itself is concerned, leaves us, at all times, equally 
liable to do the one as the other. How can an equal 
liability to two distinct and opposite courses, be a 
ground of assurance, that we shall choose the one, 
and avoid the other ] Thus the consciousness of 
Liberty tends directly and intrinsically to a total an- 
nihilation of the spirit of self-dependence. 

Let us now contemplate our relation to the Most 
High. He knows perfectly in what direction we 
shall, in our self-determination, exert our powers 
under any influence and system of influences brought 
to bear upon us. It is also in His power to subject us 
to any system of influences he pleases. He has re- 
vealed to us the great truth, that if, in the exercise of 
the spirit of dependence, we will trust Him for grace 
to do the good and avoid the evil which He requires 
us to do and avoid, He will subject us to a Divine 
influence, which shall for ever secure us in the one, 
and against the other. The conviction, therefore, 
rises with full and perfect distinctness in the mind, 
that, in the exercise of the spirit of dependence, ac- 
tion in all future time, in the direction of purity and 
bliss, is secure ; and that, in the absence of this 
spirit, action, in the opposite direction, is equally cer- 
tain. In the belief of the doctrine of Liberty, another 
truth becomes an omnipresent reality to our minds, 
that the exercise of this spirit, thus rendering our 
" calling and election sure," is, at all times, practi- 
cable to us. What then is the exclusive tendency of 



LIBERTY AND DEPENDENCE. 203 

this doctrine ^ To destroy the spirit of self-depend- 
ence, on the one hand, and to induce the exercise of 
the opposite spirit, on the other. The doctrine of 
Necessity reveals the fact of dependence, but destroys 
the spirit, by the production of the annihilating con- 
viction, that we neither shall nor can exercise that 
spirit, till God, in his sovereign dispensations, shall 
subject us to an influence which renders it impossi- 
ble for us not to exercise it. The doctrine of Liberty 
reveals, with equal distinctness, the fact of depend- 
ence ; and then, while it produces the hallowed con- 
viction of the perfect practicability of the exercise of 
the spirit of dependence, presents motives infinitely 
strong, not only to induce its exercise, but to empty 
the mind wholly of everything opposed to it. 

GOD CONTROLS ALL INFLUENCES UNDER WHICH CREA- 
TURES DO ACT. 

3. While the existence and continuance of our 
powers of moral agency depend wholly upon the 
Divine Will, and while the Most High knows, with 
entire certainty, in what direction we shall exert our 
powers, under all influences, and systems of influ- 
ences, brought to bear upon us, all these influences 
are entirely at his disposal. What tendency have 
such convictions, together with the consciousness of 
Liberty, and ability to exercise, or not to exercise, 
the spirit of dependence, but to induce us, in the ex- 
ercise of that spirit, to throw our whole being into 



204 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

the petition, "Lead us not into temptation, but de- 
liver us from evil 1" If God knows perfectly under 
what influences action in us shall be in the direction 
of the right, or the wrong, and holds all such influ- 
ences at his own control, what attitude becomes us 
in the presence of the " High and lofty One," but 
dependence and prayer 1 

DEPENDENCE ON ACCOUNT OF THE MORAL SERVITUDE 
OF THE WILL. 

4. Finally, a consciousness of a state of Moral 
Servitude, together with the conviction, that in the 
exercise of the spirit of dependence, we can rise to 
the u Glorious Liberty of the Sons of God ;" that in 
the absence of this spirit, our Moral Servitude is per- 
fectly certain ; all these, together with the conviction 
which the belief of the doctrine of Liberty induces (to 
wit: that the exercise of the spirit of dependence is 
always practicable to us), tends only to one result, to 
induce the exercise of that spirit, and to the total an- 
nihilation of the opposite spirit. 

While, therefore, the doctrine of Liberty sanctifies, 
in the mind, the feeling of obligation to do the right 
and avpid the wrong, a feeling which the doctrine of 
Necessity tends to annihilate, the former (an effect 
which the latter cannot produce) tends only to the 
annihilation of the spirit of pride and self-confidence, 
and to induce that spirit of filial dependence which 
cries " Abba, Father !" 



CHAPTER XVI. 

FORMATION OF CHARACTER. 

ELEMENT OF WILL IN FORMATION OF CHARACTER. 
CHARACTER COMMONLY HOW ACCOUNTED FOR. 

In accounting for the existence and formation of 
peculiarities of character, individual, social, and na- 
tional, two elements only are commonly taken into 
consideration, the natural propensities^ and the cir- 
cumstances and influences under which those pro- 
pensities are developed and controlled. The doctrine 
of Necessity permits us to take nothing else into 
the account. Undoubtedly, these elements have 
very great efficacy in determining character. In 
many instances, little else need to be taken into con- 
sideration, in accounting for peculiarities of charac- 
ter, as they exist around us, in individuals, commu- 
nities, and nations. 

• 

THE VOLUNTARY ELEMENT TO BE TAKEN INTO THE 
ACCOUNT. 

In a vast majority of cases, however, another, 
and altogether a different element, that of the Will, 
or voluntary element, must be taken into the reckon- 
ing, or w T e shall find ourselves wholly unable to 
account for peculiarities of mental and moral de- 
18* 



206 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

velopment, everywhere visible around us. It is an 
old maxim, that " every man is the arbiter of his 
own destiny." As character determines destiny, so 
the Will determines character ; and man is the 
arbiter of his own destiny, only as he is the arbiter 
of his own character. The element of Free. Will, 
therefore, must be taken into the reckoning, if we 
would adequately account for the peculiarities of 
character which the individual, social, and national 
history of the race presents. Even where mental 
and moral developments are as the propensities and 
external influences, still the voluntary element must 
be reckoned in, if we would account for facts as they 
exist. In a majority of instances, however, if the 
two elements under consideration, and these only, 
are taken into the account, we shall find our con- 
clusions very wide from the truth. 

AN EXAMPLE IN ILLUSTRATION. 

I will take, in illustration of the above remarks, 
a single example — a case with which I became so 
familiarly acquainted, that I feel perfectly safe in 
vouching for the truth of the statements which I 
am about to make. I knew a boy who, up to 
the age of ten or twelve years, was under the in- 
fluence of a most ungovernable temper — a temper 
easily and quickly excited, and which, when excit- 
ed, rendered him perfectly desperate. Seldom, 
if ever, was he known to yield in a conflict, how- 



FORMATION OF CHARACTER. 207 

ever superior in strength his antagonist might be. 
Death was always deliberately preferred to submis- 
sion. During this period, he often reflected upon his 
condition, and frequently wished that it was other- 
wise. Still, with melancholy deliberation, he as 
often said to himself, I never can and never shall sub- 
due this temper. At the close of this period, as he 
was reflecting upon the subject again, he made up 
his mind, with perfect fixedness of purpose, that, to 
the control of that temper, he would never more 
yield. The Will rose up in the majesty of its 
power, and assumed the reins of self-government, 
in the respect under consideration. From that mo- 
ment, that temper almost never, even under the high- 
est provocations, obtained the control of the child. 
A total revolution of mental developments resulted. 
He afterwards became as distinguished for natural 
amiability and self-control, in respect to his temper, 
as before he had been for the opposite spirit. This 
total revolution took place from mere prudential 
considerations, without any respect whatever to 
moral obligation. 

Now suppose we attempt to account for these dis- 
tinct and opposite developments of character — de- 
velopments exhibited by the same individual, in 
these two periods — by an exclusive reference to natu- 
ral propensities and external influences. What a to- 
tally inadequate and false account should we give 
of the facts presented ! That individual is just as 



20S 



DOCTRINE OF THE WILL, 



conscious, that it was the element of Free Will that 
produced this revolution, and that when he formed 
the determination which resulted in that revolution, 
he might have determined differently, as he is, or ever 
has been, of any mental states whatever. All the 
facts, also, as they lie out before us, clearly indicate, 
that if we leave out of the account the voluntary 
element, those facts must remain wholly unexplain- 
ed, or a totally wrong explanation of them must be 
given. 

The same principle holds true in all other instan- 
ces. Though natural propensities and external in- 
fluences greatly modify mental developments, still, 
the distinguishing peculiarities of character, in all 
instances, receive their form and coloring from the 
action of the voluntary power. This is true, of the 
peculiarities of character exhibited, not only by indi- 
viduals, but communities and nations. We can 
never account for facts as they are, until we con- 
template man, not only as possessed of Intelligence 
and Sensibility, but also of Free Will. All the pow- 
ers and susceptibilities must be taken into the ac- 
count, if men would know man as he is. 

DIVERSITIES OF CHARACTER. 

A few important definitions will close this Chapter. 

A decisive character exists, where the Will acts in 
harmony with propensities strongly developed. 
When a number of propensities of this kind exist^ 



FORMATION OF CHARACTER. 209 

action, and consequently character, may be change- 
able, and yet decisive. 

Unity and decision of character result, when the 
Will steadily acts in harmony with some one over- 
shadowing propensity. 

Character is fluctuating and changeable^ when the 
Will surrenders itself to the control of different pro- 
pensities, each easily and highly excited in the 
presence of its appropriate objects, and yet the ex- 
citement but temporary. Thus, different propensi- 
ties, in rapid succession, take their turn in controlling 
the Will. 

Indecision and feebleness of character result, 
when the Will uniformly acts under the influence 
of the principle of fear and caution. To such a 
mind, in all important enterprises especially, there 
is always " a lion in the way." Such a mind, there- 
fore, is continually in a state of distressing indecision 
when energetic action is necessary to success. 



CHAPTER XVII, 

CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS. 

A few reflections of a general nature will conclude 
this Treatise. 

OBJECTION. THE WILL HAS ITS LAWS. 

1. An objection, often adduced, to the entire view 
of the subject presented in this Treatise, demands a 
passing notice here. All things in existence, it is 
said, and the Will among the rest, are governed by 
Laws. It is readily admitted, that all things have 
their laws, and that the Will is not without law. 
It is jumping a very long distance to a conclusion, 
however, to infer from such a fact, that Necessity is 
the only law throughout the entire domain of exist- 
ence, physical and mental. What if, from the fact, 
that the Will has its law, it should be assumed that 
Liberty is that law ? This assumption would be just 
as legitimate as the one under consideration. 

OBJECTION. GOD DETHRONED FROM HIS SUPREMACY, 
IF THE DOCTRINE OF LIBERTY IS TRUE. 

2. Another objection of a general nature, is the 
assumption, that the doctrine of Liberty destroys the 
Divine supremacy in the realm of mind. " If man," 
says Dr. Chalmers, " is not a necessary agent, God is 
a degraded sovereign." A sentiment more dishon- 
orable to God, more fraught with fatal error, more 



CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS. 211 

revolting to a virtuous mind, when unperverted by a 
false theory, could scarcely be uttered. Let us, for a 
moment, contemplate the question, whether the doc- 
trine of Liberty admits a Divine government in the 
realm of mind. The existence and perpetuity, as 
stated in a former Chapter, of free and moral agency 
in creatures, depend wholly upon the Divine Will. 
With a perfect knowledge of the direction in which 
they will exert their powers, under every kind and 
degree of influence to which they may be subjected, 
He holds all these influences at his sovereign disposal. 
With such knowledge ^nd resources, can God exer- 
cise no government, but that of a degraded sove- 
reignty in the realm of mind ? Can He not exercise 
the very sovereignty which infinite wisdom and love 
desire ? Who would dare affirm the contrary ? If 
the doctrine of Liberty is true, God certainly does 
not sit upon the throne of iron destiny, swaying the 
sceptre of stern fate over myriads of subjects, mis- 
called moral agents ; subjects, all of whom are com- 
manded, under infinite sanctions, to do the right and 
avoid the wrong, while subjected to influences by 
the Most High himself, which render obedience in 
some, and disobedience in others, absolute impossi- 
bilities. Still, in the light of this doctrine, God has a 
government in the domain of mind, a government 
wisely adapted to the nature of moral agents — agents 
capable of incurring the desert of praise or blame ; 
a government which all approve, and under the be- 
nign influence of which, all who have not forfeited 



212 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

its protection by crime, may find " quietness and as- 
surance for ever." 

OBJECTION. GREAT AND GOOD MEN HAVE HELD THE 
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 

3. In reply to what has been said in respect to the 
tendencies of the doctrine of Necessity, the fact will 
doubtless be adduced, that the greatest and best of 
men have held this doctrine, without a development 
of these tendencies in their experience. My an- 
swer is, that the goodness of such men, their sense 
of moral obligation, &c, did not result from their 
theory, but existed in spite of its intrinsic tendencies. 
They held this doctrine in theory, and yet, from a 
consciousness of Liberty, they practically adopted the 
opposite doctrine. Here, we have the source of the 
deep feeling of obligation in their minds, while the 
intrinsic and exclusive tendency of their Theory , even 
in them, was to weaken and annihilate this hallowed 
feeling. The difference between such men and 
sceptics is this : The piety of the former prevents 
their carrying out their theory to its legitimate re- 
sults ; while the impiety of the latter leads them to 
march boldly up to those results — a fearless denial 
of moral obligation in every form. 

LAST RESORT. 

4. The final resort of certain Necessitarians, who 
may feel themselves wholly unable to meet the ar- 
guments adduced against their own and in favor of the 



CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS. 213 

opposite theory, and are determined to remain fixed 
in their opinions, may be readily anticipated. It is 
an assumption which may be expressed in language 
somewhat like the following : " After all, the im- 
mortal work of Edwards still lives, and will live, 
when those of his opponents will be lost in oblivion. 
That work still remains unanswered." A sweeping 
assumption is a very easy and summary way of dis- 
posing of a difficulty, which we might not otherwise 
know what to do with. Let us for a moment con- 
template some of the facts which have been undeni- 
ably established in reference to this immortal work. 

(1.) At the outset, Edwards stands convicted of a 
fundamental error in philosophy, an error which 
gives form and character to his whole work — the 
confounding of the Will with the Sensibility, and 
thus confounding the characteristics of the pheno- 
mena of the former faculty with those of the pheno- 
mena of the latter. 

(2.) His whole work is constructed without an 
appeal to Consciousness, the only proper and au- 
thoritative tribunal of appeal in the case. Thus his 
reasonings have only an accidental bearing upon his 
subject. 

(3.) All his fundamental conclusions have been 
shown to stand in direct contradiction to the plainest 
and most positive testimony of universal Conscious- 
ness. 

(4.) His main arguments have been shown to 
19 



214 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 

be nothing else but reasoning in a circle. He de- 
fines, for example, the phrase " Greatest apparent 
good," as synonymous with choosing ,and then argues, 
from the fact that the " Will always is as the greatest 
apparent good," that is, that it always chooses as it 
chooses, that it is subject to the law of Necessity. 

So in respect to the argument from the Strongest 
Motive, which, by definition, is fixed upon as the 
Motive in the direction of which the Will, in each 
particular instance, acts. From the fact that the 
action of the Will is always in the direction of this 
Motive, that is, in the direction of the Motive towards 
which it does act, the conclusion is gravely drawn, 
that the Will is and must be subject, in all its de- 
terminations, to the law of Necessity. I find my 
mind acted upon by two opposite Motives. I can- 
not tell which is the strongest, from a contempla- 
tion of what is intrinsic in the Motives themselves, 
nor from their effects upon my Intelligence or Sen- 
sibility. I must wait till my Will has acted. From 
the fact of its action in the direction of one Motive, 
in distinction from the other, I must then draw two 
important conclusions. 1. The Motive, in the di- 
rection of which my Will did act, is the strongest. 
The evidence is, the fact of its action in that direc- 
tion. 2. The Will must be subject to the law of 
Necessity. The proof is, the action of the Will in 
the direction of the Strongest Motive, that is, the 
Motive in the direction of which it did act. Sage 



CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS. 215 

argument to be regarded by Philosophers and Theolo- 
gians of the 19th century, as possessing the elements 
of immortality ! 

(5.) His argument from the Divine fore-knowledge 
has been shown to be wholly based upon an assump- 
tion unauthorized by reason, or revelation either, to 
wit : that he understands the mode of that Fore- 
knowledge, — an assumption which cannot be made 
except through ignorance, as was true in his case, 
without the greatest impiety and presumption. 

(6.) The theory w 7 hich Edwards opposes has 
been shown to render sacred, in all minds that hold 
it, the great idea of duty, of moral obligation ; while 
the validity of that idea has never, in any age or 
nation, been denied, excepting on the avowed au- 
thority of his Theory. 

(7.) All the arguments in proof of the doctrine of 
Necessity, with the single exception of that from 
the Divine Fore-knowledge — an argument resting, as 
we have seen, upon an assumption equally baseless, — 
involve a begging of the question at issue. Take 
any argument we please, with this one exception, 
and it will be seen at once that it has no force at 
all, unless the truth of the doctrine designed to be 
established by it, be assumed as the basis of that ar- 
gument. Shall we pretend that a Theory, that has 
been fully demonstrated to involve, fundamentally, 
the errors, absurdities, and contradictions above 
named, has not been answered ? 



216 



DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 



WILLING, AND AIMING TO PERFORM IMPOSSIBILITIES. 

5. We are now prepared to answer a question 
about which philosophers have been somewhat di- 
vided in opinion — the question, whether the Will can 
act in the direction of perceived and affirmed im- 
possibilities ? The true answer to this question, 
doubtless is, that the Mind may will the occurrence 
of a known impossibility, but it can never aim to 
produce such an occurrence. 

The Mind, for example, while it regards the non- 
existence of God as that which cannot possibly 
occur, may come into such a relation to the Most 
High, that the desire shall arise that God were not. 
With this desire, the Will may concur, in the wish) 
that there were no God. Here the Mind wills a 
known impossibility. In a similar manner, the Mind 
may will its own non-existence, while it regards its 
occurrence, on account of its relation to the Divine 
Will, as impossible. 

But while the Mind may thus will the occurrence 
of an impossibility, it never can, nor will aim, that 
is, intend, to produce what it regards as an impos- 
sibility. A creature may will the non-existence of 
God ; but even a fallen Spirit, regarding the occur- 
rence as an absolute impossibility, never did, nor will 
aim to annihilate the Most High. To suppose the 
Will to set itself to produce an occurrence regarded 
as impossible, involves a contradiction. 



CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS. 217 

For the same reason, the Will will never set itself 
upon the accomplishment of that which it is per- 
fectly assured it never shall accomplish, however 
sincere its efforts towards the result may be. All 
such results are, to the Mind, joracft'caZ impossibilities. 
Extinguish totally in the Mind the hope of obtaining 
the Divine favor, and the Divine favor will never be 
sought. Produce in the Mind the conviction, that 
should it aim at the attainment of a certain end, 
there is an infallible certainty that it will not attain 
it, and the subject of that conviction will no more 
aim to attain that end, than he will aim to cause the 
same thing, at the same time, to be and not to be. 

In reply, it is sometimes said, that men often aim 
at what they regard even as an impossible attain- 
ment. The painter, for example, aims to produce a 
perfect picture, while he knows well that he cannot 
produce one. I answer, the painter is really aim- 
ing at no such thing. He is not aiming to produce 
a perfect picture, which he knows he cannot, and 
will not produce, but to produce one as nearly 
perfect as he can. This is what he is really 
aiming at. Question the individual critically, and 
he will confirm what is here affirmed. Remind him 
of the fact, that ne cannot produce a perfect pic- 
ture. I know that, he replies. I am determined, 
however, to produce one as nearly perfect as possi- 
ble. Here his real aim stands revealed. The same 
principle holds true in all other instances. 
19* 



218 DOCTRINE OF THE WILL. 



THOUGHT AT PARTING. 

6. In taking leave of the reader, I would simply 
say, that if he has distinctly apprehended the great 
doctrine designed to be established in this Work, and 
has happily come to an agreement with the author 
in respect to it, the following hallowed impression 
has been left very distinctly upon his mind. While 
he finds himself in a state of profound and most 
pleasing dependence upon the Author of his being, 
in the Holy of Holies of the inner sanctuary of 
his mind, one idea, the great over-shadowing idea 
of the human Intelligence, has been fully sancti- 
fied — the idea of duty, of moral obligation. With 
the consciousness of Liberty, that idea must be to 
the mind an omnipresent reality. From it we can 
never escape ; and in all states, and in all worlds, it 
must and will be to us, as a guardian angel, or an 
avenging fiend. But one thing remains, and that is, 
through the grace proffered in the Remedial Sys- 
tem, to " live and move, and have our being," in 
harmony with that idea, thus securing everlasting 
" quietness and assurance" in the sanctuary of our 
minds, and ever enduring peace and protection under 
the over-shadowing perfections of the Author of our 
existence, and amid all the arrangements and move- 
ments of his eternal government. 



W 



Deacidified using the Bookkeeper process. 
Neutralizing agent: Magnesium Oxide 
Treatment Date: Nov. 2004 

PreservationTechnologies 

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